Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd
Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55
Both sides built their tax arguments on decades of amending history. When a statutory definition is in dispute, how much can that history do for either of them?
What happened?
Publishing and Broadcasting Ltd (PBL) owned all of the nearly three billion issued and paid-up ordinary shares in Crown Ltd ([10]). On 28 June 2002 PBL and Crown agreed that PBL would sell just over 840 million of those shares to Crown, in an off-market buy-back, for $1 billion ([10]). Crown’s ledger already held a Shareholders Equity Account with a credit balance of more than $2.4 billion. On the day of the agreement Crown created a new Share Buy-Back Reserve Account and debited $1 billion to it, with a corresponding credit to an inter-company loan account. It made no entry in the Shareholders Equity Account ([11]-[12]). The buy-back was completed on 6 August 2002 ([13]).
For income tax, the buy-back price was taken to be a dividend to the extent that it was not “debited against amounts standing to the credit of ... the company’s share capital account”, and the rest of the price was taken not to be a dividend and was treated as the seller’s consideration for working out a capital gain or loss ([5]-[6]). The Commissioner of Taxation said the $1 billion fell on the capital side and assessed PBL to a capital gain; PBL objected that the dividend rule applied ([16]). Emmett J dismissed PBL’s appeal against the disallowance of its objection, and the Full Court of the Federal Court (Stone, Greenwood and Logan JJ) allowed PBL’s appeal ([17]). The Commissioner appealed to the High Court.
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed the Commissioner’s appeal with costs. French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ gave a single joint judgment. The Court set aside the orders of the Full Court and ordered that PBL’s appeal from the orders of Emmett J be dismissed with costs ([50]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The joint judgment began its resolution of the case with a statement about method. Quoting an earlier decision of the Court, it said that the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the statutory text ([39]). It then said, in its own words: “So must the task of statutory construction end.” The statutory text “must be considered in its context”, and that context “includes legislative history and extrinsic materials”. But “Understanding context has utility if, and in so far as, it assists in fixing the meaning of the statutory text.” The Court continued that legislative history and extrinsic materials “cannot displace the meaning of the statutory text” and that “their examination” is not “an end in itself” ([39]).
The Court applied that approach to the dispute. Both parties had argued from the historical development of the corporations and taxation legislation, and the Full Court had been persuaded to a narrower reading of the definition of “share capital account” in s 6D of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) by that kind of argument ([21]). The joint judgment acknowledged the aspects of history the parties relied on but said that none was of much assistance in fixing the meaning of s 6D or in applying s 159GZZZP(1) ([40]-[41]). The aspect of legislative history it found of greater utility was the contemporaneous commencement of the Corporations Law’s new provisions on “financial statements” and “financial records”, in the light of which s 6D had to be read ([42]).
Read that way, the words “an account which the company keeps of its share capital” in s 6D(1)(a) were not confined to the account to which paid-up capital was originally credited ([42]). It was sufficient that the account, whether debited or credited, was either a record of a transaction into which the company had entered in relation to its share capital, or a record of the company’s financial position in relation to its share capital ([44]). Section 6D(2) required all such accounts to be treated as a single account and was not merely facilitative of transfers between accounts ([45]).
Crown’s Share Buy-Back Reserve Account, whose only entry was the $1 billion debit, was a record of the transaction by which Crown had contracted to reduce its share capital, so it was a share capital account and was taken, with the Shareholders Equity Account, to be a single combined account ([46]-[47]). To call the debit a debit “against” the credit balance of that combined account was to apply the fiction in s 6D(2), not to extend it ([47]). The Court rejected PBL’s new argument that s 159GZZZP(1) was not engaged because the buy-back had not been completed on 30 June 2002 ([48]), and concluded that the $1 billion was, as at that date, debited against amounts standing to the credit of Crown’s share capital account ([49]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [39]–[41] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab)
The statement of method at [39] is what the Court then applies at [40]-[41] to discount the legislative history both parties had argued and to turn instead to the text and its context, so it is part of the reasoning on which the result depends.
Proposition 2
Ratio · French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [42]–[47] (PDF p 20) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state the Court’s construction of s 6D and apply it to Crown’s accounts; they are the reasons for holding that the $1 billion was debited against amounts standing to the credit of Crown’s share capital account, which is the ground on which the appeal was allowed.
Why does this case matter?
A statutory-interpretation answer often turns on what to do with the history of a provision once the other side has an argument from it. An examiner looks for the student who can say what a piece of context did for the meaning of the words, rather than reciting that context may be considered.
Exam and application relevance
Cite Consolidated Media for the statement of method at [39] of the joint reasons, and attribute its opening sentence to the earlier decision the Court quotes, which its footnote identifies as Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27 at 46 [47]. The statement was applied to a definition in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) as it stood for the year of income ended 30 June 2002, so an answer about share buy-backs today should check the current provisions before relying on the Court’s reading of them. In a problem, identify which piece of context actually bears on the words in dispute and say what it does to their meaning, as the Court did with the financial-records provisions at [42].
Check your understanding
1. Which Justices gave the joint judgment, and what order did the Court make?
2. According to [39], what role may legislative history and extrinsic materials play in fixing the meaning of a statutory text, and what can they not do?
3. Why did the Court treat the commencement of the Corporations Law’s financial-records provisions as more useful than the legislative history the parties had argued, and what did that do to the Full Court’s reading of s 6D(1)(a)?