Finding the ratio when judges give separate reasons

Why this case teaches the method

All six Justices in Garcia agreed the appeal should be allowed. But they gave three different sets of reasons.

Four Justices (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ) wrote joint reasons. Kirby J used a different approach, adapted from the House of Lords. Callinan J would have applied Dixon J’s principles from Yerkey v Jones.

So the result was unanimous, but the reasoning behind it was not.

This mattered because the New South Wales Court of Appeal had earlier said the Yerkey principle came from only one judge. It held this meant the principle was not binding on it.

That is why the High Court needed to explain how to find a binding rule when judges disagree on reasoning.

Kirby J’s statement of the method

Kirby J explained how to find the binding rule (the ratio decidendi, meaning the legal reason a case must be followed) in a case with separate judgments. It comes from the reasons of judges who agreed on the final order, on an issue they actually had to decide.

Three results follow. Dissenting opinions do not count. General comments on side issues, not needed for the decision, are ignored, however convincing. And a single judge cannot bind the Court unless a majority agrees, expressly or by implication.

This is only Kirby J’s own view, not something the whole Court in Garcia decided. The joint judgment did not adopt it. They said they were not trying to pin down the case’s ratio decidendi at all.

Applying the method to an earlier case

Four judges decided Yerkey v Jones. Each gave separate reasons, but all agreed to allow the appeal.

Kirby J noted none of them expressly agreed with another’s reasoning. So working out the ratio meant comparing their reasons. He found Dixon J’s reasons were the longest and most detailed. But no other Justice adopted them, expressly or by necessary implication. Kirby J concluded Dixon J’s reasons were not binding as such, though still deserving great respect.

The joint reasons disagreed. They thought Dixon J’s reasons were not significantly different from the other judges’ reasons. They also said only the High Court itself can decide whether to depart from or overrule its own past decisions.

Both groups of judges agreed on the actual order in Garcia. Yet they read Yerkey v Jones differently. This shows that finding the ratio of a fragmented decision is often an argument you construct. It is not always a plain fact you simply read from the report.

What the joint reasons did instead

The joint reasons took a different path. They said the rules in Yerkey v Jones were just examples of ordinary equitable principles. They found two types of case in Dixon J’s reasoning: actual undue influence by a husband, and a failure to explain the transaction where there was no undue influence. Garcia was the second type.

For that second type, the joint reasons listed several conditions that must combine. The surety must not have understood the transaction’s purport and effect. She must be a volunteer, meaning she gained nothing from it.

The lender must be taken to know a wife may trust her husband in business matters, and that he might not explain things fully. The lender also must not have explained the transaction itself, or checked that someone else had.[^cite:garcia-nab-separate-reasons]

These are the material facts the Court identified itself. A later answer should state the rule at this same level of detail.

The joint reasons also warned that calling enforcement “unconscionable” only labels the result. It does not show the reasoning that produced it. So a label like this is not the ratio.

Ratio, obiter and what is left open

The joint judges limited their decision in Garcia. They said the Yerkey v Jones principles might extend to other relationships, like a husband acting as surety for his wife, but left that question open.

This left-open point is not the ratio (the binding reason for the decision). It is also not obiter (comment made in passing, not essential to the decision). The Court simply declined to decide it, so Garcia cannot answer a problem raising that question.

Kirby J said in 1998 that lower courts are not bound by obiter dicta, though they pay close attention to it. The High Court has since said more about how much weight carefully considered obiter from a majority deserves.

So Kirby J’s remark is not the full picture today. The later cases, and a qualification to them, are covered in other articles on ratio, obiter, and precedent.

Applying this in a problem question

Start by finding the order, the actual result, and noting which judges agreed with it. Some judges may reach the same order for different reasons.

Check whether any set of reasons has support from a majority of judges. If no judge expressly adopted another’s reasons, compare them yourself and say your conclusion is an argument drawn from that comparison.

Set aside dissents and remarks not needed for the order, called obiter dicta. State clearly that you have done this.

List only the facts the court itself treated as working together. State the rule at the level of generality those facts actually support.

Note anything the court said was limited to particular facts, or deliberately left open. Do not cite the case for those unresolved points.

Finally, say whether your source passage comes from joint reasons, a single Justice, or a dissent.

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