Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation

High Court of Australia · 1999

Ethics And Professional ResponsibilityConfidentiality

Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49

Almost nothing an organisation writes has exactly one reason behind it. How much of the reason has to be legal before the document is privileged?

Clarified by Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 303

The anomaly Esso was decided to remove has since been closed from the other direction by statute in some jurisdictions, and the High Court has confirmed the effect. Section 131A of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) and s 131A of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) require a court to determine an objection to a “disclosure requirement” by applying Part 3.10 -- which contains client legal privilege -- and define that term to include pre-trial discovery, non-party discovery, interrogatories, a notice to produce and a subpoena. French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ confirm the consequence at [32]: s 122(2) of the Evidence Act is “made applicable by s 131A of that Act to the determination of a question of waiver of client legal privilege arising in the context of pre-trial discovery”. Their Honours also state the waiver principle at [30]: courts impute an intention to waive “where the actions of a party are plainly inconsistent with the maintenance of the confidentiality which the privilege is intended to protect”.

DO NOT GENERALISE FROM THE SECTION NUMBER. The Commonwealth Evidence Act 1995 also has a s 131A, and it extends journalist privilege rather than client legal privilege to disclosure requirements. What matters is whether the applicable Act extends the client legal privilege Division to discovery; check the provision, not its number.

What happened?

Esso was in litigation with the Commissioner of Taxation over amended assessments and claimed privilege over documents on discovery. Two different tests were in play at once. Under Grant v Downs the common law protected a confidential communication only where obtaining or giving legal advice or assistance, or use in legal proceedings, was its sole purpose. Sections 118 and 119 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) used dominant purpose — but those provisions govern the adducing of evidence, not discovery, and apply only in federal and ACT courts (and New South Wales, which had enacted the same terms).

So the same document could be protected at trial and produced on discovery. Esso asked the High Court to remove that anomaly, contrary to what three members of the Court had said in Grant v Downs ([11]).

What did the Court decide?

The appeal was allowed with costs, by four to two. The Court set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court and, in their place, allowed Esso’s appeal to that court from Foster J. Foster J’s first question, which test governs a claim for privilege over discovered documents, was answered in Esso’s favour, and the second “[d]oes not arise” ([62]). The respondent was ordered to pay Esso’s costs of the proceedings before Foster J and of the appeal to the Full Court ([63]).

Below, Foster J had answered the first question by applying the test in Grant v Downs, and a Full Court of five, by majority (Black CJ, Sundberg and Finkelstein JJ; Beaumont and Merkel JJ dissenting), had substantially upheld him ([9]-[10]). Here Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ gave joint reasons ([1]-[63]) and Callinan J agreed in the result in separate reasons ([115]-[175]). McHugh J ([64]-[84]) and Kirby J ([85]-[114]) each would have dismissed the appeal.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Legal professional privilege protects a confidential communication made for the dominant purpose of obtaining or giving legal advice or assistance, or of use in legal proceedings, even where the communication also served another purpose. Confidentiality is a precondition, not an optional extra; dominant purpose replaced the sole purpose test laid down by the majority in Grant v Downs.

The joint reasons did not treat the choice as obvious: “As a practical matter, the choice presently confronting this Court is between sole purpose and dominant purpose” ([61]). What decided it was where each test put the balance. One reason for rejecting the pre-Grant position had been that it was “unduly protective of written communications within corporations and bureaucracies”, but “[t]he sole purpose test goes to the other extreme”: such organisations “necessarily conduct a large proportion of their internal communications in writing”, and “[i]f the circumstance that a document primarily directed to lawyers is incidentally directed to someone else as well means that privilege does not attach, the result seems to alter the balance too far the other way” ([59]).

Their Honours added that if the only way to avoid the sole purpose test’s “absoluteness and rigidity” was to water it down until it worked like a dominant purpose test, “then it should be abandoned” ([60]).

McHugh J’s dissent names the cost: the dominant purpose test “is much harder to apply than the sole purpose test and its use must increase the volume of interlocutory litigation” ([73]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ

Read judgment: [61]–[62] (PDF p 28) (opens in a new tab)

The joint reasons preferred dominant purpose and answered the referred question on that basis, replacing the sole-purpose test. Callinan J allowed the appeal in separate reasons; McHugh and Kirby JJ dissented. The contribution of this decision is the purpose test. Confidentiality was an assumed starting point, not a new requirement established here.

Why does this case matter?

Purpose is the element most likely to be argued about after the event and least likely to be recorded at the time, which is why the practical work in a privilege dispute is usually evidentiary rather than doctrinal: whose idea the document was, what brief it answered, what would have been written without the legal reason. A student who can state the law but cannot say what evidence would show it has half an answer.

It is also a case about a court re-examining the reasoning of an earlier majority without overruling the decision itself: the joint reasons said the question was to be decided by the considerations Gibbs CJ set out in The Commonwealth v Hospital Contribution Fund ([54]-[55]), while McHugh and Kirby JJ would have kept the existing authority ([65], [85]). If you are asked whether a court should depart from the reasoning of its own earlier decision, this is a case where the argument was had rather than assumed.

Exam and application relevance

Start with the circulation of the material. Wide distribution is evidence on whether a communication was kept confidential, and later disclosure may waive privilege, but neither follows automatically. As the Court held in Mann v Carnell, decided the same day, disclosure to a third party waives privilege only where it is inconsistent with maintaining the confidentiality the privilege protects, which is a question about the circumstances. Say what the circulation shows, rather than counting recipients.

Then say which limb of the statutory privilege you are in, and note that two things vary between them: the purpose the provision requires, and how the provision is structured. Advice privilege in s 118 restricts participants for communications — between client and lawyer, or between lawyers acting for the client — though s 117 defines “client” and “lawyer” to take in employees and agents, so that restriction is less narrow than it reads. Separately, s 118(c) protects “the contents of a confidential document ... prepared by the client, lawyer or another person” for the purpose of the lawyer providing legal advice, and a written communication is also a document, so a third party’s material may still qualify through that paragraph.

Litigation privilege in s 119 imposes no such restriction on communications: it covers “a confidential communication between the client and another person, or between a lawyer acting for the client and another person”, for the purpose of legal services relating to actual or anticipated proceedings. So ask what purpose the provision requires, who counts as client or lawyer, and whether what you have is a communication, a document, or both.

Then ask what the material was for, at the time it was created, from the circumstances rather than from a label. A document copied to lawyers does not become privileged, and a heading saying “privileged and confidential” proves nothing. Ask who commissioned it, why, and whether it would have been created in that form without the legal reason.

Finally, say which regime you are in, and read the provision rather than trusting a section number. Sections 118 and 119 govern the adducing of evidence. In New South Wales and Victoria, s 131A of the local Act also applies Part 3.10 — the client legal privilege provisions — to a “disclosure requirement”, defined to include pre-trial discovery, non-party discovery, interrogatories, a notice to produce and a subpoena, so there the statute decides a privilege objection on discovery. The Commonwealth Act’s s 131A does something different: it extends journalist privilege, not client legal privilege. Where no such extension applies, the common law governs discovery, and the question becomes which test of purpose it applies: Esso is the authority for that answer.

Check your understanding

A board paper analyses a commercial decision and includes a section of legal advice. What questions decide whether the whole document is privileged — and which of them comes before purpose?