Yerkey v Jones

High Court of Australia · 1939

ContractVitiating Factors

Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649

A husband bought a poultry farm and undertook to get his wife to mortgage her house for part of the price. She signed, the venture failed, and she said she had not understood. Why did the lenders win?

Clarified by Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395; [1998] HCA 48

In Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd the joint reasons of Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ considered the better view to be that Dixon J’s reasons were not significantly different from the reasons of the other members of the Court in Yerkey ([17]), and held that the principles he spoke of are particular applications of accepted equitable principles ([18]). They said that he dealt with two kinds of case, actual undue influence and a failure to explain the suretyship transaction adequately ([23]), and that the second does not depend on a presumption of undue influence or on the husband acting as the creditor’s agent, but on the surety being a volunteer who was mistaken about the purport and effect of the transaction and a creditor taken to appreciate that she may receive no sufficient explanation from her husband ([33]). Kirby J took the view that none of the other Justices expressly or impliedly agreed with Dixon J’s opinion, so that it was not a holding of the Court ([62]-[64]), and Callinan J did not read the other Justices as dissenting from it ([100]).

What happened?

Mrs Jones owned a house at Walkerville, subject to a first mortgage of £700. Her husband, Estyn Jones, a clerk on a slender salary, resolved to buy a poultry farm near Payneham from the Yerkeys for £3,500. The vendors made it a condition that payment of £1,000 of the price, due in three years, be secured by a second mortgage over her house, and the agreement took the form of his undertaking to procure her to execute it (Dixon J). She opposed the purchase as far too big and too costly to run, and he assured her that there was no risk (Dixon J).

On 21 August 1936 she, her husband and the vendors went to the office of the vendors’ solicitors, where a solicitor, Mr von Bertouch, explained the documents, including the joint and several covenant by her and her husband to pay the £1,000 (Latham CJ). She signed the mortgage. The venture failed, interest fell into arrears, and the Yerkeys sued on the covenant. Napier J gave judgment against Mr Jones and dismissed the claim against Mrs Jones on equitable grounds, and the Yerkeys appealed (Dixon J).

What did the Court decide?

The appeal was allowed with costs. The judgment of the Supreme Court of South Australia in Mrs Jones’s favour was set aside, and judgment was entered for the Yerkeys against her as well as her husband for £1,068 17s 4d. Latham CJ, Rich J, Dixon J and McTiernan J each gave separate reasons.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

In his own reasons, Dixon J said that where a wife agrees at her husband’s instance to become his surety it is clearly necessary to distinguish two kinds of case. Where she is alive to the nature and effect of the obligation but is procured to undertake it by the exertion upon her of her husband’s undue influence, affirmatively established, the creditor’s dealing directly with her and explaining the document does not protect it, and nothing but independent advice or relief from the ascendancy of her husband over her judgment and will would suffice; and if the creditor left it to the husband to obtain her consent and did no more independently of him than ascertain that she understood what she was doing, it seems that the transaction will be voidable at her instance against the creditor if she was in fact acting under her husband’s undue influence.

Where she does not understand the effect of the document or the nature of the transaction, the creditor’s reliance on the husband to inform her is of great importance; if the creditor takes adequate steps to inform her and reasonably supposes that she has an adequate comprehension, the fact that she failed to grasp some material part of the document cannot in itself give her an equity to set it aside; and where undue influence in the full sense is not made out but pressure, surprise, misrepresentation or some of them combine with or cause a failure to understand, the final question is whether the grounds on which the creditor believed the document was fairly obtained and executed by a woman sufficiently understanding its purport and effect were such that it would be inequitable to fix the creditor with the consequences of the husband’s improper or unfair dealing.

Dixon J also said that the burden of proving that a wife fully understood a guarantee given for her husband’s debt is not placed upon the creditor by the mere fact that her husband secured her consent.

The lenders succeeded in separate reasons from all four Justices. Latham CJ held that apart from special rules applying to a wife who becomes a surety, which he described as “a rather vague and indefinite survival” from the days when a married woman was almost incapable in law, the general law of undue influence, misrepresentation and mistake gave Mrs Jones no defence; that there is no presumption of undue influence from the marital relationship; and that the provisions of the mortgage were explained to her in considerable detail, so that the lenders had every reason to believe that she knew what she was doing.

Dixon J held that the lenders reasonably believed that she had understood the substantial effect of the obligations, that she was not deluded, coerced or overborne, and that she failed to make out a case for equitable relief. Rich J, not prepared to dissent from the conclusion, said that the facts fell short of establishing the necessary foundation, and McTiernan J agreed, with some doubt, that the facts did not raise an equity.

Why does this case matter?

A student who remembers Yerkey v Jones as the case in which a wife was relieved of her guarantee has the result backwards: the lenders won, and the principles for which it is cited are those Dixon J stated in setting out what a wife would have had to show.

Exam and application relevance

The principles are cited to Dixon J’s reasons. The High Court in Garcia recorded different views about how far the other Justices’ reasons differed from his. Where Yerkey is used in an answer, the High Court’s later account of it in Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd should accompany it, so that a statement of what the case stands for is not left resting on a 1939 opinion alone.

Check your understanding

1. Which Justice stated the distinction between the two kinds of case, and who won the appeal?

2. According to Dixon J, what does a creditor’s direct explanation of the document achieve where the wife is under her husband’s undue influence?

3. What did Latham CJ say about a presumption of undue influence arising from the marital relationship?