Rescission for a vitiating factor: election, affirmation and the bars
What a party must do and can lose when avoiding a contract in equity: rescission as the party’s own act, affirmation and election, restitutio in integrum and equity’s flexibility, relief on terms, and the effect of third-party rights.
Learning outcomes
- Explain that rescission for a vitiating factor is the claimant’s own act and that the court adjudicates its validity.
- Identify the conduct and knowledge relevant to affirmation, and say how far Sargent v ASL Developments can be applied.
- Explain how equity treats restitutio in integrum differently from the common law, using Alati v Kruger and Vadasz v Pioneer Concrete.
- Identify when relief may be partial or on terms, and when a later equitable interest acquired for value without notice can defeat a claim to set a transaction aside.
The individual vitiating factors each explain why a contract may be attacked. This article is about what the person attacking it then has to do, and what can still go wrong: in the misrepresentation cases cited here rescission is something a party does, a party can lose the right to do it, and a court that gives effect to it may do so only on terms. These questions come after the factor is made out and apply across the factors, so they are collected here rather than repeated in each factor’s article.
The authorities are High Court cases that state the general law. Alati v Kruger was a case of fraudulent misrepresentation, and in Vadasz v Pioneer Concrete (SA) Pty Ltd the High Court assumed fraud without finding it. The article does not say that every principle below applies unchanged to every vitiating factor, and it flags where a case’s own facts limit it.
What this covers
This article covers four things: who rescinds and what the court’s role is, how a party who knows of the defect can lose the right by affirming, how equity treats the requirement that the parties be returned to their former positions, and how a third party’s rights can defeat a claim to set a transaction aside. It also covers the terms a court may attach to relief.
It does not cover the content of any vitiating factor, the statutory orders available for misleading or deceptive conduct under the Australian Consumer Law, delay and laches beyond what Alati v Kruger says about conduct during litigation, or whether a completed (executed) contract can be rescinded for innocent misrepresentation. No statute is cited here, so no statutory provision is stated.
Rescission is the party’s own act, and the court adjudicates it
In Alati v Kruger the joint reasons of Dixon CJ, Webb, Kitto and Taylor JJ said that “Rescission for misrepresentation is always the act of the party himself”, and that the function of a court in which proceedings for rescission are taken is to adjudicate upon the validity of a purported disaffirmance as an act avoiding the transaction ab initio and, if it is valid, to give effect to it and make appropriate consequential orders.1
The same joint reasons set out the choices open to a purchaser who had been induced to buy a business by a fraudulent misrepresentation that was also a term of the contract. The purchaser could sue for damages for breach of warranty, but could not do that and also rescind. The purchaser could sue to recover as damages for fraud the difference between the price paid and the fair value of the property at the time of the contract, which the joint reasons said would again involve affirming the purchase. Or, provided the purchaser was in a position to restore substantially what had been received, the purchaser could avoid the purchase and sue to recover the purchase money with interest, and also with damages for any loss suffered through carrying on the business in the meantime.1 The joint reasons agreed with the trial judge that, by issuing the writ claiming rescission, the purchaser had elected to take the third course.
Two points follow for a problem question, both limited to rescission for misrepresentation as Alati v Kruger describes it. Wanting to rescind is not itself an election: in that case the election was found in what the purchaser did, namely issuing a writ that primarily claimed rescission, despite an alternative claim on the warranty, so the question is what the client has done. And the court’s order gives effect to the party’s act if that act was valid, rather than creating the rescission. The article does not say the same of every vitiating factor: Maguire v Makaronis, a fiduciary-breach case, is described below as one in which the clients’ equity was to have the whole transaction rescinded.
Affirmation: knowledge and unequivocal conduct
The authorities cited here put affirmation in terms of what the claimant knew and did. In Alati v Kruger the joint reasons found that the purchaser, on discovering the falsity of the representation, “acted promptly and without having done anything which could amount to an affirmation of the purchase”.1
For what counts as affirmation, the fullest High Court treatment among the authorities cited here is Stephen J’s account of election in Sargent v ASL Developments Ltd. That case concerned vendors’ contractual right to rescind a contract of sale of land, not rescission for a vitiating factor, so what follows is an analogy and not a statement of the rule for vitiating factors. Stephen J held that, where contractually conferred rights were in issue, what had to be established was the vendors’ knowledge of the facts giving rise to the inconsistent legal rights; their own understanding of the nature or extent of those rights was irrelevant. He said that the words or conduct ordinarily required to constitute an election “must be unequivocal in the sense that it is consistent only with the exercise of one of the two sets of rights and inconsistent with the exercise of the other”, while adding that less unequivocal conduct, providing only some evidence of an election, may suffice if coupled with actual knowledge of the right of election. He held that, at least in the case of election between affirming a contract and disaffirming it under rights conferred by that contract, detriment to the other party is not a necessary element of election.4
Stephen J added a limit that matters for how far the case can be pushed. He said he was not to be taken as concluding that, where contractually conferred rights are not in issue, there can be no binding election without knowledge of the right to elect, and that he did not need to decide the point.4 Mason J gave separate reasons in the case; the passages above are Stephen J’s, and none is attributed to Mason J.
Restitutio in integrum: the common law requirement and equity’s flexibility
In Alati v Kruger the ability to restore to the vendor substantially what the purchaser had received was the condition on which the third course was open (restitutio in integrum), and the joint reasons treated equity and the common law differently on how strictly it is applied. They said that, if the case had been decided on common law principles, it might have been argued that the purchaser was not entitled to rescind because he could not return in specie what he had received in the same plight. In equity, though, the disaffirmance of a contract induced by fraud was valid “even though precise restitutio in integrum is not possible, if the situation is such that, by the exercise of its powers, including the power to take accounts of profits and to direct inquiries as to allowances proper to be made for deterioration, it can do what is practically just between the parties, and by so doing restore them substantially to the status quo”.1
On the facts, the purchaser had taken possession of the business, had used some stock that could not be returned in specie, and the business had deteriorated through no fault of the purchaser. The joint reasons held that these changes did not stand in the way of rescission, because money could allow for the stock and the deterioration was not the purchaser’s fault.1 The joint reasons then varied the orders so that the purchase money was repaid after deducting the value of stock and chattels that could not be returned and of any use of the property.
The joint reasons in Vadasz v Pioneer Concrete (SA) Pty Ltd repeated the same point and tied it to the effect of rescission: “the result is to set aside the contract ab initio”, and while equity followed the law in requiring restitution as a condition of rescission where a contract had been wholly or partly executed, “equity did not require complete restitution of the position which existed before the contract but allowed its remedies, particularly an order for monetary accounts, to be utilized to achieve practical restitution and justice”. They also said that, had the guarantor in that case relied on the common law, he would not have been entitled to rescission, because the contract did not remain completely executory and he could not return in specie what he had received.2
Relief may be partial or conditional
Setting a transaction aside is not always all-or-nothing. In Vadasz v Pioneer Concrete (SA) Pty Ltd the guarantor had signed a guarantee believing it covered only the company’s future debts, and the trial judge found he had been induced by the other side’s misrepresentation. The joint reasons dismissed his appeal against an order that relieved him of liability for past indebtedness only and left him liable for debts incurred after he signed. They said it was unnecessary to decide whether, absent an offer to do equity, the order should be characterised as partial rescission or as partial setting aside of the guarantee, because the money judgment would be the same either way. They reasoned that he had obtained the benefit he sought, further supply of goods on credit to the company, and had not offered to pay for those goods; that “he who seeks equity must do equity”; and that holding him to the future-debt liability did no more than hold him to what he was prepared to undertake independently of the misrepresentation. They said that “The concern of equity, in moulding relief between the parties is to prevent, nullify, or provide compensation for, wrongful injury”, and, in a passage referring to Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio, that “If it appears that the other party would not have entered into the contract at all if the true position were known, the contract may be set aside in its entirety”.2 Fraud was assumed, and the joint reasons stressed that no actual finding of fraud had been or was being made.
The same condition-setting appears in Maguire v Makaronis, a case of breach of fiduciary duty by solicitors who acted for their clients in a mortgage under which the solicitors were themselves the undisclosed mortgagees. The joint reasons of Brennan CJ, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ said that to set the mortgage aside purely in its operation as a security, without conditioning that on repayment, “would be to reform the transaction in an impermissible fashion”, because the clients would be left with the fruits of the transaction “whereas their equity was to have the whole transaction rescinded and, so far as possible, the parties remitted to their original position”.3 That case concerned a fiduciary breach, not a misrepresentation, and is cited here only for the point that relief which rescinds is conditioned on the return of what the other side gave.
The joint reasons in Vadasz also quoted Lord Wright in Spence v Crawford as saying that a court “will be more drastic in exercising its discretionary powers in a case of fraud than in a case of innocent misrepresentation”. That is the joint reasons reporting an English statement; it is not their own holding, and the article does not say how far it has been applied since.2
The court’s discretion and the claimant’s conduct
In Alati v Kruger the joint reasons said that the remedy is discretionary, and that if the purchaser had acted unconscientiously while the action was pending, for instance by causing the loss of a valuable leasehold and goodwill by discontinuing the business and abandoning the premises without giving the vendor a reasonable opportunity to take them back, the court might refuse relief. They found nothing of that kind in the case: the vendor had been served with the writ, knew the judge’s findings, did not apply for a receiver or offer to take the property back, and the purchaser was under no duty to go on working for nothing and incurring losses.1 From this a student can take that the court looks at the claimant’s conduct after rescission is claimed, and that in this case the vendor’s own inaction was part of the reason the complaint of unfairness failed.
Fullagar J agreed with the joint reasons but wrote separately on a purchaser who has purported to rescind and remains in possession. He described restitutio in integrum as “a condition of rescission” and reasoned that such a purchaser is under a duty to take reasonable care to preserve the property so that it may, so far as reasonably practicable, be restored; that where the property includes a business’s goodwill the purchaser must carry on the business and take reasonable care to preserve the goodwill; and that, on a breach causing deterioration, the court may find it inequitable to decree rescission or may make compensation for the deterioration a condition of the decree. He thought the purchaser need not remain in possession, but would breach the duty by abandoning the property without notice to the vendor, whereas, if the purchaser gave reasonable notice offering to restore possession, a vendor who declined the offer would act at his own risk. These are the reasons of one Justice only, and he found on the facts that the vendor had not established loss caused by any breach of duty.1
Third parties
A transaction cannot always be set aside against someone who has acquired rights from the person who obtained it. The Court said in Alati v Kruger that if a court of equity would treat a rescission as effectual, the equitable title to property which had passed revests on the rescission, although a rescission which the common law would not accept cannot of its own force revest the legal title.1
Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd shows the effect of a later third party’s interest. The case concerned a sale of land under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) by a mortgagee, which the trial court had held was exercised not in good faith but in fraud of the mortgagor; the purchaser was a subsidiary of the mortgagee, and the third party was the trustee of a debenture deed who claimed a charge over the purchaser’s assets. It was not a case about a contract induced by a vitiating factor, and the reasoning is tied to Torrens land and the mortgagee’s power of sale. Kitto J held that, apart from any estoppel, the trustee’s equitable charge stood in the way of the mortgagor’s success “because it was acquired for value and without any notice either of the existence of the mortgagor’s right to set aside the sale or of any facts from which such a right might be inferred”; he accepted that, if the mortgagor was entitled to have the sale set aside, it had more than a mere equity, but treated the case as within a category described by Lord Westbury in Phillips v Phillips in which the defence of purchase for value without notice can succeed although the purchaser holds no legal estate. Menzies J treated the contest as one between the mortgagor’s equity to have the conveyance set aside and the equitable interest of a holder who took without notice, and held that the maxim “Qui prior est tempore potior est jure” has no application in that contest.5 Only the reasons of Kitto J and Menzies J are stated here; Taylor J’s reasons are not. The case is therefore authority for a limited proposition about a later equitable interest acquired for value without notice; it does not tell a student when a bona fide purchaser of the legal title takes free, and the article does not state that rule.
Where the boundaries are
- Whether and when a completed (executed) contract can be rescinded for innocent misrepresentation is not established by the authorities cited here.
- Delay and laches as an independent bar are not established by the authorities cited here beyond what Alati v Kruger says about conduct after rescission is claimed.
- Statutory powers to declare a contract void, vary it or refuse to enforce it, such as those under the Australian Consumer Law, are different in source and scope from the equitable relief above and are not stated here.
- Every case relied on was decided in the High Court under the general law, but facts and findings differ: fraud in Alati v Kruger, assumed fraud in Vadasz, fiduciary breach in Maguire v Makaronis, a contractual right in Sargent, a mortgagee’s sale in Latec.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the vitiating factor first; this article only begins once a ground to avoid the contract is made out, and it does not decide whether it is.
- Ask what the claimant has done since learning of the defect. Under Alati v Kruger, prompt action without anything amounting to affirmation supported rescission. Use Sargent by analogy only: it concerned a contractual right to rescind, and Stephen J left open whether knowledge of the right to elect is needed where contractual rights are not in issue.
- Ask whether the parties can be put substantially back in their former positions. Do not stop at “the goods cannot be returned”: Alati v Kruger and Vadasz treat money, accounts and allowances as ways of achieving what is practically just, though Vadasz also says that complete restitution was not possible there and the case turned on equity’s flexibility.
- Consider whether relief will be partial or on terms. In Vadasz the guarantee was set aside for past debts only; in Maguire v Makaronis rescission of the mortgage was conditioned on repayment. Say that each depends on its own facts.
- Ask whether a third party has acquired an interest. Cite Latec for a later equitable interest acquired for value without notice, say that it concerned a mortgagee’s sale of Torrens land and that only the reasons of Kitto J and Menzies J are stated, and do not extend it to every purchaser.
- State the consequence precisely and flag what the cases above do not settle: statutory orders, and whether an executed contract can be rescinded for innocent misrepresentation.
Self-check
- Have I treated rescission as the claimant’s act, with the court adjudicating its validity, rather than as an order the court makes of its own motion?
- Have I identified what the claimant knew and did after discovering the defect, and noted that Sargent is an analogy about a contractual right to rescind?
- Have I explained how equity deals with restitution and its limit, and not said that restitution can never be a problem?
- Have I said that relief may be partial or conditional, and attributed Vadasz, Maguire and Alati to their own facts and to the joint reasons?
- Have I limited Latec to its facts and to Kitto J and Menzies J, and not stated a general rule for bona fide purchasers?
- Have I said which questions this article does not answer: statute, delay and the executed-contract rule?