Finding the ratio when judges give separate reasons
A worked reading of Garcia v National Australia Bank showing how a High Court Justice stated the way to find a binding rule, how Justices disagreed about the ratio of Yerkey v Jones, and how material facts and left-open questions limit a ratio.
Learning outcomes
- Identify which judges agreed in an order and whether any set of reasons commanded a majority.
- State a ratio at the level of the facts the court itself treated as material, and separate it from what the court left open.
- Attribute a statement of method to the Justice who made it, and not to the Court.
The ratio decidendi of a case is the reasoning necessary to reach its order, and a court of several judges does not always give one set of reasons. Before asking what a case stands for, ask which judges agreed in the order, and whether any reasoning commanded a majority. Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395 is a High Court decision on a wife who guaranteed the debts of her husband’s company. It is useful here for a different reason, because members of the Court discussed how to find the binding rule of an earlier decision, Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649, and disagreed about what that decision stood for. This article teaches method in High Court precedent. It does not teach the law of guarantees, and what it says about precedent rests on this case and the earlier one it analyses.
Why this case teaches the method
All six Justices who sat in Garcia agreed that the appeal should be allowed. They gave three sets of reasons: joint reasons of Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ, separate reasons of Kirby J, and separate reasons of Callinan J.1 The joint reasons are the reasoning of four of the six Justices. Kirby J reached the same order by a modified version of an approach taken by the House of Lords, and Callinan J would have applied the principles stated by Dixon J in Yerkey v Jones. So the order was unanimous and the reasoning was not.
The New South Wales Court of Appeal had held that the Yerkey principle was the view of one judge only and that it was not bound to follow it. That is why the High Court had to say something about how a binding rule is found.
Kirby J’s statement of the method
Kirby J stated what the binding rule of a decision must be derived from: “(1) the reasons of the judges agreeing in the order disposing of the proceedings; (2) upon a matter in issue in the proceedings; (3) upon which a decision is necessary to arrive at that order”. Three consequences follow in his Honour’s reasons. Opinions in dissent are disregarded for this purpose. Remarks “of a general character upon tangential questions or issues not necessary to the decision” are discarded, however persuasive. And even Dixon J “cannot speak for the Court unless his reasoning attracts the support, express or implied, of a majority of the participating Justices”.
Treat this as a careful statement by one Justice and not as a holding of Garcia. The joint reasons did not adopt it. They said that they did not base their decision “upon some confined analysis of the case intended to identify its ratio decidendi”.
Applying the method to an earlier case
Yerkey v Jones was decided by four Justices, Latham CJ, Rich, Dixon and McTiernan JJ, each of whom gave separate reasons and concurred in allowing the appeal.2 Kirby J observed that none expressly concurred in another’s reasoning, so the analysis “depends upon a comparison of the reasons which each gave”. His comparison found that Dixon J’s reasons were the lengthiest and most detailed but were not adopted, expressly or by necessary implication, by any other Justice. On that analysis they were not binding as such on courts subject to the High Court’s authority, although they deserved “the greatest of respect”.
The joint reasons took a different view of the same question. They considered “the better view” to be that Dixon J’s reasons “were not significantly different from the reasons of the other members of the Court”, and they added that “it is for this Court alone to determine whether one of its previous decisions is to be departed from or overruled”.
Both views came from High Court Justices who agreed on the order in Garcia. Finding the ratio of an earlier fragmented decision is therefore an argument that you make from the reasons, and it is not always a fact that you read off the report.
What the joint reasons did instead
The joint reasons reached the principle by another route. They treated the principles in Yerkey v Jones as “simply particular applications of accepted equitable principles”, and they identified at least two kinds of case in Dixon J’s reasons: actual undue influence by a husband, and a failure to explain the transaction where there was no undue influence. Garcia concerned the second.
For that second kind of case they set out circumstances that combine: the surety did not understand the purport and effect of the transaction; she was a volunteer who obtained no gain from it; the lender is to be taken to understand that a wife may trust her husband in business matters and that he may not explain the transaction fully; and the lender did not itself explain it or find out that a stranger had.1 Those are the material facts the Court itself identified, and a later answer should state the rule at that level. The joint reasons also noted that calling enforcement “unconscionable” characterises the result and does not identify the reasoning that leads to it, so a label is not a ratio.
Ratio, obiter and what is left open
The joint reasons confined the decision. They said that the principles in Yerkey v Jones might apply to other relationships, “but that is not a question that falls for decision in this case”, and they said the same of a husband who acts as surety for his wife. That is neither the ratio nor a ruling in obiter. It is a question the Court declined to decide, and a problem on those facts cannot cite Garcia as having answered it.
On obiter, Kirby J said that Courts of Appeal and Full Courts “may be expected to pay close attention” to the opinions of individual Justices but “are not bound in law” by obiter dicta or analysis not essential to the holding. That remark was made in 1998. The High Court has since said more about the weight of carefully considered dicta of a majority of its Justices, so Kirby J’s remark is not a complete statement of how lower courts treat High Court dicta. The later authority, and a qualification of it, are in Ratio, obiter and material facts and Precedent in Australian law.
Where the authority sits
Garcia is a High Court decision, so it binds lower Australian courts on what it decided, and the High Court can reconsider its own decisions. What it decided is found chiefly in the joint reasons of four Justices. Kirby J’s statement of method and Callinan J’s different approach are the reasons of single Justices.
Applying this in a problem question
- Find the order and note which judges agreed in it, including those who agreed in the result for different reasons.
- Identify whether any set of reasons commanded a majority. Where none expressly adopts another, compare the reasons and say that your conclusion is an argument from them.
- Set aside dissents and remarks that were not needed for the order, and say that you have done so.
- List the facts the court itself treated as combining, and state the rule at the level those facts support.
- Note what the court confined or left open, and do not cite the case for it.
- State whether the passage you rely on is from joint reasons, one Justice or a dissent.
Self-check
- Have I said which judges agreed in the order and which gave separate reasons?
- Have I attributed each statement to the judge or judges who made it?
- Have I stated the rule at the level of the facts the court treated as material?
- Have I separated what the court decided from what it left open?
- Have I treated a single Justice’s statement of method as that and not as a holding?