Guarantees taken by lenders: when a surety is not bound
When a lender is bound by what happened between a surety and the debtor - the route through the debtor’s undue influence where the lender left the procuring to him, and the Yerkey and Garcia principles for a surety who did not understand the transaction.
Learning outcomes
- Separate the two kinds of guarantee case - the surety who was overborne, and the surety who did not understand the transaction - and say which the facts raise.
- State the four circumstances the joint reasons in Garcia identified, and say what that Court left open.
- Explain why the second kind of case does not rest on a presumption of undue influence.
A lender that takes a guarantee from the borrower’s spouse or relative is not a party to whatever passed between them. The question is when it is nevertheless bound by it. That is not the question of proving undue influence between the parties to a transaction, which is taken in Proving undue influence; the plurality in Thorne v Kennedy said expressly that it was not concerned with when a person can take the benefit of a transaction procured by the undue influence of a third party, which raises additional issues where the recipient is not a volunteer.4 Those issues are the subject of the guarantee cases, and in the leading High Court decision the answer did not depend on a presumption of undue influence at all. This article does not cover the statutory regimes that sit beside the general law, or the consequences of vitiation such as rescission and the bars to it.
Where the lender left the procuring to the debtor
In Bank of New South Wales v Rogers (1941) 65 CLR 42, a niece had given a bank security over her shares for the overdraft of her uncle, with whom she had lived since her father’s death. The appeal against the declaration that the security did not bind her was dismissed by Starke, McTiernan and Williams JJ. Starke J held that the uncle stood in loco parentis, so that the relationship was one from which undue influence is presumed unless rebutted. He inferred that the bank knew that some special relationship of confidence and trust existed between them, found that the bank had prepared the documents and left it to the uncle to procure the critical authorities, and held that it “must therefore abide the consequences of his undue influence”. He also found that the bank gave her neither the information nor the advice that her situation required.1 The account of Rogers here is of Starke J’s reasons only.
The wife as surety: Dixon J’s two kinds of case
In Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649, a wife had given a second mortgage over her land to secure part of the purchase price of a property her husband had agreed to buy. The lenders succeeded in the High Court: Latham CJ allowed the appeal on the footing that the terms of the mortgage were explained to her in detail and the lenders had reason to think she understood it, Rich J said he was not prepared to dissent from that conclusion, McTiernan J concurred in the order (agreeing “with some doubt” that the facts did not raise an equity), and Dixon J held that she had not made out a case for equitable relief. Dixon J’s reasons are nonetheless the source of the principles discussed in Garcia.2 He distinguished cases in which a wife who understands what she is undertaking is procured to become surety by her husband’s undue influence “affirmatively established” from cases in which she does not understand the effect of the document or the nature of suretyship. In the first, he said, the creditor’s explanation of the document will not protect it: “Nothing but independent advice or relief from the ascendancy of her husband over her judgment and will would suffice.”2
Garcia: the two kinds restated as accepted equitable principle
Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395 is the High Court’s later treatment. Mrs Garcia signed a guarantee of debts of a company controlled by her husband, secured by an all-moneys mortgage over her home. The trial judge found she did not understand that the guarantee was secured by the mortgage, that she signed after pressure from her husband, and that the bank took no step to explain the transaction. He made no positive finding of actual undue influence, and none was contended for in the appeal. The High Court allowed her appeal, restoring the trial judge’s orders.3
The joint reasons of Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ, with Kirby J and Callinan J writing separately, said that the principles in Yerkey v Jones are simply particular applications of accepted equitable principles, and that they are not based on notions of the subservience or inferior economic position of women. They said Dixon J dealt with two kinds of case. The first is actual undue influence by a husband, in which the surety is overborne and does not bring a free mind and will to the decision. The second involves no undue influence but a failure to explain adequately and accurately the suretyship transaction.3
The four circumstances that make enforcement unconscionable
On the second kind of case the joint reasons in Garcia said that the analysis “is not one which depends upon any presumption of undue influence by the husband over the wife”, and does not depend on the husband acting as the creditor’s agent. They identified the combination of circumstances that makes it unconscionable to enforce the guarantee:
(a) in fact the surety did not understand the purport and effect of the transaction;
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(b) the transaction was voluntary (in the sense that the surety obtained no gain from the contract the performance of which was guaranteed);
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(c) the lender is to be taken to have understood that, as a wife, the surety may repose trust and confidence in her husband in matters of business and therefore to have understood that the husband may not fully and accurately explain the purport and effect of the transaction to his wife; and yet
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(d) the lender did not itself take steps to explain the transaction to the wife or find out that a stranger had explained it to her.3
Notice, advice, and what Garcia left open
The joint reasons said they preferred not to adopt the analysis of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien, which proceeded from the circumstances in which a creditor is taken to have notice of the wife’s equity to set the transaction aside, and that the only question of notice that arises is whether the creditor knew at the time of the guarantee that the surety was then married to the borrower. A creditor can avoid the problem, they said, if it itself explains the transaction sufficiently or knows that the surety has received “competent, independent and disinterested” advice from a third party. The joint reasons did not decide whether the principles extend to relationships short of marriage, or to a husband who stands surety for his wife, and said those questions were not before the Court. Kirby J instead favoured a re-formulation of the O’Brien principle, and Callinan J would have applied the principles stated by Dixon J.3 In Australia, English authority such as O’Brien is persuasive only and not binding, and the joint reasons in Garcia declined to adopt it.
What each kind of case rests on
Two points follow for a student who has read only the earlier overview. In Garcia the second kind of case was explained by the joint reasons as resting on unconscionability in enforcing against a mistaken volunteer, not on a presumption of undue influence. And the first kind of case remains one of actual undue influence, where an explanation by the lender is not enough.
Applying this in a problem question
- State the jurisdiction. These are High Court decisions on judge-made equity, but check whether any statute applies to the guarantee.
- Separate the two kinds of case before anything else, because they are proved differently and the lender’s answer differs.
- If the surety understood the transaction but was overborne, ask whether actual undue influence by the debtor is established. On the Rogers route, ask whether the lender knew of the relationship of influence, left the procuring to the debtor, and can show the security was the surety’s voluntary and well-understood act. Keep that route distinct from the wife-surety principles.
- If the surety did not understand the transaction, test the four circumstances in Garcia, remembering that they were stated for a wife as surety for her husband and that the joint reasons left other relationships open.
- Do not reach for a presumption of undue influence to explain the second kind of case. The joint reasons said in terms that the analysis does not depend on one.
- Ask what the lender actually did. An explanation by the lender does not answer the first kind of case; in the second, explaining the transaction sufficiently, or knowing that a competent, independent and disinterested stranger has explained it, is what protects the lender.
- Note which Justices said what. Garcia carries separate reasons from Kirby J and Callinan J, and the account of Rogers here is of Starke J’s reasons only.
Self-check
- Have I said which of the two kinds of case the facts raise?
- Have I avoided saying a presumption of undue influence explains the second kind of case in Garcia?
- Have I said what Garcia left open about relationships other than husband and wife?
- Have I identified whose reasons I am relying on, rather than writing “the Court held”?