Sargent v ASL Developments Ltd

High Court of Australia · 1974

ContractDischarge And Remedies

Sargent v ASL Developments Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 634

Three sellers relied on a clause that let them rescind over an undisclosed planning defect. What did their later dealings with the contracts do to that right?

What happened?

Three vendors near Castle Hill sold land under standard contracts. Clause 16 let either party rescind if planning rules changed from the Fourth Schedule. No planning certificate was attached. The trial judge found each vendor had this right. The issue: did later conduct under the contracts cost them that right?

What did the Court decide?

The three appeals were dismissed with costs. McTiernan ACJ, Stephen J and Mason J agreed in the orders (Mason J at 659).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Stephen J: knowing the facts is enough to lose a contractual right to rescind by affirming; detriment isn’t required. Mason J: exercising contract rights while knowing the facts binds a party, even without knowing the right to terminate. Appeals dismissed. Stephen J left open non-contractual rights.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Stephen J

Read judgment: p 646 (opens in a new tab)

Stephen J’s statement that the vendors are taken to know the rights conferred by the clause, so knowledge of the facts that bring the clause into operation is enough, and that unequivocal conduct is what constitutes the election. This is the step that answers the appellants’ argument, so it is necessary to the orders. Stephen J’s reasons concur in dismissing the appeals.

Separate reasoning · Mason J

Read judgment: p 658 (opens in a new tab)

Mason J concurs in the orders but reaches the knowledge element by a different route: he holds that knowledge of the facts sufficient to alert the party to the alternative right is enough, and that the right to terminate need not be known. He states this as a general principle for contract and property. His reasons are not Stephen J’s and the two are not combined.

Obiter · Stephen J

Read judgment: p 645 (opens in a new tab)

Stephen J states that he does not decide whether knowledge of the right to elect is needed where the rights in issue do not arise under a contract. The point was unnecessary to the outcome, so it is obiter.

Why does this case matter?

The clause alone won’t answer the exam question. Examiners ask what happened after the contract — the party’s later conduct, not just the clause’s wording.

Check your understanding

1. In Sargent, what did Stephen J say about detriment to the other party, and at what page?

2. Mason J did not hold that detriment was necessary. What did he say about the payments the vendors received, and at what page?

3. Why did the Turnbulls’ solicitor’s knowledge matter, and which judges dealt with it?

A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail. The full case note is the complete statement.