Sargent v ASL Developments Ltd
Sargent v ASL Developments Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 634
Three sellers relied on a clause that let them rescind over an undisclosed planning defect. What did their later dealings with the contracts do to that right?
What happened?
Three contracts for adjoining land near Castle Hill were made in late 1969 with the same purchaser, by Mrs V M Sargent, by Mr and Mrs C T Sargent and by Mr and Mrs K D Turnbull, on the standard form (Mason J at 650). Clause 16 let either party rescind by notice if the land was affected by a town planning scheme or interim development otherwise than as stated in the Fourth Schedule (Mason J at 650). No planning certificate was annexed to the contracts, so the schedule said nothing about planning (Stephen J at 638-639).
The primary judge held that clause 16 conferred a right of rescission on each vendor (Mason J at 651). The question on appeal was whether the vendors had lost that right by what they did afterwards under the contracts (Stephen J at 641). The vendors served notices of rescission in 1972, and the Supreme Court made orders for specific performance in the purchaser’s favour (Mason J at 650-652).
What did the Court decide?
The three appeals were dismissed with costs. McTiernan ACJ, Stephen J and Mason J agreed in the orders (Mason J at 659).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Where a contract itself confers a right to rescind, a party that affirms the contract by unequivocal conduct, knowing the facts that give it the right, loses the right by election. Stephen J held that knowledge of the facts is enough, that detriment to the other party is not a necessary element, and that less unequivocal conduct may suffice only with actual knowledge of the right to elect (at 644, 646-647). Mason J reached the same orders by a separate route: a party that exercises rights under the contract while aware of the facts that entitle it to terminate is bound by an election to affirm, even if unaware of the right to terminate (at 658). The three appeals were dismissed with costs. Stephen J expressly left open whether knowledge of the right to elect is needed where the rights in question do not arise under a contract (at 645).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · Stephen J
Read judgment: p 646 (opens in a new tab)
Stephen J’s statement that the vendors are taken to know the rights conferred by the clause, so knowledge of the facts that bring the clause into operation is enough, and that unequivocal conduct is what constitutes the election. This is the step that answers the appellants’ argument, so it is necessary to the orders. Stephen J’s reasons concur in dismissing the appeals.
Separate reasoning · Mason J
Read judgment: p 658 (opens in a new tab)
Mason J concurs in the orders but reaches the knowledge element by a different route: he holds that knowledge of the facts sufficient to alert the party to the alternative right is enough, and that the right to terminate need not be known. He states this as a general principle for contract and property. His reasons are not Stephen J’s and the two are not combined.
Obiter · Stephen J
Read judgment: p 645 (opens in a new tab)
Stephen J states that he does not decide whether knowledge of the right to elect is needed where the rights in issue do not arise under a contract. The point was unnecessary to the outcome, so it is obiter.
Why does this case matter?
A student who reads only the clause will answer a different question from the one the examiner sets. The clause gives the right; the examiner asks what the party did with it after the contract was made. A student who spends the answer on the clause’s wording and not on that later conduct has missed the point of the case.
Exam and application relevance
Use Sargent when a question asks whether a party has kept a right to terminate after it kept performing the contract. Set out what the party did under the contract after the right arose, and on which dates, before deciding whether it bars the later attempt to terminate. On these facts the payments the vendors received under the contracts are the conduct the Court examined (Stephen J at 648; Mason J at 659).
Where the right arises outside the contract, Stephen J left open whether knowledge of the right to elect is needed (at 645). An answer should name that gap and say what follows from it, not assume the contractual answer carries over.
Check your understanding
1. In Sargent, what did Stephen J say about detriment to the other party, and at what page?
2. Mason J did not hold that detriment was necessary. What did he say about the payments the vendors received, and at what page?
3. Why did the Turnbulls’ solicitor’s knowledge matter, and which judges dealt with it?