Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters Subscribing to Contract No IH00AAQS v Cross

High Court of Australia · 2012

ReasoningStatutory Interpretation

Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters Subscribing to Contract No IH00AAQS v Cross [2012] HCA 56

A New South Wales statute capped legal costs in claims for ‘personal injury damages’ and borrowed that phrase’s meaning from another Act, which did not apply to injuries caused by intentional assault. Did the cap apply?

What happened?

The respondents were assaulted by hotel security staff. They sued the appellants, the insurers of the company that employed those staff, for trespass to the person, claiming damages for personal injuries allegedly inflicted intentionally and with intent to injure ([2]). In the District Court the damages awarded to each respondent were less than $100,000, and Garling DCJ made a costs order with a declaration that the costs were subject to s 198D of the Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) ([45], in the reasons of Crennan and Bell JJ).

Section 198D(1) fixed the maximum costs for legal services provided to a party in connection with “a claim for personal injury damages” if the amount recovered on the claim did not exceed $100,000 ([4]). Section 198C(1) provided that “personal injury damages” had “the same meaning as in the Civil Liability Act 2002” ([6]). The Civil Liability Act defined “personal injury damages” as damages that relate to the death of or injury to a person caused by the fault of another person ([7]). The Civil Liability Act’s provisions on awards of personal injury damages did not apply to an award where the fault concerned was an intentional act done with intent to cause injury; Div 5B of the Legal Profession Act contained no equivalent exclusion ([10], [12]).

The Court of Appeal (Hodgson and Basten JJA and Sackville AJA) unanimously held that the definition meant personal injury damages of the kind to which Pt 2 of the Civil Liability Act applied, so the cap did not apply to these claims ([17]). The appeals to the High Court were heard with New South Wales v Williamson, which concerned the same question ([1]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court allowed each appeal, set aside paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Court of Appeal’s order, and ordered that the appeal to that Court be dismissed, with the appellants to pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal to the High Court ([43]). French CJ and Hayne J gave joint reasons ([1]-[43]). Kiefel J agreed with the orders proposed by French CJ and Hayne J and gave separate reasons ([105]). Crennan and Bell JJ dissented and would have dismissed the appeals ([52], [76]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

French CJ and Hayne J held that the text of the provisions readily supported the appellants’ construction: “personal injury damages” in the costs limiting provisions extended to any and every form of damages that relate to the death of or personal or bodily injury to a person caused by the fault of another person ([33], [41]). Section 198C(1) directed attention to the Civil Liability Act’s definition and not to the operation or application of that Act ([33]). Each Act used the defined expression within a larger composite phrase, speaking of an “award” of personal injury damages in one and a “claim” for them in the other, and the operation of each turned on the composite phrase and not on the defined expression ([35]).

The express exclusions in each Act differed, so each had a different area of operation ([37]). The Civil Liability Act’s exclusion of intentional torts showed the mischief that Act addressed; it did not follow that Div 5B was directed only to the same claims, particularly when intentional torts “might so easily have been” excluded from it and were not ([38]).

On method, their Honours said that the purpose of a statute may be based on an express statement, inference from its text and structure and, where appropriate, extrinsic materials. “The purpose of a statute resides in its text and structure” ([25]). The purpose of legislation must be derived from what it says and not from any assumption about the desired or desirable reach of its provisions ([26]). The Court of Appeal had said there was “no basis” in extrinsic material or the policy underlying the legislation for imposing the cap on all claims for personal injury damages (Cross v Certain Lloyds Underwriters [2011] NSWCA 136 at [49], quoted at [40]).

That, their Honours said, assumed the answer to the question of construction and then asked whether the assumed answer was falsified ([40]). It was not legitimate to identify a purpose not apparent from the text, examine extrinsic material and notice that nothing in it was positively inconsistent, and then answer the question of construction by the purpose first assumed ([41]). They accepted that provisions are construed in context, including the context of the source Act, but said the appeals did not depend on when or to what extent that context must be considered ([29]-[32]).

Kiefel J’s reasons turned on the relationship between the two Acts. They shared a wider purpose of reducing the cost of public liability insurance, but each had its own sphere of operation and the Legal Profession Act’s cap turned on the amount recovered, which had no connection with the Civil Liability Act ([97]-[102]). There was no basis for construing the term other than by reference to the definition in the Civil Liability Act ([104]). Her Honour treated resort to material outside the statute as legitimate, while saying it does not warrant attributing a wider operation than the language permits ([89]).

In dissent, Crennan and Bell JJ read “the same meaning as in Part 2” as confining the expression to damages to which Pt 2 applied, because the extrinsic materials and the mischief showed that Div 5B was enacted to remedy the same problem as the Civil Liability Act ([68]-[73]). They said the Court of Appeal’s recourse to extrinsic materials to identify the general purpose and the mischief “did not involve error” ([70]). The footnote to that statement refers to s 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 19 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) and s 34 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) (fn 107).

The costs limiting provisions of the 1987 Act were repealed from 1 October 2005 by the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW), which has provisions in generally similar but not identical terms. French CJ and Hayne J said the same answers should be given on the later provisions and found it unnecessary to examine the transitional provisions ([19]-[22]); Crennan and Bell JJ left their effect for another occasion ([53]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · French CJ and Hayne J (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [33]–[39] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab), [40]–[42] (PDF p 20) (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs give the ground on which the appeals were allowed: s 198C(1) directed attention to the definition in the Civil Liability Act and not to that Act’s operation ([33]); the operative phrases of each Act were the composite expressions ‘claim for personal injury damages’ and ‘award of personal injury damages’ ([35]); the two Acts had different fields of operation ([37]-[38]); and the Court of Appeal’s reasoning from ‘the policy underlying the legislation’ assumed the answer ([40]-[41]). They conclude that the claims were claims for personal injury damages ([42]). The paragraphs run across more than one PDF page.

Ratio · French CJ and Hayne J (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [25]–[26] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs state the method that [40]-[41] then apply to the Court of Appeal’s reasoning: purpose is identified from express statement, text and structure and, where appropriate, extrinsic materials; it resides in the text and structure; and it is derived from what the legislation says and not from an assumption about its desirable reach. They are general statements of method, but the decision applies them, which is why they are classified with the ground of decision. Paragraph [26] begins on the next PDF page.

Classification unresolved · French CJ and Hayne J (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [29]–[32] (PDF p 16) (opens in a new tab)

Their Honours accept that regard must be had to context, including the context provided by the source Act, but say that resolution of the appeals does not depend on examining when or to what extent it is necessary to consider the context of a definition in the Civil Liability Act when construing the expression in the Legal Profession Act ([32]). That question is left unresolved.

Separate reasoning · Kiefel J

Read judgment: [88]–[89] (PDF p 40) (opens in a new tab), [97]–[104] (PDF p 42) (opens in a new tab)

Kiefel J reaches the same orders by a separate route ([105]): the two Acts shared a wider purpose but did not operate together as a single scheme, each had its own sphere of operation and nothing in Div 5B was tied to the Civil Liability Act, so there was no basis to construe ‘personal injury damages’ other than by its definition ([97]-[104]). Her Honour treats resort to materials outside the statute as legitimate while not a warrant for a wider operation than the language permits ([89]). Her reasons are not the joint reasons of French CJ and Hayne J.

Separate reasoning · Crennan and Bell JJ (dissenting)

Read judgment: [68]–[73] (PDF p 31) (opens in a new tab)

Crennan and Bell JJ dissent. They would have dismissed the appeals ([52], [76]) because the extrinsic materials and the mischief indicated that Div 5B was enacted to remedy the same problem as the Civil Liability Act, so that ‘the same meaning as in Part 2’ confined the expression to damages to which Pt 2 applied ([68]-[73]). They say the Court of Appeal’s recourse to extrinsic materials to identify the general purpose and mischief ‘did not involve error’ ([70]); the footnote to that statement (fn 107) cites Bropho and names s 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 19 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) and s 34 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW). That is the dissenting view and not the Court’s.

Why does this case matter?

Cross is a standard authority for the limits that an argument from purpose faces in an interpretation problem. The Justices treated the same material, extrinsic material about the 2002 reforms and the idea that the two Acts formed a single package, in different ways, so a student who cites the case needs to say whose reasons are being used.

Exam and application relevance

Frame the question as the Court did: whether a definition borrowed from another Act carried that Act’s field of operation with it. Test any argument from purpose against the text and structure of the provision in the problem.

Cite the passages on purpose as the reasons of French CJ and Hayne J, and the orders as those of the Court.

Check your understanding

1. Why did French CJ and Hayne J say that the phrase on which the operation of each Act turned was not “personal injury damages” itself ([35])?

2. What did French CJ and Hayne J say was wrong with the Court of Appeal’s statement that there was “no basis” in extrinsic material or policy for the cap to apply to all claims for personal injury damages ([40]-[41])?

3. What did Crennan and Bell JJ say about the Court of Appeal’s use of extrinsic materials, and how did Kiefel J’s reasons differ from theirs and from those of French CJ and Hayne J ([70], [89], [104])?