Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd

High Court of Australia · 2016

Ethics And Professional ResponsibilityDuties To Court

Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd (2016) 259 CLR 1

A solicitor advises two guarantors to consent to a judgment for $3.4 million, when their real liability is $1.86 million. The solicitor says the advocate’s immunity ends the case before negligence is even asked. Does it?

What happened?

The first appellant and Ms Lord guaranteed a company’s debts to a bank. The bank sued them on the guarantee, and the trial opened before Rein J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. On the opening day the bank certified that the amount owing under the guarantee was $1,856,122 ([9]). Counsel for the guarantors then reported a settlement: judgment would be entered against the guarantors and the company for the company’s full indebtedness of about $3.4 million, and the bank would not enforce it if the guarantors paid $1.75 million by 19 November 2010 ([10]).

The consent order for judgment was made, and the Court noted the non-enforcement agreement. The guarantors did not pay in time, and an attempt to set the settlement aside as a penalty failed ([11]). The first appellant and his assignee then sued the guarantors’ solicitor, alleging negligence in advising them to consent to judgment in those terms and in failing to advise them of its effect ([12]). The parties agreed facts, and on the separate question the solicitor relied on the advocate’s immunity as a complete answer ([13]).

What did the Court decide?

By a majority of five to two the appeal was allowed. The separate question whether the claim was defeated because the defendant was immune from suit was answered “No” ([63]). The Court of Appeal’s contrary answer was set aside. The Court did not decide whether the solicitor was negligent or whether any loss was caused. It said that the decision of the Court of Appeal, “while it stands, precludes any investigation of the strengths and weaknesses of the appellants’ claim” ([26]).

There were three judgments: the joint reasons of French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ ([1]-[63]), the reasons of Nettle J ([64]-[73]) and the reasons of Gordon J ([74]-[132]). Nettle and Gordon JJ would have dismissed the appeal.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ declined to reconsider Giannarelli and D’Orta, but held that the test those cases state “is not satisfied where the work of the advocate leads to an agreement between parties to litigation to settle their dispute” ([5]). The immunity attaches to the advocate’s participation in the quelling of a controversy by judicial power, so the connection required is “a functional connection” between the advocate’s work and the judge’s decision ([5]). In their words ([6]):

“in order to attract the immunity, advice given out of court must affect the conduct of the case in court and the resolution of the case by that court.”

A “merely historical” connection, in which one event precedes another as a necessary condition of it, is not enough ([49]). Advice to settle is connected to the case only in that sense, and the immunity “does not extend to negligent advice which leads to the settlement of a claim in civil proceedings” ([45]). The same reasoning meant the immunity was not engaged merely because the parties’ agreement was embodied in consent orders ([6]). The joint reasons found that the consent order and the Court’s notation “reflected an agreement of the parties for the payment of money in circumstances where no exercise of judicial power determined the terms of the agreement or gave it effect as resolving the dispute” ([62]).

Two limits belong to the holding. First, the majority acknowledged “many cases where, although the parties have agreed upon the terms of the order which a court is asked to make, the making of the order itself requires the resolution of issues by the exercise of judicial power”, giving settlements of representative proceedings and compromises on behalf of a person under a legal incapacity as examples, and said “[i]t is not necessary to consider such cases here” ([61]). Second, the joint reasons did not decide whether the immunity attaches only to the kinds of decision a lawyer may make without instructions from the client ([45]).

Nettle J agreed that advice to enter a settlement wholly out of court does not attract the immunity ([67]). He would have held it applied where the settlement provides for a consent order that determines the parties’ rights and liabilities, because a claim that the advice was negligent would call in question the court’s order ([68]-[71]). Gordon J reached the same result: the consent judgment was the final quelling of a controversy by the exercise of judicial power, and the claim was a direct challenge to finality ([108]-[111], [126]-[127]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ

Read judgment: [46] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab), [62] (PDF p 27) (opens in a new tab)

The functional connection to a judicial determination was necessary to the majority’s rejection of immunity. Applying that test, the majority held that the parties fixed the terms of this settlement without judicial determination; embodying their agreement in a consent order did not make the settlement advice immune. This reasoning supplied the ground for allowing the appeal on the separate immunity question.

Classification unresolved · French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ

Read judgment: [61] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab)

The majority expressly declined to consider settlements whose orders require issues to be resolved by judicial power, including representative proceedings and compromises for persons under legal incapacity. The passage reserves the application of immunity in those circumstances; it does not decide either that all settlement advice is actionable or that those settlements attract immunity.

Separate reasoning · Nettle J

Read judgment: [67]–[68] (PDF p 28) (opens in a new tab), [73] (PDF p 30) (opens in a new tab)

Nettle J dissented and would have dismissed the appeal. He distinguished settlements wholly out of court from settlements embodied in orders determining rights and liabilities. In his view, challenging the advice to consent to this judgment would collaterally attack that determination, so the immunity applied. His agreement about wholly private settlements did not extend to the majority’s treatment of this consent judgment.

Separate reasoning · Gordon J

Read judgment: [126]–[127] (PDF p 45) (opens in a new tab)

Gordon J dissented and would have dismissed the appeal. She treated the consent verdict and judgment as the final quelling of the controversy by judicial power, with the parties’ rights merged in it. On that basis, the advice was work intimately connected with the court’s determination and attracted immunity. This was the contrary route to the majority’s conclusion about the consent order.

Why does this case matter?

Because winning the immunity point is only the first step. A defence to a negligence claim is not the claim, and the Court itself noted the “measure of opacity” in the pleaded case on negligence and causation ([22]). A solicitor sued over settlement advice can still defend on breach, causation and loss.

It is also a split decision, five Justices to two. The joint reasons are the Court’s holding, and the dissenting reasoning should be presented as dissent, not as a competing statement of the law.

And it is not a decision about the duty to the court. That duty was left where it was; what the Court confined is the immunity.

Exam and application relevance

Start from what the claimant says went wrong. Identify who determined the settlement terms and what the court was asked to do. Retrieve the majority’s test and its reservation before applying the principle to those facts. Explain which passage supports your conclusion and whether the problem falls within what the majority decided.

Keep the separate immunity question distinct from the merits of the negligence claim. State what the appeal resolved before discussing what would still need to be proved.

Check your understanding

1. Which passage of Giannarelli and D’Orta did the joint reasons treat as the authoritative test, and why did they say the settlement advice in this case did not satisfy it?

2. What did the joint reasons say about a settlement of a representative proceeding, and how does that affect what you can say about it in an answer?

3. Nettle J and Gordon J would both have dismissed the appeal. On what kind of settlement did Nettle J agree with the majority, and where did he part from it?

4. After this decision, what must a claimant still prove, and what did the Court say about the strength of the claim in this case?