Proving undue influence: on the facts and by presumption
How undue influence between the parties to a transaction is proved - on the evidence of the particular transaction, or by a rebuttable presumption arising from the relationship - and where the doctrine stops against duress and unconscionable conduct.
Learning outcomes
- Distinguish proof of undue influence on the facts from proof by presumption, and state what rebuts the presumption.
- Explain why independent advice is evidence on whether the claimant’s will was free rather than a complete answer.
- Separate the two kinds of surety case identified by Dixon J in Yerkey v Jones and explain how the High Court treated them in Garcia v National Australia Bank.
- Attribute each proposition to the Justices who stated it, including where Thorne v Kennedy and Garcia were decided on divided reasoning.
Undue influence is a doctrine of equity, developed by judges, and the High Court decisions cited here apply in every Australian jurisdiction. The question this article answers is how the doctrine is proved as between the parties to a transaction: whether the claimant’s own will was subordinated to the will of the person who took the benefit, and by what route that can be established. A different question arises where a lender takes a guarantee from someone influenced, or left in the dark, by the borrower; that is not a question of proving undue influence between the parties and in the leading High Court case the answer did not depend on a presumption of undue influence at all. It is taken in a separate treatment of guarantees taken by lenders. This article does not cover the statutory regimes that sit beside the general law, the consequences of vitiation such as rescission and the bars to it, or duress and unconscionable conduct beyond the boundary points noted below.
What the doctrine asks
The question is whether the claimant’s act was free. The five-Justice plurality in Thorne v Kennedy [2017] HCA 49 said that pressure can deprive a person of free choice where it causes the person substantially to subordinate his or her will to that of the other party, and that it is not necessary to find the person was reduced entirely to an automaton.1 The plurality added that, at the very least, the judgmental capacity of the party seeking relief must be “markedly sub-standard” as a result of the effect upon the person’s mind of the will of another. It also said that pressure is only one of the many sources of influence, so the pressure that contributes to a conclusion of undue influence need not be characterised as illegitimate or improper.1
Dixon J, in Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113, put the basis of the jurisdiction as “the prevention of an unconscientious use of any special capacity or opportunity that may exist or arise of affecting the alienor’s will or freedom of judgment in reference to such a matter”.2 Evatt J agreed with Dixon J’s reasons. The same passage records that the source of that power may be found “in no antecedent relation but in a particular situation, or in the deliberate contrivance of the party”, so no antecedent relationship is necessary, but the facts must show that the transaction was the outcome of such an actual influence over the mind of the alienor that it cannot be considered the alienor’s free act.
Two ways to prove it
The plurality in Thorne v Kennedy said there are different ways to prove undue influence: direct evidence of the circumstances of the particular transaction, or a presumption.1
Proof on the facts. The primary judge in Thorne found undue influence on the evidence, and the plurality upheld that finding. Ms Thorne, a fiancée who had moved to Australia, signed a pre-nuptial agreement four days before the wedding, having been told by her fiancé that the wedding would not go ahead if she did not sign; an independent solicitor had advised her not to sign and she signed anyway. The plurality said the gap between her understanding of that advice and her act of signing was capable of being a circumstance relevant to whether undue influence should be inferred, and that a grossly unreasonable agreement signed despite being known to be so can be an indicium of undue influence. For agreements of that kind it listed factors that may have prominence, among them whether the agreement was offered on a basis that it was not subject to negotiation, any explicit or implicit threat to end the engagement, whether there was time for careful reflection, the parties’ relative financial positions and the independent advice received. The list is the plurality’s own, for pre-nuptial and post-nuptial agreements, and is not a general checklist for every transaction.1 In Johnson v Buttress Starke J, while doubting that the facts placed the case in a protected class, thought it open to the trial judge to infer from the circumstances that the transfer was the result of unfair and undue pressure rather than free and deliberate judgment.2
Proof by presumption. The plurality in Thorne said that a presumption arises where the claimant is proved to be in a particular relationship and the transaction is one, commonly involving a substantial benefit to another, that cannot be explained by ordinary motives or is not readily explicable by the relationship of the parties. The classes of relationship are not closed. Latham CJ in Johnson v Buttress listed parent and child, guardian and ward, trustee and beneficiary, solicitor and client, physician and patient, and cases of religious influence, and said the list is not exhaustive.2 Outside the recognised classes, the plurality said the presumption can be raised by proof that the history of the particular relationship involved one party occupying a position of ascendancy or influence and the other a corresponding position of dependency or trust. Either way the presumption is rebuttable by the other party proving that the particular transaction, in its particular circumstances, was nevertheless the result of the weaker party’s free will.1
The relationship of fiancé and fiancée is not a recognised class. The Thorne plurality, which noted that Dixon J had treated it as one in 1936 and 1939, concluded that common experience today of the wide variety of circumstances in which two people become engaged negates any presumption that either substantially subordinates his or her free will to the other.1
Johnson v Buttress shows the presumption at work. Mr Buttress was an elderly, illiterate man who gave away his only property, a cottage that was his sole source of income, to a relative of his late wife on whom he had come to rely for advice and support in his business matters. The High Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, leaving the decree setting aside the transfer in place. Latham CJ held that, although it had not been affirmatively proved that Mrs Johnson exercised undue influence, she had not displaced the presumption that arose, and Dixon J held that an antecedent relation of influence existed which threw on her the burden of showing the transfer was the free exercise of Buttress’s independent will, a burden she had quite failed to discharge.2
Latham CJ also said that evidence that independent advice has been given is one means, and the most obvious means, of helping to establish that a gift was the result of the free exercise of independent will, and that the absence of such advice, even if not sufficient in itself to invalidate the transaction, would be a most important factor, even though it might not be necessary in every case to show competent independent advice.2 Advice is therefore evidence on the question whether the will was free. Thorne shows it does not settle that question on its own: the advice there was emphatic, and was not followed.
Where undue influence stops
Two neighbouring doctrines are covered in their own articles, and the plurality in Thorne drew these lines. On duress, it said that the extent to which pressure came from the other party, and whether it was illegitimate or improper, are matters “within the domain of duress rather than undue influence” (see Duress). On unconscionable conduct, it said the two doctrines overlap and the same circumstances can support both, but that they have distinct spheres of operation: special disadvantage for unconscionable conduct can be shown by a finding of undue influence but also by many circumstances that would not establish undue influence, and the plurality set Mason J’s contrast between a will that is “overborne” and a will that is independent and voluntary but the product of a disadvantageous position that the other party unconscientiously exploits (see Unconscionable conduct).1
The five-Justice plurality found both undue influence and unconscionable conduct on the facts. Gordon J, agreeing in the orders, reached her conclusion by a different path: she found the agreements were procured by unconscionable conduct but not undue influence, because Ms Thorne’s capacity to make an independent judgment was not affected and her will was not overborne. Nettle J also agreed in the orders in separate reasons. A student relying on Thorne for its account of undue influence is relying on the reasons of five of the seven Justices.1
Applying this in a problem question
- State the jurisdiction. The decisions here are High Court authority on judge-made equity, but check whether any statute applies to the transaction.
- Ask who benefits from the transaction and who exercised the influence. If a lender took a guarantee at the debtor’s instance, the question is a different one and belongs with the guarantee cases.
- Ask whether actual influence can be shown on the facts, using the Thorne indicia where the transaction is a financial agreement between partners, and treating them as that plurality’s list for that context, not as elements.
- If not, ask whether the relationship is a recognised class, or can be shown to have involved ascendancy or influence on one side and dependency or trust on the other, and whether the transaction cannot be explained by ordinary motives. Do not assume fiance and fiancee, or any other relationship, is a class.
- If a presumption arises, ask whether the other party has shown the transaction was nonetheless the result of free will. Treat independent advice as evidence, not as a certificate, and ask whether it was given and followed.
- Note which Justices said what. Gordon J did not find undue influence in Thorne.
Self-check
- Have I identified which of the two routes to proof the facts support, rather than asserting undue influence at large?
- Have I treated independent advice as evidence rather than a complete answer?
- Have I attributed the Thorne account to the five-Justice plurality and noted Gordon J’s different route?
- Have I avoided treating the Thorne factors as elements, or as a checklist for transactions other than the financial agreements they were stated for?