Harvard Nominees Pty Ltd v Tiller

Federal Court of Australia (Full Court) · 2020

ReasoningPrecedent And Ratio Decidendi

Harvard Nominees Pty Ltd v Tiller (2020) 282 FCR 530

Three of the six High Court Justices who heard an earlier case said an intermediate appellate decision was wrong. Does that bind a lower court, and what counts as ‘the High Court’ for the purpose?

Affirmed by Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [2025] FCAFC 131

A later Full Court of the Federal Court (Beach, Rofe and Jackman JJ) adopted this reading of Farah. In Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [2025] FCAFC 131 at [106] the Court said that in applying Farah’s statement that an intermediate court of appeal should not depart from long-established authority and seriously considered dicta of a majority of the High Court, “there are two requirements, namely that the seriously considered dicta conform with long-established authority and that they are the dicta of a majority of the High Court”, citing Harvard Nominees at [54] for the view that this is “the better reading of the passage in Farah”.

What happened?

Harvard Nominees Pty Ltd (Harvard) is a company controlled by Mr John Caratti. It leased two Western Australian farms to Mr Tiller and Dimension Agriculture Pty Ltd in reliance on a misleading and deceptive representation about the involvement of another man, Mr Nicoletti, in Dimension, which was in fact his vehicle and had been structured to keep his involvement from Mr Caratti ([1]). When this was discovered, Harvard gave notice that it elected to rescind the leases ([1]). Harvard sought orders under s 243 of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) declaring the lease void and giving effect to that rescission, together with damages under s 236 ([5]-[8]).

The primary judge found that Mr Tiller and Dimension had engaged in contravening conduct, but refused relief because Harvard had not shown that it suffered or was likely to suffer loss or damage ([2]). The appeal turned on whether that conclusion was correct ([2]). Harvard argued that being bound to the leases was itself loss or damage and relied on the Full Court’s decision in Demagogue Pty Ltd v Ramensky; the respondents relied on a statement in the joint judgment in the High Court’s decision in Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd that Demagogue was wrong on that point ([47]). The primary judge had thought it unclear that Demagogue should be followed in the face of “seriously considered dicta” in Marks, and the respondents argued that the statement in Marks was ratio decidendi or, at the least, seriously considered dicta that had to be applied ([49], [51]).

What did the Court decide?

The Full Court of the Federal Court (Lee, Anastassiou and Stewart JJ) gave joint reasons. It allowed the appeal, set aside the orders dismissing Harvard’s application, and remitted the matter to the primary judge on the question of what relief, if any, should be granted under ss 236 and 237 of the ACL and on the costs of the proceedings below. It ordered the respondents to pay Harvard’s costs of the appeal (Orders 1-4; [98]-[99]). On loss or damage, the Court disagreed with the primary judge ([77]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The Full Court started from the rule in Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd that trial judges and intermediate courts of appeal must follow the seriously considered dicta of a majority of the High Court ([52]). It recorded that Campbell JA had identified two possible readings of Farah, and that Heydon J in Pape v Commissioner of Taxation regarded such dicta as binding only if they conform with long-established authority ([53]-[54]). Their Honours said that the High Court has not definitively settled the issue, but that in their view the correct approach is that there are two requirements, namely that the dicta conform with long-established authority and that they are the dicta of a majority of the High Court.

They gave two reasons: it is a better reading of Farah, and dicta of a majority would otherwise enjoy the same precedential status as rationes ([54]). They added that the decision in the case on whether the relevant dicta must be followed did not turn on whether the dicta conformed with long-established authority ([54]).

On the second requirement, the statement in Marks that Demagogue was wrong was expressed by three Justices, McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ, on a bench of six, in an appeal that was dismissed 5:1. The Full Court held that this was not “the majority of the High Court” ([55]). It is the majority of the High Court sitting in the particular case, and not a “majority of the majority”, that is required ([56]). The Full Court then examined the separate reasons in Marks, those of Gummow J, Gaudron J and Kirby J (dissenting in the result) as well as the joint judgment. It concluded that the majority judgments did not compel the conclusion that the statement was the ratio of Marks ([68]), and that no seriously considered dicta of a majority of the Court could be found to the effect that Demagogue ought not be followed ([69]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Lee, Anastassiou and Stewart JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [55]–[56] (opens in a new tab), [68]–[69] (opens in a new tab)

The respondents argued that the statement in Marks had to be followed as ratio or as seriously considered dicta of a majority ([51], [58]). Rejecting both limbs, on the count of Justices who expressed the statement and on the reasoning of the separate judgments in Marks, was the ground on which the Court declined to treat Marks as displacing Demagogue.

Obiter · Lee, Anastassiou and Stewart JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [53]–[54] (opens in a new tab), [57] (opens in a new tab)

The Court gave its view that Farah carries two requirements, but said that the decision on whether the dicta must be followed did not turn on the requirement of conformity with long-established authority ([54]), and [57] addresses it only on a conditional footing (‘if that be a requirement’).

Why does this case matter?

Students are often tempted to treat any statement in a High Court judgment as binding because of where it appears. This case is a worked example of an intermediate appellate court deciding whether a statement in a High Court judgment is one it has to follow, in an appeal that was really about loss under consumer legislation. Read the paragraphs themselves, because the weight of each statement depends on what the Full Court’s reasons actually say about it.

Exam and application relevance

When a problem sets a statement in a High Court judgment against a decision of an intermediate appellate court, set out the High Court bench, the Justices who expressed the statement, and the disposition of the appeal before you characterise the statement. Then say whether it was necessary to the result, and apply the Farah rule to the answer.

Attribute the reading of Farah in this decision to Lee, Anastassiou and Stewart JJ, and use the Court’s own qualification at [54] about the High Court. Keep apart what the Full Court said about Farah in [54] and what it said about the statement in Marks in [55]-[56] and [68]-[69], and say which of them the outcome of the appeal depended on. Check for later authority on the reading of Farah before you cite it.

Check your understanding

1. What did the primary judge conclude about loss or damage, and on what question did the appeal turn ([2])?

2. Which two decisions were set against each other on whether being bound to a contract can be loss or damage, and which court decided each ([47], [49])?

3. How many Justices sat in Marks, which Justices expressed the statement said to be binding, and what was the vote on the outcome ([55], [62])?

4. What two readings of Farah did the Full Court set out, and whose observation did it record for the first ([53])?

5. What did the Full Court say about whether the High Court has settled which reading is correct, and about whether its own decision turned on the long-established authority requirement ([54])?