John v Federal Commissioner of Taxation

High Court of Australia · 1989

CasesReasoningAustralian Legal SystemPrecedent And Ratio Decidendi

John v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 166 CLR 417

Fifteen years earlier the High Court had let a share trader deduct a notional cost. Taxpayers had relied on it. Could the Court now decline to follow its own decision, and on what terms?

What happened?

Mrs John was one of the twenty partners in Malindi Trading Co, a share-trading partnership formed in April 1977. On 27 April 1977 Malindi bought half the shares in each of six companies in the Compinge group; this appeal concerned five of them, bought for about $2.4 million. The next day each of the five companies declared dividends out of profits from the revaluation or sale of assets not acquired for resale at a profit, and issued bonus shares to its shareholders, crediting the dividends as payment for them. The day after that, Malindi sold the original shares and the bonus shares to a single purchaser for about the same total. On those figures Malindi had made a profit of $1,165.85.

Professional advisers had planned the transactions to produce a tax advantage. Dividends paid wholly out of profits of that kind were not assessable income under s 44(2) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), and in Curran v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1974) 131 CLR 409 the High Court had held that a share trader could offset the dividends credited in payment of bonus shares that became its trading stock. Offsetting them turned the profit into a loss of $2,097,640.15 in Malindi’s books, and Mrs John claimed to deduct her share of it under s 92(1). The amount in issue was $104,882.

The Commissioner of Taxation disallowed the deduction. Yeldham J upheld her appeal to the Supreme Court of New South Wales as far as the five Compinge companies were concerned. The Full Court of the Federal Court allowed the Commissioner’s appeal, distinguishing Curran on the footing that the Compinge transaction was not part of Malindi’s share-trading business. Mrs John appealed to the High Court. The Commissioner defended the result on the Federal Court’s reasoning and on s 260 and the principle of fiscal nullity, and submitted in addition that Curran had been wrongly decided.

What did the Court decide?

The High Court (Mason CJ, Wilson, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ) dismissed the appeal with costs. Five Justices, Mason CJ, Wilson, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ, gave joint reasons. Brennan J gave separate reasons and agreed that the appeal should be dismissed.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

The High Court has power to review and depart from its own earlier decisions, but does not undertake that course lightly, and there is no very definite rule for when it will. The joint reasons took four matters that Gibbs CJ identified in Commonwealth v Hospital Contribution Fund (1982) 150 CLR 49 as having justified departure there: that the earlier decisions did not rest on a principle carefully worked out in a significant succession of cases; a difference between the reasons of the Justices forming the majority in one of them; that the earlier decisions had achieved no useful result and had led to considerable inconvenience; and that they had not been independently acted on in a way that militated against reconsideration.

Applying those matters to Curran v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1974) 131 CLR 409, the joint reasons held that the first applied, because Curran stood alone and its overruling would not affect the other dividend-stripping cases, and that the second applied, because Barwick CJ and Menzies J had reasoned differently from Gibbs J. The third played no part. The fourth was absent: taxpayers, including the appellant, had arranged their affairs in reliance on Curran, and Parliament had since amended the Act with effect from June 1978 to deal specifically with bonus shares, and those were powerful reasons for following it.

The joint reasons then said that cases of statutory construction (and of the application of a statutory provision) raise special considerations, which they illustrated with Mason J’s statement in Babaniaris v Lutony Fashions Pty Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 1 that a court must give effect to the legislative intention as expressed in the statute, and that an ultimate appellate court convinced that a previous interpretation is plainly erroneous cannot allow the error to stand. A division of opinion in the earlier majority and a persuasive dissent do not make the earlier decision any less a precedent; they point to a possibility that it may later be challenged.

In the end the justification for not following an earlier decision construing a statute must be that the Court regards it as wrong, wrong in a significant respect, and that the Court should give effect to the intention of Parliament. On that footing the Court held that Curran was not determinative despite the taxpayer’s reliance on it, and, with Curran put aside, that the only expenditure Malindi incurred was the cost of the original shares, so that there was no loss or outgoing referable to the bonus shares and no deduction for Mrs John.

Brennan J, separately, also held that Curran was wrongly decided, but treated the question of overruling differently. He thought there were powerful considerations against overruling it (the taxpayers’ reliance, the possibility of affecting tax liabilities arising from transactions entered into in reliance on it, and the Parliament’s later modification of its effect), and he held that the fact that Curran was a majority decision reached on differing grounds over a cogent dissent did not diminish its authority, because the authority of the Court’s decisions does not depend on the constitution of the Court or the cogency of dissenting reasons.

Overruling must be an exceptional course. But when it is necessary for the Court to perform, and be seen to perform, its constitutional function of interpreting and applying the law enacted by Parliament, that course must be adopted: a later Court’s mere preference for another construction is not enough, but if it is satisfied that the earlier interpretation is erroneous in the sense of being opposed to the undoubted intention of Parliament as enacted, it cannot adhere to the error unless Parliament has itself accepted or adopted it and legislated on the assumption that the earlier decision was correct.

In his view Curran introduced a concept, notional expenditure, that is not found in the Act and profoundly alters its operation, and the later statutory provision did not assume that Curran was correct, so the Court had no option but to refuse to follow it.

Why does this case matter?

Students tend to treat a High Court decision either as fixed for ever or as gone once a later bench thinks it wrong. An examiner looks for the step between an earlier case being wrong and an earlier case not being followed, and rewards the student who can say what else the Court weighs at that step and which Justices say so.

Exam and application relevance

Cite John for how the High Court approaches the question whether to depart from one of its own earlier decisions, naming the Justices for each step: the five Justices who applied the Hospital Contribution Fund matters and the statutory-construction considerations, and Brennan J, who reached the same disposition by a different route and gave a different weight to a divided earlier majority. The decision turned on the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) as it stood for the 1977 transactions, and the departure was from a decision on the construction and application of a statute, so say that when comparing it with a decision on the common law.

Check your understanding

1. Which Justices gave the joint reasons, and what did Brennan J do?

2. Which of the four matters from Commonwealth v Hospital Contribution Fund did the joint reasons find present in Curran, and which did they find absent?

3. How did Brennan J treat the fact that Curran was a majority decision reached on differing grounds over a dissent?