Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG
Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222
An accountancy firm spent eighteen months on confidential litigation work for a Brunei prince, then agreed to help his country’s investment agency trace money that had gone to him. It put up an internal screen. Could he stop the new work?
Qualified by Spincode Pty Ltd v Look Software Pty Ltd [2001] VSCA 248
In Spincode Pty Ltd v Look Software Pty Ltd [2001] VSCA 248; (2001) 4 VR 501, Brooking JA concluded that Australian law has diverged from that of England, and that the danger of misuse of confidential information is not the sole touchstone for restraining a solicitor from acting against a former client: he identified two further possible bases, a duty of loyalty not to act against a former client in the same or a closely related matter, and the court’s control over solicitors as its officers ([52]-[58]). Ormiston JA agreed with Brooking JA essentially for the reasons necessary to the decision, and said that with more time he might have reached agreement on those further aspects ([61]); Chernov JA found it unnecessary to decide them ([63]). Brereton J later recorded in Kallinicos v Hunt [2005] NSWSC 1181 at [61] that Brooking JA’s judgment has not won acceptance in New South Wales insofar as it differs from Bolkiah. So the Victorian Court of Appeal’s reasoning stops short of treating confidentiality as the only ground, and the question remains one to check against the law of the relevant State.
Clarified by Kallinicos v Hunt [2005] NSWSC 1181
In Kallinicos v Hunt [2005] NSWSC 1181 Brereton J drew from the authorities, including Bolkiah, that once a retainer is at an end the court’s jurisdiction at the suit of a former client is not based on any conflict of duty or interest but on protection of the former client’s confidences, unless there is no real risk of disclosure, and that there is no continuing equitable or contractual duty of loyalty after the retainer ends ([76]). His Honour added that the court has inherent jurisdiction to restrain a solicitor from acting in a particular case as an incident of its control over its officers and its process, that Bolkiah does not address that jurisdiction at all, and that the later New South Wales cases applying Bolkiah are not to be read as supposing that it excludes that jurisdiction ([76]). That jurisdiction is exceptional, is exercised with caution, and is tested by whether a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that the proper administration of justice requires the practitioner to be prevented from acting ([76]).
What happened?
KPMG, a large English firm of chartered accountants, had audited the Brunei Investment Agency (the BIA) since 1983 (Lord Millett). Prince Jefri, the third and youngest brother of the Sultan of Brunei, was a former Minister of Finance and for many years the BIA’s chairman (Lord Millett). Over about eighteen months between 1996 and 1998, one of Prince Jefri’s companies retained KPMG on his behalf to carry out an investigation connected with major litigation, code-named Project Lucy (Lord Millett). The work involved extensive litigation support services, and KPMG came to hold a large volume of confidential information about his assets and financial affairs; some 168 KPMG personnel worked on assignments for him (Lord Millett).
In June 1998 the Government of Brunei appointed a Finance Task Force, and on 8 July 1998 the BIA formally instructed KPMG to help investigate the withdrawal of assets from the BIA by special transfers, an assignment code-named Project Gemma (Lord Millett). Project Gemma was at least in part adverse to Prince Jefri, it was common ground that some of the Project Lucy information was or might be relevant to it, and KPMG neither told him of the new assignment nor sought his consent (Lord Millett).
KPMG put an information barrier, popularly called a Chinese Wall, in place within its forensic accounting department; about fifty people worked on Project Gemma, eleven of whom had previously worked for Prince Jefri (Lord Millett). KPMG conceded that an accountant who provides litigation support services of the kind provided to Prince Jefri must be treated, for present purposes, in the same way as a solicitor (Lord Millett).
Pumfrey J granted an injunction restraining KPMG from continuing with work on Project Gemma, accepting that KPMG had taken all the steps which could be expected to minimise or avoid disclosure but taking the view that he was bound by authority to approach the adequacy of the protective measures with a very critical eye (Lord Millett). The majority of the Court of Appeal (Lord Woolf MR and Otton LJ) took a different approach, which asked three questions and balanced the interests involved (Lord Millett).
What did the Court decide?
The House of Lords (Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Clyde, Lord Hutton and Lord Millett) unanimously allowed Prince Jefri’s appeal and granted an injunction, announcing its decision shortly after the argument and giving its reasons in December 1998. Lord Millett gave the leading speech. Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Clyde and Lord Hutton each said that Lord Millett’s reasons were those which led them to allow the appeal, and Lord Hope agreed with Lord Millett’s reasons and added remarks of his own. Lord Hope described the terms of the injunction as designed to protect Prince Jefri against the risk while enabling KPMG to continue to provide services to the BIA as its auditors.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
Lord Millett affirmed that the court’s intervention on behalf of a former client is “founded not on the avoidance of any perception of possible impropriety but on the protection of confidential information”, and said that the position differs where an existing client seeks the court’s intervention, because a fiduciary cannot act both for and against the same client and that disqualification rests on the inescapable conflict of interest. For a former client, he said, “The court’s jurisdiction cannot be based on any conflict of interest, real or perceived, for there is none”, and the only duty to the former client that survives the end of the retainer is a continuing duty to preserve the confidentiality of information imparted during it.
The former client must establish that the firm possesses information confidential to him, to the disclosure of which he has not consented, and that the information is or may be relevant to the new matter in which the other client’s interest is or may be adverse to his own; the burden is on him but “it is not a heavy one”, Lord Millett saw no need for presumptions, and he saw no cause to attribute the knowledge of one partner to the others (“The basis of the jurisdiction”).
The duty to preserve confidentiality, “Whether founded on contract or equity”, is “unqualified”: it is a duty to keep the information confidential, not merely to take all reasonable steps to do so, and a duty not to misuse it; the former client cannot be protected completely from accidental or inadvertent disclosure, but “he is entitled to prevent his former solicitor from exposing him to any avoidable risk” (“The extent of the solicitor’s duty”). Lord Millett regarded the criticisms of the test taken from Rakusen v Ellis, Munday and Clarke, that the court will not intervene unless there is a “reasonable probability of real mischief”, as well founded, and preferred “simply to say that the court should intervene unless it is satisfied that there is no risk of disclosure”: “the risk must be a real one, and not merely fanciful or theoretical.
But it need not be substantial” (“Degree of risk”). He rejected the balancing exercise undertaken by the majority of the Court of Appeal (Lord Woolf MR and Otton LJ), which was adopted from Russell McVeagh McKenzie Bartleet v Tower Corporation, as “inappropriate”, and said that the considerations it relied on, such as Prince Jefri’s knowledge that KPMG were the BIA’s auditors, go instead to whether he must be taken to have consented to KPMG’s taking on a further assignment; he must be taken to have consented to the June instructions, a natural extension of the audit, but “Project Gemma was a very different matter” (“Degree of risk”).
Lord Hope added that the nature of litigation support work by accountants requires the court to exercise the same jurisdiction as in the case of a solicitor, and that where the court is not satisfied that the measures in place will protect the former client against the risk, “the proper course will be for it to grant an injunction”.
On the adequacy of the information barrier, Lord Millett said that once the former client has established that the firm holds information imparted in confidence and proposes to act for another party with an adverse interest in a matter to which the information is or may be relevant, “the evidential burden shifts to the defendant firm to show that even so there is no risk that the information will come into the possession of those now acting for the other party”.
“There is no rule of law that Chinese Walls or other arrangements of a similar kind are insufficient to eliminate the risk”, but “the starting point must be that, unless special measures are taken, information moves within a firm”. He adopted Sopinka J’s formulation in MacDonald Estates v Martin, that the court should restrain the firm unless satisfied on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that measures have been taken to ensure that no disclosure will occur, with the word “effective” substituted for “all reasonable” (“The adequacy of the protective measures taken by K.P.M.G.”).
Applying that, he accepted that Chinese Walls are widely used by financial institutions and recognised by regulatory rules as a means of restricting the movement of information between departments of an organisation, and set out the arrangements the Law Commission had described as normally making them up, including physical separation, an educational programme, defined procedures for crossing the wall, monitoring by compliance officers and disciplinary sanctions. But the walls in this case “were established ad hoc and were erected within a single department”, the teams on Project Lucy and Project Gemma each had a rotating membership involving far more personnel than were working on the project at any one time, and the difficulty of enforcing confidentiality or preventing the unwitting disclosure of information was “very great”.
He concluded that “an effective Chinese Wall needs to be an established part of the organisational structure of the firm, not created ad hoc and dependent on the acceptance of evidence sworn for the purpose by members of staff engaged on the relevant work”, and that KPMG had not discharged “the heavy burden of showing that there is no risk” that information confidential to Prince Jefri might unwittingly or inadvertently come to the notice of those working on Project Gemma (“Application to the facts of the present case”; “Conclusion”).
Lord Hope said that, in such a case, “everything is likely to depend on the measures which are in place to ensure that there is no risk that the information will be disclosed”.
Why does this case matter?
Questions about a professional firm that wants to act against someone it once served tend to be answered from the single word conflict. This case shows how much can turn on what the earlier relationship produced and on what a large firm is able to prove about its own internal arrangements.
Exam and application relevance
Start with who is asking the court for help, whether they are a current or a former client, and what the court is being asked to protect. Then ask what information the firm holds, how it may bear on the new work, and what the firm can show about the arrangements it relies on. This is a House of Lords decision on English law about accountants who had given litigation support, so in an Australian answer it is persuasive, and how Australian courts have treated its approach, and the professional conduct rules in force, should be checked. Attribute the reasoning to Lord Millett and Lord Hope’s additional remarks to him. See how PhotoCure ASA v Queen’s University at Kingston applied it.
Check your understanding
1. What work had KPMG done for Prince Jefri, and what was Project Gemma (Lord Millett, in his account of the facts)?
2. What did KPMG concede about accountants who provide litigation support services (Lord Millett, in his discussion of the law)?
3. How did Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Clyde and Lord Hutton each express their agreement with Lord Millett, and what did Lord Hope add?
4. Which approach taken by the majority of the Court of Appeal did Lord Millett reject, and to what question did he say the considerations it relied on were relevant instead (Lord Millett, in the section on the degree of risk)?
5. What features of the arrangements did Lord Millett rely on in finding that the difficulty of preventing unwitting disclosure was very great, and what did he say an effective Chinese Wall needs to be (Lord Millett, in applying the law to the facts)?
6. What did Brereton J say in Kallinicos v Hunt that Bolkiah does not address ([76])?