Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Patents
Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [2025] FCAFC 131
When the High Court splits three-three, the Full Federal Court’s decision below is affirmed. Does a judge to whom the case is then remitted still have to follow that Full Court’s reasons?
What happened?
Aristocrat held four innovation patents for gaming machines. The Commissioner’s delegate revoked them in 2018. Burley J reversed that in 2020, but the Full Court reversed him again in 2021, with a majority (Middleton and Perram JJ) and separate reasons from Nicholas J. The matter was remitted for residual issues. The High Court split evenly in 2022, so the Full Court’s decision stood under s 23(2)(a). On remitter, Burley J followed the majority decision, considering himself bound. Leave was granted, but the High Court refused to remove the appeal.
What did the Court decide?
The Full Court allowed the appeal, set aside the earlier orders, and held the residual claims were a manner of manufacture. Claim 1 was excluded.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The Full Court held that when the High Court splits evenly, s 23(2)(a) affirms only the orders below, not the reasons. So an equal split does not itself affirm the majority’s reasoning, and creates no binding precedent, since only unanimous or majority High Court decisions bind.
A remittal order to decide issues “in light of” the Full Court’s reasons just meant “having regard to” them. It did not itself force the primary judge to apply the majority view.
Still, precedent bound the primary judge anyway. The Full Court’s majority had already decided claim 1’s invalidity, and the remaining claims were not materially different.
The Court rejected combining a dissent with part of the majority to manufacture a binding ratio. It also clarified that following “seriously considered dicta” of a High Court majority requires genuine majority reasoning, not just a matching outcome reached differently. All six Justices agreed, for different reasons: reasons, not outcomes, create precedential weight.
The Full Court is not strictly bound by its own earlier decisions. It should depart only for compelling reason, depending on context—rejecting a stricter “plainly wrong” test.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Beach, Rofe and Jackman JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [97]–[104] (opens in a new tab)
The Court needed to decide whether the primary judge was bound by the majority decision because of s 23(2)(a) or the remittal order, or by the doctrine of precedent. Its construction of s 23(2)(a) and of the remittal order is the premise for locating the source of the primary judge’s obligation in the doctrine of precedent ([103]-[104]).
Proposition 2
Ratio · Beach, Rofe and Jackman JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [104]–[109] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state why the primary judge was bound and why Aristocrat’s two arguments for escaping the majority decision failed. They are the ground on which the Court held that PJ2 applied the majority decision as it was bound to do, which is the premise of the later finding of constructive error. The statement of the two Farah requirements adopts the Full Court’s reading in Harvard Nominees, and the composite-ratio statement cites Federation Insurance v Wasson, so the principles are those courts’ as applied here.
Proposition 3
Ratio · Beach, Rofe and Jackman JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [113]–[116] (opens in a new tab), [121]–[123] (opens in a new tab)
The test for departure, its application to the six High Court Justices’ criticism, and the treatment of the primary judge’s reliance on the earlier decision as constructive error are the steps by which the Court upheld the amended ground 5 and set aside the orders of 12 April 2024.
Why does this case matter?
Precedent questions after a divided High Court are easy to answer by instinct. This case shows how many separate questions are packed into one, and an examiner can build a problem from any of them.
Check your understanding
When the High Court splits evenly, what does s 23(2)(a) of the Judiciary Act do?
Why was the primary judge bound by the Full Court majority?
When may a Full Federal Court depart from an earlier Full Court decision?