Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Patents
Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [2025] FCAFC 131
When the High Court splits three-three, the Full Federal Court’s decision below is affirmed. Does a judge to whom the case is then remitted still have to follow that Full Court’s reasons?
What happened?
Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd owned four innovation patents for electronic gaming machines with a “feature game”, each with a priority date of 11 August 2014 ([2]-[3]). On 5 July 2018 a delegate of the Commissioner of Patents revoked them because none of the claims was a manner of manufacture ([3]). Burley J reversed that decision on 10 July 2020. On 6 December 2021 the Full Court (Middleton, Perram and Nicholas JJ) reversed Burley J: Middleton and Perram JJ gave one set of reasons, the majority decision, and Nicholas J gave separate reasons for the same conclusion. It remitted the matter to the primary judge to determine the residual issues, in an order that referred to the Full Court’s reasons ([4], [7]).
Six Justices of the High Court heard the appeal and were equally divided on 17 August 2022. Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Keane JJ would have dismissed it and Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ would have allowed it, and the Full Court’s decision was affirmed under s 23(2)(a) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ([5]-[7]). On remitter Burley J dismissed the appeal on 12 April 2024, applying the majority decision of the Full Court, because he considered himself bound by it ([8], [91]).
Leave to appeal was granted, and on 6 February 2025 all seven Justices of the High Court refused Aristocrat’s application to remove the appeal into the High Court ([9]). Aristocrat argued that s 23(2)(a) left the court able to apply the allowing reasons ([85]), that the seriously considered dicta of all six Justices rejecting the majority decision’s two-step approach had superseded it ([106]), and, by an amendment to its notice of appeal, that the Full Court should not follow the majority decision ([110]).
What did the Court decide?
The Full Court (Beach, Rofe and Jackman JJ) gave one set of reasons. It granted leave to amend the notice of appeal, allowed the appeal, and set aside the primary judge’s orders of 12 April 2024 and the delegate’s decision of 5 July 2018 to revoke claims 2 to 5 of the 967 patent and claims 1 to 5 of the other three patents. It directed the Commissioner to issue certificates of examination and ordered the Commissioner to pay Aristocrat’s costs. It held that the residual claims were a manner of manufacture ([136], [141], [143]). Claim 1 of the 967 patent stayed outside the relief ([144]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The Full Court held that where the High Court is equally divided and s 23(2)(a) requires the decision appealed from to be affirmed, “the decision” that is affirmed refers to the orders of the court below and not to its reasons ([98]). So s 23(2)(a) did not of its own force affirm the reasoning of the Full Court’s majority decision ([98]-[99]). The equal division created no binding precedent, because only unanimous or majority decisions of the High Court have binding authority ([104]). A remittal order to determine residual issues “in light of the Full Court’s reasons” meant “having regard to” them, and did not of its own force require the primary judge to apply the majority decision ([100], [103]).
The primary judge was nevertheless bound to follow the majority decision, by the doctrine of precedent: the invalidity of claim 1 had been decided by the Full Court for the reasons it gave, and there was no material distinction between those facts and the residual claims ([104]). The Court rejected two ways of avoiding that. First, it said that “[a]s a matter of principle, it is not permissible to construct a purportedly binding ratio by adding reasons of a dissentient to one or more of the majority to form a majority of judges”, citing Federation Insurance Ltd v Wasson (1987) 163 CLR 303 at 314, and it read the cases Aristocrat relied on as using aggregated reasons “to confirm”, not to establish, principles ([105]).
Second, it said that the statement in Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd that an intermediate court of appeal should not depart from long-established authority and seriously considered dicta of a majority of the High Court has two requirements: the dicta must conform with long-established authority, and they must be the dicta of a majority of the High Court ([106]). All six High Court Justices rejected the two-step approach, but for markedly different reasons ([107]). “It is the reasons, not the outcome, of judgments which gives them precedential significance”, and a coincident outcome produced by two distinct lines of reasoning is not seriously considered dicta of a majority of the High Court ([108]-[109]).
The Full Court itself was in a different position. It said the Full Court is not necessarily bound by earlier Full Court decisions ([113]). It adopted the principle that the Full Federal Court should depart from an earlier Full Federal Court decision only where there is a compelling reason, which depends on the issue and circumstances, in preference to a “plainly wrong” formulation that Beach J had said puts the matter too strongly ([113]-[114]). After an equal division in the High Court a court should seek to keep its decision consistent with the views of the Justices so far as possible, even if no ratio can be drawn from them ([115]).
Because all six Justices criticised the two-step analysis, albeit for different reasons, the Court found a compelling reason to hold that the majority decision should not be followed, although the equal division supplied no positive proposition to put in its place ([116]). The primary judge had been bound and no criticism of him was called for, but on an appeal by way of rehearing the law had changed as a result of the appeal itself, which the Court called constructive error and which it could correct ([121]-[122]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Beach, Rofe and Jackman JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [97]–[104] (opens in a new tab)
The Court needed to decide whether the primary judge was bound by the majority decision because of s 23(2)(a) or the remittal order, or by the doctrine of precedent. Its construction of s 23(2)(a) and of the remittal order is the premise for locating the source of the primary judge’s obligation in the doctrine of precedent ([103]-[104]).
Proposition 2
Ratio · Beach, Rofe and Jackman JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [104]–[109] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state why the primary judge was bound and why Aristocrat’s two arguments for escaping the majority decision failed. They are the ground on which the Court held that PJ2 applied the majority decision as it was bound to do, which is the premise of the later finding of constructive error. The statement of the two Farah requirements adopts the Full Court’s reading in Harvard Nominees, and the composite-ratio statement cites Federation Insurance v Wasson, so the principles are those courts’ as applied here.
Proposition 3
Ratio · Beach, Rofe and Jackman JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [113]–[116] (opens in a new tab), [121]–[123] (opens in a new tab)
The test for departure, its application to the six High Court Justices’ criticism, and the treatment of the primary judge’s reliance on the earlier decision as constructive error are the steps by which the Court upheld the amended ground 5 and set aside the orders of 12 April 2024.
Why does this case matter?
Precedent questions after a divided High Court are easy to answer by instinct. This case shows how many separate questions are packed into one, and an examiner can build a problem from any of them.
Exam and application relevance
Begin by identifying the court you are writing for and its rank relative to the courts whose decisions are in play. Then separate the sources of any obligation: the text of s 23(2)(a), the wording of a remittal order, and the doctrine of precedent. Each can be tested against the Full Court’s reasons at the paragraphs cited above.
The High Court has since refused special leave to appeal from this decision. On 5 February 2026 Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ said that there was insufficient reason to doubt the correctness of the Full Court’s decision and that, because the Full Court applied established principles on manner of manufacture and reached a unanimous conclusion on characterisation, there was no utility in granting special leave to consider the rules of precedent concerning s 23(2)(a) (Commissioner of Patents v Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd [2026] HCADisp 15 at [2]). That disposition did not decide the precedent questions, so present these as the Full Federal Court’s reasoning.
Check your understanding
1. According to the Full Court, what does s 23(2)(a) of the Judiciary Act affirm when the High Court is equally divided, and what does it leave unaffirmed?
2. Why was the primary judge bound by the majority decision of the Full Court, and what did the Court say about the argument that the dicta of all six High Court Justices had superseded it?
3. What did the Court say about adding reasons of a dissentient to those of the majority, and which authority did it cite?
4. What principle did the Court adopt for when the Full Federal Court may depart from an earlier Full Federal Court decision, and why was there a compelling reason here?