Legal Services Commissioner v Madden (No 2)
Legal Services Commissioner v Madden (No 2) [2008] QCA 301
A solicitor did not contest the charges of professional misconduct, but the tribunal found him dishonest although no one had alleged it, and struck him off. Was the tribunal entitled to do that?
Qualified by legislation: Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), from 1 December 2009
Section 1513 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Jurisdiction Provisions) Amendment Act 2009 (Qld) omitted the words ‘on the commissioner’s application’ from s 455(1), from 1 December 2009. Madden’s holding that the tribunal is confined to the allegations in the discipline application is unaffected; its statement at [80] that a variation needs the Commissioner’s application describes the provision as it then stood. Under s 455 as amended the disciplinary body may vary the application by omitting allegations or including additional allegations if satisfied that it is reasonable to do so having regard to all the circumstances, including the fairness of the proceeding.
What happened?
Mr Madden was admitted as a solicitor in Queensland in 1987. On 9 February 2007 the Legal Services Commissioner filed a discipline application against him under the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld). Before it was heard that Act was repealed and replaced by materially indistinguishable provisions in the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), which commenced on 1 July 2007 ([1], [4], [63]). The application set out six charges. Charges one to four concerned his conduct for a client, Mr Kampf, in personal injuries proceedings: neglect and delay, acting without instructions, a breach of the Trust Accounts Act 1973 (Qld) and overcharging. Charges five and six concerned his work for Mr Portch and Ms Dakin, later Mrs Portch: failing to maintain reasonable standards of competence in preparing a financial agreement and acting in a conflict of interest ([7], [10]-[26]).
Mr Madden did not contest the charges of professional misconduct, and he and the Commissioner signed a statement of agreed facts ([8]-[9]). Those facts included that he had not told Mr Kampf of two applications brought by the defendant in Mr Kampf’s proceedings, that without instructions he had agreed to pay the defendant’s costs of the first, and that he had paid $1,125.70 to the defendant’s solicitors from his trust account ([13]-[17]).
At the hearing the Tribunal, constituted by the Chief Justice with two panel members, raised whether an inference was available that Mr Madden had acted deceitfully to extricate himself from a problem of his own making ([27], [30]). Counsel for the Commissioner accepted that an inference of dishonesty might be open on the facts but did not submit that it should be drawn, and counsel for Mr Madden submitted that the application did not allege dishonesty ([31]). The Tribunal invited the Commissioner to amend the application, and the Commissioner was not prepared to apply to amend it ([32]-[33]).
The Tribunal gave both parties a document setting out arguable inferences, intending to alert them to what it proposed to consider ([34]-[35]), and decided to proceed on that footing although Mr Madden’s counsel submitted that it had no power to amend the application except at the Commissioner’s instigation ([36]-[37]). Mr Madden gave evidence and was cross-examined, but it was not put to him that he had acted dishonestly ([38]-[43]).
On 8 February 2008 the Tribunal found that Mr Madden had acted dishonestly, treated the conduct as professional misconduct, and ordered that his name be removed from the local roll, that he pay $800 compensation to Mrs Portch, and that he pay the Commissioner’s costs ([1], [44]-[47]). He appealed to the Court of Appeal.
What did the Court decide?
The Court of Appeal of Queensland (Holmes and Fraser JJA and White J, in a single judgment of the Court delivered on 30 September 2008) allowed the appeal and set aside orders 1 and 4 made by the Tribunal, including the order removing Mr Madden’s name from the roll. In its place it ordered that he pay a penalty of $10,000, complete a course of study called Professional Responsibility at the Queensland University of Technology, practise under supervision for twelve months, hold his practising certificate on conditions for twelve months and seek advice on management of his practice from two named practitioners, and that the Commissioner pay his costs of the appeal; the order for $800 compensation was not disturbed ([112], [134]-[135]). This is a decision of a State intermediate appellate court: it binds courts and tribunals below it in Queensland and is persuasive elsewhere.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The Court of Appeal, in a single judgment of the Court, held that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by embarking on a hearing to determine whether Mr Madden had acted dishonestly in the conduct alleged in charges two and three when dishonesty was not alleged in the discipline application, and it set aside the finding of dishonesty ([93]). The parties had agreed before the Tribunal that the application did not charge dishonesty, and the Court held that charge four, which alleged that he knew or ought to have known that fees were not properly chargeable, was not to be construed as comprehending dishonesty, applying the rule of practice that a charge of dishonesty must be made in clear terms ([52]-[57]).
The question was therefore whether, on the proper construction of the 2007 Act, the Tribunal had jurisdiction to find dishonesty that was not charged in the discipline application when notice of a possible finding of dishonesty had been given before the hearing ([58]). The Court held that it did not. Section 601 confers jurisdiction to hear and decide a discipline application ([59]), s 453 requires the disciplinary body to hear and decide each allegation stated in the discipline application ([65]), and s 456(1) allows the Tribunal to make orders only after it has completed a hearing of a discipline application and is satisfied that the practitioner is guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct ([67]).
From those provisions, with ss 452 and 455, the Court concluded that the legislative intention was to confine the Tribunal’s jurisdiction by reference to the particular allegations made by the Commissioner in the discipline application ([72]-[73]). The scheme is that the Commissioner investigates possible misconduct, decides whether to bring a charge and decides what to charge, and the Tribunal’s role is adjudicative ([74]). Following the reasoning of the High Court in Walsh v Law Society of New South Wales on an analogous New South Wales scheme, the Court said that provisions requiring particularity, and the safeguards they give a practitioner, should not be narrowly construed ([75]-[77]).
It rejected the Commissioner’s submissions that dishonesty could be considered on the question of sanction, because s 456 contemplates a hearing followed by both the findings of any proved misconduct and the penalty, and the statutory objective of ensuring fairness is as relevant to penalty as to findings of fact ([89]-[92]). The inferences document, the Court said, adverted to possible dishonesty that was inextricably bound up with the decisions whether the practitioner was guilty and what penalty to impose ([93]).
On the appeal under s 468 the Court’s role is confined to correcting any error by the Tribunal and, where necessary, exercising afresh the statutory jurisdiction conferred on the Tribunal, so it was not open to the Court to find that Mr Madden acted dishonestly ([110]). The Court found it unnecessary to say whether the Tribunal had erred in fact in finding dishonesty, because the finding had to be set aside for want of jurisdiction ([109]), and it set aside the findings challenged in grounds (b) and (c) of the notice of appeal because they depended on the finding of dishonesty ([111]).
The Court also held that, under s 455(1) as it then stood, the Tribunal could vary a discipline application only on the Commissioner’s application ([74], [80]). Section 455(1) of the 2007 Act, as it then stood, provided that the disciplinary body may, “on the commissioner’s application”, vary a discipline application by omitting allegations or including additional allegations, if satisfied that it is reasonable to do so having regard to all the circumstances ([66]). On the Court’s account of the scheme, the Tribunal’s part in an amendment is to exercise a judicial discretion whether to allow the amendment the Commissioner seeks ([74]).
The Tribunal had observed that, if the only power to amend was at the Commissioner’s instigation, the resultant position was unsatisfactory, and that consideration may not have been given to s 602(1), which empowers the tribunal to do all things necessary or convenient to be done for exercising its jurisdiction ([78]). The Court held that s 602 does not confer jurisdiction that is not elsewhere conferred and does not qualify the condition in s 455(1) that the Commissioner must first apply, and that no unconditional power to vary discipline applications should be implied, because the 2007 Act adopts the familiar adversarial procedure under which it is no part of the judicial function to determine what charges are to be brought or pursued: the decision to institute proceedings is the province of the executive, and decisions directed to ensuring a fair trial and preventing abuse of the Tribunal’s processes are the province of the Tribunal ([79]-[80]).
It said that the Tribunal’s approach reflected that of the High Court in Walter v Council of Queensland Law Society, but that those statements were made in the context of a regulatory scheme that had since been superseded, and that the Tribunal’s conclusion, although supported by substantial reasons, could not stand with the High Court’s analysis of an analogous scheme in Walsh ([81]-[83]). As to the Tribunal’s view that it must be able to intervene independently as an emanation of the Supreme Court, the Court noted that s 13 of the 2007 Act preserves the Supreme Court’s inherent jurisdiction over the control and discipline of local lawyers, but held that the Tribunal had not exercised that jurisdiction, because the Chief Justice heard and decided the discipline application as chairperson of the Tribunal with the assistance of its panel members, and that the preservation of the inherent jurisdiction did not favour a view that the Tribunal was entitled to exercise it or justify rejecting the natural construction of the provisions that confine the Tribunal’s jurisdiction ([84]-[88]).
It said that difficult questions may arise concerning the relationship between the inherent jurisdiction and completed or existing disciplinary proceedings under the 2007 Act, but that it was not necessary in the appeal to attempt to resolve them ([87]).
The Court rejected the appellant’s contention that, because the discipline application did not seek an order removing his name from the roll, the Tribunal had no power to make that order, and held that the Tribunal did not lack jurisdiction or power to make it ([95]-[99]). Section 452 confers power on the Commissioner to apply and does not in terms require the application to specify any particular order, and s 456(1), which empowers the Tribunal to make orders, is not in terms limited by reference to the specification of any particular order in the application: the Tribunal may make “any order as it thinks fit” ([96]).
The power to vary a discipline application in s 455(1) extends only to omitting or including allegations and not to the nature of the order sought, so the appellant’s construction would confine the power to make orders by whatever order was first framed with reference to the unamended allegations, even though the allegations could be substantially changed on the Commissioner’s application, which the Court called a most unlikely legislative intention ([97]). The Court said that practitioners should appreciate that the Tribunal may make any of the orders in s 456 that it considers appropriate if satisfied of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, that the requirements of procedural fairness are met by the provisions requiring the application to express the charge and to provide particulars of the facts on which it is based, and that any prejudice to a practitioner from the late specification of a particular order may be met by appropriate orders of the Tribunal ([98]).
The removal order was set aside, not because of this ground, but because the Tribunal’s findings on which it rested depended on the finding of dishonesty, which significantly influenced the decision to order removal ([47], [111]-[112]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Holmes and Fraser JJA and White J (joint judgment of the Court)
Read judgment: [52]–[58] (opens in a new tab)
The Court’s conclusion that the discipline application did not charge dishonesty, and that charge four could not be read as doing so, is the premise of the jurisdictional question it then answers.
Ratio · Holmes and Fraser JJA and White J (joint judgment of the Court)
Read judgment: [59]–[77] (opens in a new tab), [89]–[93] (opens in a new tab)
The construction of ss 601, 452, 453, 455 and 456, the reasoning from Walsh and the rejection of the Commissioner’s sanction-stage submissions lead to the conclusion at [93] that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction, which is the ground on which the finding of dishonesty was set aside.
Ratio · Holmes and Fraser JJA and White J (joint judgment of the Court)
Read judgment: [109]–[111] (opens in a new tab)
The limits on the Court’s own role on an appeal under s 468 explain why it did not itself find dishonesty and why the dependent findings fell with the finding of dishonesty; at [109] the Court expressly did not decide whether the Tribunal erred in fact.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Holmes and Fraser JJA and White J (joint judgment of the Court)
Read judgment: [74] (opens in a new tab), [78]–[83] (opens in a new tab), [84]–[86] (opens in a new tab), [88] (opens in a new tab)
The Court rejected the Tribunal’s reasons for thinking it could explore dishonesty without the Commissioner’s application; that rejection is part of the Court’s reasoning to the conclusion that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction.
Obiter · Holmes and Fraser JJA and White J (joint judgment of the Court)
Read judgment: [87] (opens in a new tab)
The Court notes that difficult questions may arise about the relationship between the inherent jurisdiction and proceedings under the 2007 Act and says that it is not necessary to attempt to resolve them, so the observation is not part of the ground of decision.
Proposition 3
Ratio · Holmes and Fraser JJA and White J (joint judgment of the Court)
Read judgment: [95]–[99] (opens in a new tab)
The Court decided ground (f) against the appellant on the construction of ss 452, 455 and 456, so the reasoning at [96]-[98] is the ground of decision on that ground of appeal.
Why does this case matter?
In a problem about discipline it is natural to begin with what the practitioner did. Begin also with the document that started the proceeding. Ask what it alleged, who was able to change it, and what the body hearing it was being asked to decide, and ask separately whether the orders it made depended on how the application framed them.
Exam and application relevance
Compare the findings and orders challenged in your problem with the discipline application itself, and identify the legislation in force on the relevant date, because the reasoning here is tied to the text of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) as it stood in 2008 and to the Legal Practice Tribunal that heard the application. Check the current text of the provisions on hearing and varying a discipline application and the identity of the body that now hears them before applying the reasoning to a later problem.
Take care in describing what the decision says about the Tribunal’s finding of dishonesty and about Mr Madden’s conduct: ask whether the Court decided the question you are describing, or disposed of the finding on another basis ([109]-[110]).
Check your understanding
1. After the Tribunal formed the view that an inference of dishonesty was available, what did it invite the Commissioner to do, and what was the Commissioner’s response ([32]-[33])?
2. What was the inferences document, and why did the Tribunal provide it ([34]-[35])?
3. What did the parties agree about whether the discipline application charged dishonesty, and what did the Court say about charge four ([52]-[57])?
4. Which section did the Court identify as conferring the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, and what did s 453 require the disciplinary body to hear and decide ([59], [65])?
5. What did the Court say about the Commissioner’s submission that evidence of dishonesty was admissible on the question of sanction ([89]-[92])?
6. What did the Court say about s 602 of the 2007 Act, and about the inherent jurisdiction preserved by s 13 ([79]-[80], [84]-[88])?
7. What did the Court decide about the appellant’s contention that the Tribunal had no power to order removal from the roll because the application did not seek that order ([95]-[99])?
8. What did the Court say about its own power on the appeal to find that Mr Madden acted dishonestly ([110])?