Health Ombudsman v Antley
Health Ombudsman v Antley [2016] QCAT 472
A nurse who stole and forged prescriptions faces six charges before a tribunal, and the regulator does not succeed on all of them. Is the regulator entitled to its costs, and can a charge rest on the way she behaved after the offending?
What happened?
Lara Antley was a registered nurse aged 39 who began work at ICON Cancer Care, Wesley Hospital, in April 2014 ([14], [16]). Investigation established that she stole a script pad from Dr Fanning, forged two prescriptions for Endone and presented them at three pharmacies ([18], read as corrected in [2018] QCAT 147 at [19]). A pharmacist who suspected misconduct made a mandatory complaint ([19]), her employer dismissed her on 23 July 2014 ([20]), and on 11 August 2014 she pleaded guilty in the Sandgate Magistrates Court to fraud and stealing and was fined $500 without convictions being recorded ([22]).
Her explanation was that she intended to self-medicate to manage severe pain from a diagnosed condition ([27]). The Nursing and Midwifery Board took immediate action on 8 October 2014 by imposing conditions on her registration ([24]), and on 12 April 2016 she surrendered her registration, although s 21(2) of the Health Ombudsman Act 2013 (Qld) allowed a complaint against her to be dealt with as if she were still registered ([3], [25]).
The referral was filed in the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal on 23 December 2015 ([5]). Six charges were brought. Charges 1 to 4 concerned stealing blank authority prescriptions, forging prescriptions for Endone and obtaining or attempting to obtain the drug with them; charge 5 alleged a failure to notify the National Board that she had been charged with offences punishable by 12 months imprisonment or more; and charge 6 alleged a failure to disclose that she had forged a prescription to the police, her employer, the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency and three doctors ([10]).
All charges except charge 5 alleged professional misconduct, with an alternative allegation, and charge 5 alleged unprofessional conduct only ([9]). She took part in a compulsory conference and agreed a statement of agreed and disputed facts ([5], [6]), but on 29 September 2016 her general practitioner expressed her wish to no longer participate, and the matter proceeded without her participation and was decided on the papers ([7], [8]). The Health Ombudsman sought a nine-month disqualification, a reprimand and an order that she pay his costs ([47], [48], [51]).
What did the Court decide?
The Tribunal, constituted by Judicial Member Thomas assisted by three assessors, made findings under s 107(2) of the Health Ombudsman Act 2013 (Qld) that the respondent had behaved in a way that constitutes professional misconduct as alleged in charges 1, 2, 3 and 4 and unprofessional conduct as alleged in charge 5, and that she had no case to answer on charge 6. It reprimanded her, disqualified her from applying for registration as a registered health practitioner for nine months from the date of the order, and ordered that the parties pay their own costs ([84]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Judicial Member Thomas, assisted by three assessors, said that stealing blank prescriptions, forging prescriptions for Endone and obtaining the drug with them was conduct “totally unacceptable for any practising nurse” that “plainly satisfies those portions of the definition of professional misconduct with which she has been charged” ([42]). He found unprofessional conduct on charge 5, the failure to notify the National Board of the criminal charges, remarking that such a charge is secondary to the original misconduct and that its usual effect is “a relatively minor aggravation” to the totality of the conduct ([31], [37]).
On sanction he said that “The protection of the health and safety of the public, and the maintenance of public trust in the profession are basic considerations” and that general and personal deterrence are “highly relevant” ([43]). He noted that cases usually range from six months to three years for cancellation, suspension or postponement ([46]), that general deterrence is unlikely unless loss of registration for at least 12 to 18 months is known to be a probable consequence, and that the nine months proposed “tends to be on the light side” but “falls within the proper range” because more than seven months of registration had already been lost through surrender ([49], [50]).
With the benefit of the assessors’ advice, he ordered a reprimand together with disqualification from applying for registration for nine months ([48], [50], [84]). In a later decision, Health Ombudsman v Antley [2018] QCAT 147, the same Judicial Member acknowledged an error in paragraph [18] of the reasons, which should be read as saying two prescriptions were forged and not ten ([19]); he said that he did not think the reasons in Antley contain sufficient data to enable them to be used effectively as a precedent on sanction, and that no amendments to the reasons can be made ([20]).
On costs, Judicial Member Thomas said that s 195 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act 2009 (Qld), which had given the Tribunal power to make any order about costs it considered appropriate, was repealed in 2013 when the Health Ombudsman Act 2013 (Qld) was enacted, and that the proper assumption is that the repeal was intended and deliberate ([56]-[58]). The result, he said, is that the parties must each pay their own costs unless the “interests of justice require” a costs order, the approach laid down for QCAT from its inception, which the repeal makes applicable to health disciplinary matters ([59]).
Treating Keane JA’s observations in Tamawood as general observations about a similar framework, he asked whether there were “countervailing considerations” ([60], [61]). He held that there were, including the disproportionate and punitive effect of a costs order in this case, the historical and legislative changes that tend to make costs orders oppressive, the respondent’s conduct of the litigation (she did not join issue on her guilt of professional misconduct or increase its cost), the multiplication of bureaucracies and the fact that the Health Ombudsman does not fully stand in the shoes of a professional board, the nature and objectives of the disciplinary jurisdiction, and the probability of a crippling burden ([80]).
He said that tribunal members recite that the jurisdiction is not “punitive”, merely “protective”, “but the practical effect of a costs order often belies this” ([69]), and that a crippling or punitive effect of a costs order on a party is “capable of being a relevant factor” in deciding whether the interests of justice require one ([72]). He concluded “I do not consider that the interests of justice require me to do so” ([82]) and ordered that the parties bear their own costs ([83], [84]).
He said that he had not had the benefit of adversarial submissions and that his observations “may therefore need reconsideration in a future case with the benefit of full argument” ([52]).
The Judicial Member concluded that charge 6, which in reality was a charge that the respondent failed to turn herself in to the police, her employer, AHPRA and her doctors by making voluntary disclosures of her conduct, was “so broad that it would be unsafe for this Tribunal to make a separate finding of professional misconduct based upon it” ([32]). He distinguished Re Hampton, on which the Health Ombudsman relied for an ethical obligation to disclose, as a case about a duty arising on a particular occasion, an application for admission as a solicitor, where “a special level of candour and disclosure has always been necessary” ([33]).
He accepted that nurses are under a duty to observe a high level of candour in their dealings with their professional board and other regulatory agencies, but said charge 6 “assumes far more extensive duties than this” ([35]). He also held that the charge lacked proper particulars, since the instances of incorrect statements and false denials in the evidence were not particularised in charge 6 or elsewhere ([36]), and that acts of that kind, if relied on as professional misconduct or unprofessional conduct, need to be identified or particularised so that procedural fairness may be accorded ([37]).
The false statements and self-excusing behaviour showed a lack of remorse and might be highly relevant to sanction, but did not support a separate charge ([38], [39]). The order was that the respondent has no case to answer on charge 6 and that no further action is to be taken on that matter ([84]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Judicial Member Thomas (Hon J B Thomas AM QC), assisted by assessors
Read judgment: [31] (opens in a new tab), [37] (opens in a new tab), [42]–[50] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs are the stated reasons for the findings on charges 1 to 5 and for the reprimand and nine-month disqualification ordered at [84]. The decision is that of one Judicial Member of a Tribunal at first instance, sitting with assessors, so it is persuasive and does not bind other decision-makers. The later remarks in the same Judicial Member’s decision of 2 May 2018 ([2018] QCAT 147 at [19], [20]) are about this decision, not part of its reasons.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Judicial Member Thomas (Hon J B Thomas AM QC), assisted by assessors
Read judgment: [57]–[59] (opens in a new tab), [61]–[65] (opens in a new tab), [69]–[72] (opens in a new tab), [78]–[83] (opens in a new tab)
The default rule that follows from the repeal of s 195, the countervailing considerations, and the conclusion that the interests of justice did not require a costs order are the grounds of the costs order made at [83] and [84]. The Judicial Member qualified them at [52] as given without adversarial submissions, which is why the decision is best treated as persuasive.
Obiter · Judicial Member Thomas (Hon J B Thomas AM QC), assisted by assessors
Read judgment: [76]–[77] (opens in a new tab)
The observations about factors that may favour a costs order, and about the limits he would have placed on costs had he been inclined to make an order, are expressed as what may exist in other cases or what would be needed if he were otherwise inclined, and he did not make a costs order.
Proposition 3
Ratio · Judicial Member Thomas (Hon J B Thomas AM QC), assisted by assessors
Read judgment: [32]–[39] (opens in a new tab)
The conclusions that charge 6 was too broad, was unsupported by Re Hampton and lacked particulars are the grounds for the finding that there was no case to answer on it ([84], order 1(c)). The remark at [36] that particulars are not uncommon in charges, and the Wakelin example, illustrate the reasoning.
Why does this case matter?
A problem about a regulator’s disciplinary proceedings invites two shortcuts: treating a regulator that succeeds as entitled to its costs, and treating a charge as made out because the practitioner behaved badly after the offending. This decision tests both in a tribunal setting where the regulator did not succeed on every charge. Examiners reward answers that keep the findings on each charge, the sanction and the order about costs apart, and that say what supplies each answer.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem about a health practitioner’s disciplinary proceedings, treat the charges, the sanction and costs as separate questions and say which provision supplies each answer. When citing this decision, describe it as the decision of one Judicial Member of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, sitting with assessors at first instance and deciding the matter on the papers, so that it is persuasive and does not bind other decision-makers.
The provisions applied were the Health Ombudsman Act 2013 (Qld), the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act 2009 (Qld) and the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), as the Tribunal described them in December 2016. This judgment does not say how they now read or how later decisions have treated its costs reasoning, so check the current provisions and later Tribunal and appellate decisions before relying on it for a present problem.
Check your understanding
1. What did charges 1 to 5 allege, and what did the Tribunal find on each of them ([9], [10], [84])?
2. What did the Judicial Member say about the relevance of the respondent’s false statements and self-excusing behaviour, and what did he say about charge 6 itself ([32], [36]-[39])?
3. What consideration did the Judicial Member give to the default position on costs, and what did he say about the submissions he had received before reaching his view ([52], [59], [82])?
4. Which orders did the Tribunal make on sanction, and how did it treat the period of registration the respondent had already lost ([48]-[50], [84])?
5. Whose advice did the Judicial Member take on sanction, and is there a separate set of reasons from anyone else on the Tribunal ([50], the heading to the decision)?