Glencore International AG v Commissioner of Taxation

High Court of Australia · 2019

Ethics And Professional ResponsibilityConfidentiality

Glencore International AG v Commissioner of Taxation [2019] HCA 26

Privileged advice is stolen from a Bermuda law firm, published worldwide, and reaches the tax office. The client asks a court to stop the Commissioner using it. What can it ask the court for, and on what footing?

What happened?

The plaintiffs were companies in the Glencore group. They brought proceedings in the High Court’s original jurisdiction against the Commissioner, the Second Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation, seeking an injunction restraining the defendants and any other officer of the Australian Taxation Office from making any use of the “Glencore documents”, and an order for their delivery up ([1]). The plaintiffs said the documents had been created for the sole or dominant purpose of Appleby (Bermuda) Limited, an incorporated Bermuda law practice, giving them legal advice on a corporate restructure of Australian entities in the group ([2]). Appleby’s Managing Partner said they were among the “Paradise Papers”, stolen from Appleby’s electronic file management systems and provided to the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists; the Court said it might be assumed that they had been further disseminated ([2]).

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had obtained copies, and that the defendants had not acceded to requests to return them and to undertake not to refer to or rely on them ([3]). The defendants demurred. Their principal ground was that no cause of action was disclosed; their alternative ground was that s 166 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) entitled and obliged them to retain and use the documents ([4]). The Court noted that there was no issue about the documents being subject to privilege ([5]).

What did the Court decide?

The Court ordered that the demurrer be upheld and the proceeding dismissed with costs ([43]; Orders). It upheld the demurrer on the first ground and did not consider the alternative ground concerning s 166 ([14]). The Court gave one joint judgment, beginning at [1].

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Privilege is not a cause of action. The plaintiffs sought an injunction in equity’s auxiliary jurisdiction and accepted that this required an actionable legal right ([8]). The joint judgment said their argument “rests upon an incorrect premise, namely that legal professional privilege is a legal right which is capable of being enforced, which is to say that it may found a cause of action”, and continued: “The privilege is only an immunity from the exercise of powers which would otherwise compel the disclosure of privileged communications, as Daniels Corporation holds” ([12]).

The Court read the statement in Daniels Corporation that the privilege is “an important common law immunity” as a considered correction of a possible misunderstanding, not a tentative remark ([23], [25]), and treated Gummow J’s view in Propend and Brennan J’s in Carter as consistent with it ([26]). It said that in providing an immunity the law’s purpose was to enhance the administration of justice, not to further a client’s personal interest in preventing others from using communications they obtained ([31]), and that there is unlikely to be a warrant for anything more than an immunity from disclosure ([32]).

The plaintiffs argued that the public interest behind the privilege called for a remedy. The Court said that was not sufficient to warrant a new remedy, and that the plaintiffs’ case sought to transform an immunity into “an ill-defined cause of action which may be brought against anyone with respect to documents which may be in the public domain” ([13]). The common law develops by applying settled principles to new circumstances, and “Policy considerations cannot justify an abrupt change which abrogates principle in favour of a result seen to be desirable in a particular case” ([40]-[41]).

Its conclusion: “if there is a gap in the law, legal professional privilege is not the area which might be developed in order to provide the remedy sought” ([42]). The decision was on a demurrer, the plaintiffs did not claim on confidentiality, and the Court said that “In the absence of further facts it is not possible to say whether the plaintiffs are without any possibility of a remedy” ([42]).

What relief after disclosure rests on. The joint judgment said that “On the present state of the law, once privileged communications have been disclosed, resort must be had to equity for protection respecting the use of that material”, and that the policy of the privilege “is not irrelevant to the exercise of that jurisdiction”, but “the juridical basis for relief in equity is confidentiality” ([34]). It said Lord Ashburton v Pape was decided on the confidentiality of the privileged material ([35]).

It held that Expense Reduction Analysts concerned documents mistakenly provided in discovery, where the court’s case management powers were sufficient to make the necessary orders, and did not stand for a broader proposition allowing the privilege to be asserted in order to obtain relief in the nature of an injunction ([36]). The English and Singapore decisions the plaintiffs cited each concerned whether documents had retained the necessary quality of confidentiality, and none supported injunctions “on the basis only of the wrongfulness associated with its taking” ([37]-[39]); for an equity to arise the person to be restrained must have an obligation of conscience ([39]).

The Court said that equity will restrain an apprehended breach of confidence as to confidential privileged documents, and will restrain third parties whose conscience is relevantly affected ([6]). It observed that there might be difficulties for the plaintiffs in meeting those requirements, because the documents were in the public domain and no allegation was made about the defendants’ conduct or knowledge, but found it unnecessary to consider the question further because the plaintiffs did not seek relief on that ground ([7]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ (joint judgment)

Read judgment: [12]–[13] (PDF p 8) (opens in a new tab), [40]–[42] (PDF p 20) (opens in a new tab)

The plaintiffs sought relief on privilege alone. The joint reasons reject the actionable right required for their injunction and reject their proposed development of privilege on policy grounds. These conclusions supply the ground for upholding the demurrer: privilege is an immunity from compelled disclosure, not itself a cause of action for the relief sought. This does not decide a claim founded on confidentiality.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ (joint judgment)

Read judgment: [34] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab)

The distinction between privilege and confidentiality answers the plaintiffs’ argument that existing equitable protection supports an enforceable privilege right. In rejecting that argument, the joint reasons identify confidentiality as the juridical basis of equitable relief after disclosure. This reasoning supports the rejection of the privilege-only claim; it does not determine whether these plaintiffs could obtain relief for breach of confidence.

Obiter · Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ (joint judgment)

Read judgment: [7] (PDF p 6) (opens in a new tab)

The suggested difficulties with a confidentiality claim are tentative observations. The plaintiffs did not seek relief on that ground, and the joint reasons expressly decline to consider it further. Whether public dissemination and the absence of allegations about the defendants’ conduct or knowledge would defeat such a claim was therefore unnecessary to the decision and remained undecided.

Why does this case matter?

A problem question about leaked, stolen or wrongly obtained privileged material invites a one-step answer: the client’s privilege has been infringed, so a court will stop the other side using the documents. Examiners reward the student who asks what the client would actually plead and what facts that claim needs, and Glencore is the High Court decision that tests the one-step answer.

The case also shows how a pleading choice can shape an outcome. Compare the claim the plaintiffs chose to bring with the alternatives discussed in the reasons, and ask how the choice affected the questions the Court needed to answer.

Exam and application relevance

When the scenario involves privileged documents in the hands of someone who obtained them outside discovery or a compulsory process, separate the status of the documents from the available remedy. Identify the proposed basis of relief, the facts needed to support it, and the question the Court left undecided.

Compare the pleaded claim with the orders sought. Explain the significance of the demurrer and distinguish the ground the Court addressed from the alternative ground it did not consider. If the problem involves mistaken disclosure in discovery, examine how the Court treated Expense Reduction Analysts ([36]) before applying Glencore to the scenario.

Check your understanding

1. The plaintiffs accepted that an injunction in equity’s auxiliary jurisdiction required an actionable legal right ([8]). What premise in their argument did the joint judgment identify as incorrect, and how did it describe the privilege instead ([12])?

2. How did the joint judgment read the earlier decisions discussed at [23]-[26], and how did it answer the suggestion that the description in Daniels Corporation was tentative ([25])?

3. What did the Court say Expense Reduction Analysts decided, and what did it say that case does not stand for ([36])?

4. At [7] the Court noted difficulties for the plaintiffs in a claim on a different footing. Which facts did it mention, and why did it decline to consider them further?

5. How many sets of reasons were there, and which Justices joined in them?