Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd

High Court of Australia · 2007

ReasoningPrecedent And Ratio Decidendi

Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 22

A Court of Appeal changed a rule the High Court had discussed but never squarely decided. How free is an intermediate court to do that?

Qualified by Harvard Nominees Pty Ltd v Tiller (2020) 282 FCR 530

AN INTERMEDIATE COURT HAS READ THIS RULE AS HAVING TWO REQUIREMENTS, NOT ONE, AND THE HIGH COURT HAS NOT SETTLED IT. Harvard Nominees Pty Ltd v Tiller (2020) 282 FCR 530, Lee, Anastassiou and Stewart JJ. Their Honours set out the two possible readings of Farah: “one reading is to treat it as saying that it is wrong for an intermediate court of appeal to depart from ‘seriously considered dicta’ of a majority of the High Court (simpliciter), and ... another reading is to treat it as saying that there is an additional requirement, namely that the ‘seriously considered dicta’ concern a topic on which there is a long-established line of authority”. They adopt the second: “it is our view that this approach is correct. That is, that there are two requirements, namely that the dicta conform with long-established authority and that they are the dicta of a majority of the High Court.”

THE QUALIFICATION THEY ATTACH TO THEIR OWN CONCLUSION MATTERS AS MUCH AS THE CONCLUSION: “The High Court has not definitively settled this issue.” So this is an intermediate appellate court’s reading of what the High Court said about intermediate appellate courts -- a reading OF this rule, not an instance of it. Hill v Zuda Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 21 at [26] is express that Farah’s two principles “are distinct”: the first concerns “the relationship between an intermediate appellate court and this Court”, the second “the relationships between intermediate appellate courts and between intermediate appellate courts and trial judges”. Do not run them together. Their Honours note the same two readings had been identified in Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd (2009) 76 NSWLR 603, and that Heydon J in Pape v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1 took the two-requirement view. WHAT A STUDENT SHOULD DO: do not assert that seriously considered majority dicta bind full stop. Say that they bind, and that on the Full Federal Court’s reading they must also conform with long-established authority -- and that the point is open in the High Court. An answer that states the single-requirement version as settled has missed a live argument that is available to the party wanting to depart. Aristocrat independently corroborates the two-requirement reading and its attribution to this judgment at [54].

Qualified by Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [2025] FCAFC 131

Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [2025] FCAFC 131 at [106] adopts Harvard Nominees’ two-requirement reading of Farah. Its distinct contribution concerns shared reasoning: at [105], “it is not permissible to construct a purportedly binding ratio by adding reasons of a dissentient to one or more of the majority to form a majority of judges”. At [107]–[108], the Court found that the two groups of High Court judges had rejected the earlier approach for different reasons, so their agreement in outcome did not supply seriously considered majority dicta. Separately, Aristocrat concerned departure from the Full Federal Court’s own earlier decision. At [113], the Court explained that the formulation “plainly wrong” had not been imposed by the High Court for that context and “puts the matter too strongly”. At [114], it adopted the principle that the Full Federal Court should depart from an earlier Full Federal Court decision “only where there is a compelling reason to do so”. That same-court practice must be distinguished from the interstate rule discussed in Hill and Lendlease.

Clarified by Lendlease Corporation Ltd v Pallas [2025] HCA 19

THE THRESHOLD’S WORDING IS UNDER PRESSURE FROM ONE JUSTICE, AND THE COURT EXPRESSLY DECLINED TO TOUCH THE RULE. Lendlease Corporation Ltd v Pallas [2025] HCA 19, a bench of seven: Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ. EDELMAN J at [109] restates this rule and adds a preference: “a trial judge or an intermediate appellate court should not depart from the ratio decidendi of an earlier intermediate appellate court decision in another jurisdiction on the interpretation of Commonwealth legislation, uniform national legislation, or the common law unless the trial judge or later intermediate appellate court considers the earlier decision to be plainly wrong or, in language that should be preferred, unless there is a compelling reason to do so”. Note what else that sentence does: it describes the rule itself as one “established by this Court in seriously considered obiter dicta”, so Farah’s two rules are connected -- the second is an instance of the first. He applies the compelling-reasons language at [119], and at [120] sets out questions about the rule’s scope that were “not fully argued in this Court”, including whether it reaches an intermediate court departing from its OWN earlier decision rather than another jurisdiction’s.

WHAT THE JOINT REASONS OF GAGELER CJ, GLEESON AND JAGOT JJ DID. At [32] their Honours put the rule aside rather than develop it: “[t]he question for this Court, in contrast, is not whether Wigmans v AMP Ltd is plainly wrong”, and the fact that the Court of Appeal faced a Full Federal Court decision holding an earlier Court of Appeal decision plainly wrong “provides no occasion to add to or modify the rules of precedent applicable between intermediate appellate courts established in Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd and Hill v Zuda Pty Ltd”. At [33] the question they answer is one of statutory construction. So on those reasons the rule this proposition states is undisturbed, because their Honours said there was no occasion to add to or modify it -- not because the Court affirmed it. WHAT A STUDENT SHOULD DO: either expression is the Court’s. In Hill v Zuda Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 21 at [25] the Court -- unanimously, Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gleeson JJ -- states the second principle as departure only where the interpretation is “plainly wrong” “or, to use a different expression, unless there is a compelling reason to do so”. So Edelman J at [109] is preferring one of two accepted formulations rather than proposing a new test, and an answer using either is on the Court’s own words. The rule’s edges -- particularly the same-court case -- are expressly open on the Court’s own account.

What happened?

Say-Dee and Farah Constructions were in a joint venture to redevelop a property. When it failed, Say-Dee alleged that Farah’s principal had misused information and that related parties held property on constructive trust. The New South Wales Court of Appeal found for Say-Dee, and in doing so reworked the first limb of Barnes v Addy along lines the parties had not argued.

What did the Court decide?

The appeals were allowed. The High Court also criticised the Court of Appeal’s adoption of an unargued basis of liability without giving the parties an opportunity to address it.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Two, and they are why this case is cited far outside its subject matter.

On dicta: seriously considered dicta of a majority of the High Court are not ordinary commentary that a lower court may set aside; an intermediate court that departs from them without authority is in error.

On uniformity: intermediate appellate courts and trial judges should not depart from a decision of an intermediate appellate court in another Australian jurisdiction on the interpretation of Commonwealth or uniform national legislation unless convinced that decision is plainly wrong.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Obiter · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [134] (PDF p 65) (opens in a new tab), [158] (PDF p 77) (opens in a new tab)

This is seriously considered obiter in the joint reasons. At [109] the Court expressly proceeds on an assumption contrary to its conclusion that Farah had made sufficient disclosure; [200] identifies that conclusion as requiring the appeals to be allowed. Within that further analysis, [134] treats departure from long-established authority and seriously considered majority dicta as an error, and [158] includes that departure among the cumulative reasons for rejecting the Court of Appeal’s changes. The precedent guidance therefore carries the unanimous Court’s considered authority, but was unnecessary to disposal on the disclosure ground. The dicta being protected in Consul Development are distinct from these observations in Farah about their authority.

Proposition 2

Obiter · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [135] (PDF p 67) (opens in a new tab)

This is seriously considered obiter in the joint reasons. The statement at [135] explains why the Court of Appeal’s restitutionary reasoning could spread confusion beyond New South Wales. The appeal did not require resolution of conflicting interstate interpretations of Commonwealth or uniform national legislation: it concerned equitable liability arising from a property venture. The general statutory rule, and its extension to non-statutory law, explain the need for national consistency rather than supply a necessary ground for allowing these appeals. The Court had already found sufficient disclosure and expressly undertook its further liability analysis on a contrary assumption at [109]; [200] returns to disclosure as the ground requiring success.

Why does this case matter?

It is the case a student is most likely to meet outside its own field. The joint venture and the constructive trust are incidental; what gets cited is a passage about how courts are supposed to treat each other’s reasoning, and it appears in argument across every area where a uniform statute operates differently in two states.

Its practical effect is to narrow the room a lower court has to innovate, and you can see that in how the argument now runs: counsel inviting a state court to go its own way on a national statute spends the argument on the strength of the other court’s reasoning rather than on whether their own court is free to differ.

Note also how the Court framed the error — the Court of Appeal decided a point the parties had not argued. That is a procedural fairness complaint as much as a precedent one, and the two are worth keeping distinct when you read the passage.

Exam and application relevance

Build the argument around the passage relied on: identify whose reasons it appears in, what issue those judges were addressing, and whether their reasoning was necessary to the result. Keep the claimed authority of that passage separate from the factual analogy between the cases. For the procedural fairness issue, identify when the proposed basis of liability first arose and what opportunity each party had to address it.

Check your understanding

A single judge finds a South Australian appellate decision on a Commonwealth Act unpersuasive. What must they establish before declining to follow it?