Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (In Liq)
Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (In Liq) [1965] HCA 17; (1965) 113 CLR 265
A mortgagee put a hotel up for auction on a Friday with an £85,000 reserve, then sold it to its own subsidiary. Why could a debenture trustee, arriving later, still defeat the mortgagor’s right to undo the sale?
What happened?
Latec Investments Ltd lent Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd £36,365 in March 1958 on a mortgage over the Hotel Terrigal, land under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), and an equitable mortgage over its assets. Latec appointed a receiver in June 1958 and the mortgagor went into voluntary liquidation in July (Kitto J at 272). Latec’s board decided to sell the hotel to a subsidiary with an identical board. The property was put up for auction on a Friday, a day “generally recognized as not a good day for such a sale”, with a reserve of £85,000, and was passed in at the highest bid of £58,000; Latec then contracted to sell it to the subsidiary, Southern Hotels, for £60,000, about £86,000 being owing under the mortgage (Kitto J at 272-273).
In March 1960 Latec executed a trust deed for debentures to be issued to the public, in which Southern Hotels joined as guarantor and gave the trustee, M.L.C. Nominees, a floating charge over all its assets. The prospectuses said that Southern Hotels owned the hotel (Kitto J at 276). Nearly five years after the sale the mortgagor sued, and Else-Mitchell J set the sale aside (Kitto J at 271; Menzies J at 287). Latec, Southern Hotels and the trustee appealed to the High Court.
What did the Court decide?
The appeal was allowed with costs payable by the mortgagor, and the decree of the Supreme Court was discharged. The Court made declarations of the parties’ rights in the land in its place. Kitto J, Taylor J and Menzies J each gave separate reasons.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
All three Justices held that the sale was voidable because the mortgagee had not sold in good faith. Kitto J held that the onus lay on the purchaser, a subsidiary of the mortgagee, to satisfy the court that the power of sale was exercised in good faith and that reasonable steps were taken to obtain a fair price, and that it failed to discharge it; that the collusion of mortgagee and purchaser through their common directors was fraud in the sense of ss 42 and 43 of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), so that the mortgagor’s claim was not defeated by indefeasibility; and that the court would have set the sale aside as against the mortgagee and the purchaser, in effect declaring the purchaser compellable to act in relation to the mortgagor as if the mortgagee had sold and transferred only the mortgage and the moneys it secured. Taylor J agreed with Kitto J on that branch of the case, and Menzies J agreed that the sale was voidable.
All three Justices also held that the trustee’s later equitable charge, acquired for value and without notice of the mortgagor’s right to have the sale set aside, prevailed over that right, although the right succeeded against the mortgagee and the purchaser. Kitto J held that the charge stood in the way of the mortgagor because it was acquired for value and without notice, the case falling within the category described by Lord Westbury in Phillips v Phillips in which a purchaser for value without notice succeeds against an equity although the purchaser lacks the legal estate, and that the maxim qui prior est tempore potior est jure does not apply because it applies only as between equitable interests.
Taylor J held that a grantor entitled to set aside a conveyance for fraud has an equitable interest and not a mere equity, but that the defence of purchase for value without notice appears always to have prevailed where the person entitled to the earlier interest needed the assistance of a court of equity to remove an impediment to his title as a preliminary to asserting it. Menzies J held that in a contest between the mortgagor’s equity to have the conveyance set aside and the equitable interest of a holder who took without notice the maxim has no application, and found it unnecessary to decide the question of the mortgagor’s delay.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Kitto J
Read judgment: pp 274–275 (opens in a new tab)
The subsidiary failed to establish a good-faith exercise of the power of sale. Kitto J treated the collusive transaction as statutory fraud and explained the relief available against the mortgagee and purchaser. These findings were necessary to establish the mortgagor’s right against those parties, which the final declarations preserved subject to the intervening charges.
Ratio · Taylor J
Read judgment: p 280 (opens in a new tab)
Taylor J expressly agreed with Kitto J on the sale’s lack of good faith and upheld the mortgagor’s entitlement against the mortgagee and purchaser. This determined that branch of the dispute before he addressed the trustee’s competing charge.
Ratio · Menzies J
Read judgment: p 288 (opens in a new tab)
Menzies J held that lack of good faith was sufficient to avoid the sale against Latec and Southern. This was his determination of the first issue, establishing the right whose priority against the trustee then had to be decided.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Kitto J
Read judgment: pp 276–279 (opens in a new tab)
Kitto J decided priority independently of estoppel: the charge acquired for value without notice defeated the preliminary equity needed to set aside the sale. He applied Lord Westbury’s distinction to this dispute and excluded the temporal-priority maxim. That reasoning determined why the mortgagor failed against the trustee while retaining relief against the mortgagee and purchaser.
Separate reasoning · Taylor J
Read judgment: pp 285–286 (opens in a new tab)
Concurring in the result, Taylor J rejected describing the mortgagor’s right as only a mere equity. His distinct explanation was that equity would withhold the assistance needed to remove the impediment to the earlier title after an equitable interest had passed to a purchaser for value without notice. This was his stated ground for giving the trustee priority, rather than adoption of every aspect of the other judgments.
Ratio · Menzies J
Read judgment: p 291 (opens in a new tab)
Menzies J treated this priority contest as one between the mortgagor’s equity to set aside the conveyance and the trustee’s equitable interest acquired without notice. He held that earlier creation alone gave no priority and expressly allowed the appeal on that ground, making determination of delay unnecessary. His discussion of a hypothetical devise illustrates the distinction; the priority holding rests on the actual competing rights.
Why does this case matter?
Latec belongs to the third-party question in a rescission problem and not to the question whether a transaction can be avoided at all. When citing it in a rescission problem, identify the competing rights and say whose reasoning is relied on: the facts were a mortgagee’s sale of land under the Real Property Act, and the case does not show that every later purchaser defeats an earlier equitable claim.
Exam and application relevance
The three Justices gave three accounts of the reasoning, so Kitto J’s treatment of Phillips v Phillips, Taylor J’s and Menzies J’s should each be attributed by name and not run together as one test. An answer applying Latec to a later interest in other property should say how its facts compare with a charge taken from a purchaser at a mortgagee’s sale.
Check your understanding
1. Against whom did the mortgagor’s right to have the sale set aside succeed, and against whom did it fail?
2. What did Kitto J say about the maxim qui prior est tempore potior est jure?
3. Which Justice described the earlier right as one that needed the assistance of a court of equity to remove an impediment to the title?