Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

High Court of Australia · 2010

Administrative LawStatutory InterpretationLegal Research And MethodProcedural FairnessStatutory Interpretation

Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] HCA 23

After the High Court refused to read the Migration Act as a code, Parliament declared it an exhaustive statement of the hearing rule. A visa applicant abroad was refused without a chance to answer. Did the amendment reach her?

What happened?

Ms Saeed, a citizen of Pakistan, applied in November 2007 for a Skilled - Independent visa (Subclass 175), a visa that can be granted only if the applicant is outside Australia when it is granted ([4]). One criterion required her to have been employed in a skilled occupation for at least 12 months in the 24 months before she applied, and she supplied documents to show that she had worked as a cook at a restaurant in Rawalpindi from March 2006 until November 2007 ([4]).

Australian immigration officers in Pakistan investigated. They found that no employee records were kept on the premises and were told that no woman had ever worked in the kitchen ([5]). The Minister’s delegate told Ms Saeed that she considered the evidence of her employment to have been false or misleading and, not being satisfied about the criterion, refused the application ([5]). The delegate told her of that information in the decision record, but not before the decision was reached ([63]).

The delegate’s decision could not be reviewed by the Migration Review Tribunal, because review was limited to visas that can be granted while the applicant is in the migration zone ([6]). Ms Saeed sought a declaration and mandamus under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) on the ground that the delegate had failed to give her what the natural justice hearing rule required ([6]). The Federal Magistrates Court and the Full Court of the Federal Court followed Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Lat and dismissed her application and appeal with costs. Lat had held that s 51A(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was intended to exclude the common law hearing rule and that the relevant subdivision was a comprehensive procedural code ([7]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ) allowed the appeal with costs. It set aside the orders of the Full Court and the Federal Magistrates Court, quashed the delegate’s decision of 16 July 2008, and ordered that a writ of mandamus issue requiring the Minister to consider and determine Ms Saeed’s application according to law ([60]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The joint reasons (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ) began from the rule that when a statute confers a power to destroy or prejudice a person’s rights or interests, the principles of natural justice regulate its exercise. That implication is reached by construction, on the assumption that the legislature, aware of the common law principles, intended them to apply ([11]-[12]). Observance of natural justice is a condition of the exercise of the power, and a decision reached without fulfilling it is not authorised by the statute ([13]).

The principles can be excluded only by “plain words of necessary intendment”; an intention to exclude is not to be assumed or spelled out of indirect references, uncertain inferences or equivocal considerations, nor inferred from the mere presence in the statute of rights consistent with some natural justice principles ([14]). The presumption that Parliament does not overthrow fundamental principles without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness derives from the principle of legality ([15]).

The joint reasons applied that approach to s 51A(1), which provides that subdiv AB of Div 3 of Pt 2 of the Migration Act is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule “in relation to the matters it deals with” ([3]). Section 57 requires the Minister to give certain information to an applicant for comment, but s 57(3) confines that requirement to applicants who could be granted the visa while in the migration zone and who have a right of review, and the appellant, who applied from outside Australia, was neither ([22]).

The matter with which s 57 deals is the provision of that information to onshore applicants, so giving it to offshore applicants was not a matter dealt with, and the application of the hearing rule to the appellant’s application was not excluded ([42], [56]). Nothing in the subdivision spoke of excluding the rule for offshore applicants, and s 57(3) excluded only the procedural requirements of s 57(2) ([48]). Citing Coco v The Queen, the joint reasons added that courts should not impute to the legislature an intention to interfere with fundamental rights, that such an intention must be clearly manifested by unmistakable and unambiguous language, and that the same may be said of the displacement of fundamental principles of the common law ([58]). The Minister was therefore obliged to give the appellant an opportunity to answer the adverse material ([59]).

The statutory outcome has since changed for later applications. Items 1 and 2 of Sch 6 Pt 1 of the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2014 (Cth) omitted the words “Subject to subsection (3), the” from s 57(2) and repealed s 57(3), and apply to visa applications made on or after the commencement of that Part, which was 1 January 2015 (item 3 and the commencement table). For those applications the exclusion on which this appellant’s case turned is no longer in the Act.

The joint reasons did not decide whether the Act itself required the consideration discussed at [54] ([55]), and the Court did not decide the appellant’s constitutional arguments ([8], [92]).

The Full Courts below had resolved the difficulty in the phrase “in relation to the matters it deals with” by the Explanatory Memorandum and the Minister’s second reading speech, which showed that s 51A was meant to overcome the effect of Ex parte Miah ([27]-[28]). The joint reasons held that statements of legislative intention in explanatory memoranda or by Ministers, however clear or emphatic, cannot overcome the need to consider carefully the words of the statute ([31]), and that it is erroneous to look at extrinsic materials before exhausting the application of the ordinary rules of construction ([33]).

They accepted that the context of s 51A was provided by Ex parte Miah and that resort to the materials may be warranted to ascertain that context and objective, but said that the objective cannot be equated with the statutory intention revealed by the terms of the subdivision; whether s 51A excludes the hearing rule is answered first by the text of s 51A and the provisions with which it interacts ([34]). The materials did not answer the questions raised about the operation of the section, because Ex parte Miah had not been concerned with offshore applicants ([34], [57]).

On the text, the Minister argued that the matters the subdivision deals with are the single subject of the procedure for dealing with visa applications ([36]). The joint reasons held that the words “the matters it deals with” direct attention to the operative provisions within the subdivision ([37]), that the plural form suggests that the inquiry may be directed to a number of such provisions ([38]), and that this approach is correct because the presumption is that words are used in a statute for a reason and should be given their meaning and effect ([39]). The matters dealt with cannot simply be equated with the procedural requirements of the operative provisions, or s 51A(1) would be largely otiose ([41]).

Heydon J, in separate reasons, rejected each of the five reasons the Minister gave for a single subject matter construction, beginning with the use of the plural “matters” ([65]-[82]). He said that reading the Explanatory Memorandum and the second reading speech is much less helpful than reading the legislation; that the materials establish an intention to overturn the result of Ex parte Miah, but that what Parliament actually did turns on the meaning of the controversial expression ([74]-[75]); and that the search for the intent of legislators rather than the meaning of legislation can be both delusive and lacking in utility ([85]). He found it unnecessary to decide whether the hearing rule applies because of a presumption or an implication, or the precise test of the language needed to limit or remove the duty of procedural fairness ([92]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [56]–[59] (PDF p 27) (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs state the construction of s 51A(1) and s 57(3) that the appeal turned on and the conclusion that the hearing rule was maintained for offshore applicants and that the Minister had to give the appellant an opportunity to answer the adverse material, which is what supports the orders.

Proposition 2

Ratio · French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [31]–[34] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab)

The Court rejects the Full Courts’ resolution of the obscure phrase by the extrinsic materials and sets the order of work (text and interacting provisions first) that it then follows at [35]-[42], so the reasoning to the result depends on it.

Separate reasoning · Heydon J

Read judgment: [74]–[75] (PDF p 35) (opens in a new tab)

Heydon J agreed with the orders and gave his own reasons; these paragraphs are his treatment of the extrinsic materials and are not attributed to the joint reasons.

Why does this case matter?

Students often treat an Explanatory Memorandum or a Minister’s speech that says Parliament “intended” to exclude a common law protection as the end of the matter. An examiner looks for the order of work in an answer: what the words of the provision actually reach, what the materials are for, and whether the answer then asks separately what happens to the protection at the edge of what the provision covers.

Exam and application relevance

Use Saeed when a problem pairs a disputed statutory expression with an emphatic explanatory memorandum or ministerial speech and a common law protection that the statute may have displaced. Attribute each step to the Justices who took it: the joint reasons, and Heydon J separately for his rejection of the Minister’s five reasons and for what he left undecided. The decision turned on ss 51A and 57 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) as they stood for an application made in 2007 and refused in 2008, and on the position of an applicant outside Australia who had no right of review, so confirm the current text of s 51A and s 57 before applying it to a visa problem: for applications made on or after 1 January 2015 s 57(3) has been repealed, and the offshore exception that decided this case is gone, and use it for the method when the statute is another one.

Check your understanding

1. Which Justices gave the joint reasons, and what did Heydon J do?

2. According to the joint reasons, what order should a court follow between the words of s 51A(1) and the Explanatory Memorandum and second reading speech, and why did the materials not decide the case?

3. Why was the application of the hearing rule to Ms Saeed’s application not excluded by subdivision AB?