Guarantees taken by lenders: when a surety is not bound

Where the lender left the procuring to the debtor

In Bank of New South Wales v Rogers, a niece secured her uncle’s overdraft with her shares. She had lived with him since her father died. The appeal against the finding that she wasn’t bound failed.

Starke J said the uncle stood in loco parentis to her — meaning he acted in a father’s role. This relationship meant undue influence was presumed, unless the bank could rebut it.

He found the bank likely knew about their close relationship of trust. The bank prepared the documents but left it to the uncle to get the needed authorisations from her.

Because of this, Starke J held the bank had to bear the consequences of the uncle’s undue influence. The bank also failed to give her the information or advice she needed.

Note: this summary covers only Starke J’s reasoning in Rogers, not the other judges’.

The wife as surety: Dixon J’s two kinds of case

In Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649, a wife had given a second mortgage over her land. This secured part of the price of a property her husband agreed to buy.

The lenders won in the High Court. Latham CJ allowed the appeal because the mortgage terms were explained to her in detail. He found the lenders had reason to think she understood it.

Rich J would not dissent from that conclusion. McTiernan J agreed with the result, though “with some doubt” that the facts raised no equity (a court-made right to relief). Dixon J held she had not made out a case for equitable relief.

Despite losing, Dixon J’s reasoning became the basis for the principles later discussed in Garcia. He drew a distinction between two kinds of case.

The first is where a wife understands what she is signing, but her husband’s undue influence (improper pressure overbearing her free will) is “affirmatively established” — meaning proved, not presumed. The second is where she does not understand the document or the nature of being a surety (someone who guarantees another’s debt).

In the first kind of case, Dixon J reasoned that a creditor’s explanation of the document will not protect the transaction. He said only independent advice, or freedom from her husband’s ascendancy over her judgment and will, would suffice.

*Garcia*: the two kinds restated as accepted equitable principle

Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395 is the High Court’s later decision on this area.

Mrs Garcia guaranteed her husband’s company debts, secured by a mortgage over her home. The trial judge found she did not understand this, had been pressured by her husband, and got no explanation from the bank. There was no finding of actual undue influence, and none was argued on appeal. The High Court allowed her appeal, restoring the trial judge’s orders.[^cite:garcia-v-nab-yerkey-explained]

The majority judges said the principles from Yerkey v Jones are just ordinary equitable principles. They are not based on ideas that women are subservient or financially weaker.

They said Dixon J identified two kinds of case. First, actual undue influence: the husband overbears the wife’s will, so she doesn’t decide freely. Second, no undue influence, but the lender fails to properly explain the transaction to the surety.[^cite:garcia-v-nab-yerkey-explained]

What each kind of case rests on

In Garcia, the joint reasons explained the second kind of case differently. It rests on unconscionability: it would be unfair to enforce the guarantee against a surety who gave it by mistake and got nothing for it. This is not the same as a presumption of undue influence.

The first kind of case stays different. It still requires actual undue influence. A lender explaining the transaction to the surety does not fix this problem.

Applying this in a problem question

Start by naming the jurisdiction. These cases come from High Court equity, but check if a statute also applies to the guarantee.

Split the two kinds of case early. They are proved differently, and the lender’s defence differs too.

If the surety understood the deal but was pressured, ask if actual undue influence by the debtor is proven. Under the Rogers approach, check if the lender knew of the influence, left things to the debtor, and can show the surety acted voluntarily and understood the transaction. Keep this separate from the wife-surety principles below.

If the surety did not understand the transaction, apply the four Garcia factors. These were developed for a wife guaranteeing her husband’s debt, though the judges left room for other relationships.

Do not use a presumption of undue influence for this second kind of case. The joint judgment said the reasoning does not rely on one.

Check what the lender actually did. Explaining the transaction does not help the lender in the first kind of case. In the second kind, it does help, if the lender either explained it properly or knew an independent, competent person had done so.

Note whose reasoning you are using. Kirby J and Callinan J wrote separately in Garcia, and the summary of Rogers here reflects only Starke J’s reasoning.

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