Lendlease Corporation Ltd v Pallas

High Court of Australia · 2025

ReasoningPrecedent And Ratio Decidendi

Lendlease Corporation Ltd v Pallas [2025] HCA 19

The New South Wales Court of Appeal followed its own earlier decision even though the Full Federal Court had called that decision plainly wrong. The High Court reversed it. Did it also rule on how courts should handle such a clash?

What happened?

Shareholders in Lendlease brought a representative proceeding in the Supreme Court of New South Wales alleging breach of continuous disclosure obligations and misleading conduct (joint reasons [15]; Gordon and Steward JJ [50]-[51]). Lendlease wanted group members told that if they neither opted out nor registered, it would seek an order that they stay bound by any settlement but could not share in it without leave of the Court (Gordon and Steward JJ [52]). Whether the Court could order that notice under s 175(5) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) went to the Court of Appeal as a separate question.

An earlier Court of Appeal decision, Wigmans v AMP Ltd, had held there was no such power. The Full Federal Court in Parkin v Boral Ltd, on the materially identical Federal Court Act provisions, held Wigmans plainly wrong. The Court of Appeal, constituted by five judges, concluded that Wigmans was not plainly wrong, followed it, and answered the question in the negative (joint reasons [2]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court was a bench of seven and gave four sets of reasons: Gageler CJ, Gleeson and Jagot JJ jointly; Gordon and Steward JJ jointly; Edelman J; and Beech-Jones J. The appeal was allowed, the Court of Appeal’s order was set aside, and the separate question was answered in the affirmative (Gordon and Steward JJ [104]). Section 175(5) empowers the Supreme Court to order the notice, and concerns about conflicts of interest bear on whether the power should be exercised, not on whether it exists (joint reasons [3], [46]; Beech-Jones J [149]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The Court’s disposition rested on the construction of the statute. On the clash between intermediate appellate courts, the joint reasons said that the circumstance that the Court of Appeal faced a Full Federal Court decision calling an earlier Court of Appeal decision plainly wrong “provides no occasion to add to or modify the rules of precedent applicable between intermediate appellate courts” (joint reasons [32]).

Gordon and Steward JJ treated the argument as an “additional error” that it was “strictly unnecessary” to consider, and made “brief remarks” ([100]-[101]). Beech-Jones J agreed with them on this topic ([150]), and Edelman J agreed generally with their reasons ([105]).

Edelman J alone went further in separate reasons ([109]-[120]). He described the rule as one established “in seriously considered obiter dicta”, said that “in language that should be preferred” the test is whether “there is a compelling reason to do so”, and said that whether an intermediate court may prefer its own earlier decision was “not fully argued in this Court” ([109], [120]).

Attribute the preferred formulation to Edelman J rather than describing it as a replacement test adopted by the High Court. Read it alongside the joint reasons at [32].

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Classification unresolved · Gageler CJ, Gleeson and Jagot JJ

Read judgment: [32]–[33] (PDF p 20) (opens in a new tab)

These joint reasons decline to add to or modify the rules governing intermediate appellate courts and identify statutory construction as the question to decide. The passage marks the limit of the decision: it supplies no answer to the competing-precedents problem and should not be treated as a ratio resolving that problem.

Obiter · Gordon and Steward JJ; Beech-Jones J agreeing on this topic

Read judgment: [100]–[103] (PDF p 46) (opens in a new tab), [150] (PDF p 65) (opens in a new tab)

Gordon and Steward JJ expressly say that considering the alleged precedent error is strictly unnecessary, then offer brief remarks about existing rules, national coherence and certainty. Those observations were unnecessary to their statutory ground for allowing the appeal. Beech-Jones J expressly agrees with these observations at [150]; that agreement does not turn them into reasoning necessary to the orders.

Obiter · Edelman J

Read judgment: [109] (PDF p 49) (opens in a new tab), [112] (PDF p 50) (opens in a new tab), [118] (PDF p 54) (opens in a new tab)

In separate reasons concurring in the result, Edelman J prefers compelling reason as the formulation for departure from another intermediate appellate decision. He expressly characterises the precedent issue as seriously considered obiter at [112]. This discussion was unnecessary to deciding the statutory power question, and the other reasons do not adopt his preferred wording as a new holding of the Court.

Classification unresolved · Edelman J

Read judgment: [120] (PDF p 55) (opens in a new tab)

Edelman J leaves open a possible exception allowing an intermediate appellate court to prefer its own earlier decision over a contrary decision from another jurisdiction without finding manifest error or omission in the latter. He says the exception was not fully argued and identifies questions requiring consideration. This is a reservation in his separate concurring reasons, not a decision establishing such an exception.

Why does this case matter?

A citation to a judgment with several sets of reasons needs enough detail for a reader to check the passage relied on. In a precedent argument, an unexplained reference to the case can leave the weight of the cited passage unclear.

It is also a useful model for reading a modern High Court judgment: start with the orders, then the heading under which each passage sits, then the author of the paragraph, and only then decide what weight a sentence carries.

Exam and application relevance

Before relying on a formulation, identify its author, any express agreement and its relationship to the orders.

For a precedent question and a class action question, which passages would you select from this judgment, and why? Explain how each selected passage addresses the issue in the problem.

Check your understanding

1. Which Justices wrote separately on the rules of precedent, and what did the joint reasons say about whether to modify them?

2. Why is Edelman J’s statement at [112] about ratio relevant to how you describe his reasoning?

3. A student writes that in Lendlease the High Court held the test for departing from another intermediate court is a compelling reason. What is wrong with that sentence?