Kallinicos v Hunt
Kallinicos v Hunt [2005] NSWSC 1181
A solicitor handled the sale of development units, and the proceeds went to one business partner and not the other. When that partner is sued, can the other have the solicitor removed even though no client confidence is at risk?
Affirmed by Maxwell-Smith v S & E Hall Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 146
In Maxwell-Smith v S & E Hall Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 146 Barrett JA, with whom Beazley P and McColl JA agreed, said that a case about a solicitor acting against a former client calls for the principles that govern conduct towards former clients as distinct from current clients, and that in Cooper v Winter [2013] NSWCA 261 the Court of Appeal had endorsed Brereton J’s conclusion in this case that, once the retainer has come to an end, there is no continuing equitable or contractual duty of loyalty on the part of the solicitor to the former client. He added that the court’s jurisdiction to restrain a solicitor from acting is then based not on any conflict of duty or interest but on the protection of the confidences of the former client or, as applicable, the protection of the integrity of the judicial process and the due administration of justice. So in New South Wales these former-client conclusions carry the endorsement of the Court of Appeal and do not rest on a single judge’s decision alone ([24]).
What happened?
Mr Peter Kallinicos and Mr Peter Hunt had been in a property business that Mr Kallinicos said was a partnership, and Mr Kallinicos sued for a declaration that it had been determined on or about 9 November 2001, the appointment of a receiver and an account ([7]-[8]). The defendants included Mr Hunt and companies he controlled, Dibsenta Pty Ltd and Randall Pty Ltd. Rowntree Properties Pty Ltd, a company of which Mr Kallinicos and Mr Hunt were the directors, owned a development site at Surry Hills, and strata lots in it were sold ([6], [9]-[10]).
The solicitor, Mr Moloney, then of Eddy & Moloney, acted for Rowntree as vendor on the sales of lots 3, 11, 12 and 13 in 2002. Letters over his signature block directed the payment of the settlement moneys after the mortgages and costs. The balance on lots 3 and 12 went to Dibsenta and on lot 13 to Randall, and on lot 11 to several individuals, three of whom received $43,258.75 each; Mr Kallinicos complained that none went to his company or as he directed ([14]-[17]).
He alleged that the transfer of lot 3 bore a signature that was not his, and that the transfers of lots 11 and 12 were signed by Ms La Forest, who was not authorised to sign for Rowntree ([13]). A letter of 9 November 2001 from Mr Kallinicos’s solicitors, which Eddy & Moloney answered on Mr Hunt’s behalf, had claimed that the partnership was terminated and demanded accounts and payment ([11]-[12], [80]).
In October 2003 Mr Moloney filed a notice of change of solicitor, so that he ceased to act for Rowntree and acted only for Mr Hunt, Dibsenta, Randall and a fourth company, P&K Corporation Pty Ltd ([20]). In 2005 Mr Kallinicos applied by notice of motion for an order restraining Mr Moloney from acting for any of the defendants. He said that the court should prevent Mr Moloney from acting in this particular case because he was likely to be a material witness and to have a perceived interest in the outcome ([1], [26]).
What did the Court decide?
Brereton J, sitting alone in the Equity Division, ordered that Mr Moloney cease to act as solicitor for the defendants and pay the plaintiff’s costs of the application ([97]). The judgment was delivered on 22 November 2005 after a hearing on 5 September 2005. This is a first-instance decision of one State’s Supreme Court, so it does not bind other judges of that court and is persuasive elsewhere.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The plaintiffs did not rely on any confidential information of theirs said to be at risk, but on the court’s inherent supervisory jurisdiction to restrain a solicitor from acting in a particular case ([1], [31], [34]). Brereton J, sitting alone in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, therefore had to decide whether that jurisdiction remained available after Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222, and held that it did. He identified three bases that had been advanced before Prince Jefri for injunctions restraining solicitors from acting: breach of confidence, breach of a duty of loyalty, and the court’s inherent supervisory jurisdiction over solicitors.
The first two depended on legal rights of the parties, and the third depended on the court’s jurisdiction over its officers ([33]-[34]). He reviewed the authorities before Prince Jefri and concluded that the inherent jurisdiction was well established ([37]-[47]). Prince Jefri was a former-client case about accountants, who are not officers of the court, and the question of confidential information was at its heart. Its supervisory jurisdiction over solicitors was not relevant to it and was not considered in it, so the House of Lords should be taken to have limited a former client’s basis for restraint to the protection of confidential information, to the exclusion of enforcement of any supposed duty of loyalty, but not to have excluded the court’s inherent supervisory jurisdiction ([48]-[49]).
He read Belan v Casey and British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Blanch (Young CJ in Eq) as applying but not extending Prince Jefri ([66], [69]), and Bergin J in Asia Pacific Telecommunications Ltd v Optus Networks Pty Ltd as accepting the existence and breadth of the court’s jurisdiction over its officers ([75]). He described Goldberg J’s reasoning in Photocure ASA v Queens University at Kingston as probably the strongest direct expression of a view that the supervisory jurisdiction is no longer available ([67]).
His summary was that the court always has an inherent jurisdiction to restrain solicitors from acting in a particular case, as an incident of its inherent jurisdiction over its officers and to control its process in aid of the administration of justice ([76]).
Brereton J stated that the test in the inherent jurisdiction is whether a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that the proper administration of justice requires that a legal practitioner should be prevented from acting, in the interests of the protection of the integrity of the judicial process and the due administration of justice, including the appearance of justice. He added that the jurisdiction is to be regarded as exceptional and exercised with caution, that due weight should be given to the public interest in a litigant not being deprived of the lawyer of his or her choice without due cause, and that the timing of the application may be relevant because the cost, inconvenience or impracticality of requiring lawyers to cease to act may be a reason for refusing relief ([76]).
Applying that test, he found that Mr Moloney was almost certainly a material witness on the instructions given for the disbursement of the balance proceeds of the sales of units 3, 11, 12 and 13, and that, depending on how the evidence turned out about how the directions to the purchasers’ solicitors were given, he might well be exposed to suit and had an interest in how the evidence turned out ([78]-[83]). He recorded that counsel for the defendants conceded that Mr Moloney might be a material witness, though not that he might be exposed to suit, and that there was a live issue whether Mr Hunt was authorised on behalf of Mr Kallinicos to give directions about the sales after the alleged termination date ([78]).
He reasoned that Mr Moloney would owe loyalty to Mr Hunt, would have an interest in presenting the facts in a manner which exonerated himself, and would have a duty to the court to be frank, so that his client’s interest, his own interest and his obligation to the court might well conflict ([86]). It is generally undesirable for a practitioner who is likely to be called as a witness, other than on formal or non-contentious issues, to continue to act, and the Revised Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 1995, r 19, was relevant though far from decisive ([87]).
He concluded that a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that Mr Moloney’s independent objectivity as solicitor or witness was compromised, and that the proper administration of justice required that he not act for the defendants ([90]-[91]). He took into account that senior and junior counsel had been retained and that requiring Mr Moloney to cease to act would not be a panacea for all the associated difficulties, but regarded those considerations as not weighty ([91]). On discretion, he considered the party’s prima facie right to the lawyer of its choice, the inconvenience, cost and disruption of a change, and the exceptional nature of the jurisdiction ([92]); the proceedings were at a relatively early stage, no defence had been filed, and there was ample time to obtain other representation ([93]); the delay was explained by the late production of Mr Moloney’s files in July 2005 ([94]); and he held that the right to chosen counsel should succumb to the higher interests of the administration of justice ([95]).
In the course of that review Brereton J summarised the position where the application is made by a client or former client. He said that during a retainer, where an existing client seeks the court’s intervention, the foundation of the jurisdiction is the solicitor’s fiduciary obligation and the inescapable conflict of duty inherent in acting for clients with competing interests; that once the retainer is at an end the court’s jurisdiction is not based on any conflict of duty or interest but on the protection of the former client’s confidences, unless there is no real risk of disclosure; and that after termination there is no continuing equitable or contractual duty of loyalty to provide a basis for the court’s intervention, Spincode Pty Ltd v Look Software Pty Ltd, McVeigh v Linen House Pty Ltd and Sent v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd being cited as contrary ([76]; see also [35]).
He recorded that Brooking JA’s judgment in Spincode had not won acceptance in New South Wales insofar as it differs from Prince Jefri ([61]). These statements were not the ground of the order, which was made under the inherent jurisdiction ([1], [31]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Brereton J (sitting alone)
Read judgment: [36]–[37] (opens in a new tab), [48]–[49] (opens in a new tab), [66]–[69] (opens in a new tab), [75]–[76] (opens in a new tab)
The plaintiffs did not rely on confidence, so the order could be made only if the inherent supervisory jurisdiction was available after Prince Jefri; his Honour’s conclusion that it was, and his reasons for reading Prince Jefri and the later New South Wales decisions as leaving it in place, are necessary to the order made. The accounts of other courts’ decisions in the survey are his reading of them and carry their own authors’ reasoning only as he reports it.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Brereton J (sitting alone)
Read judgment: [76] (opens in a new tab), [78]–[91] (opens in a new tab)
His Honour states the test and the cautions in the summary at [76], then applies the test to Mr Moloney’s position as a likely material witness with a personal interest, and his conclusion at [90]-[91] is the ground for the order.
Ratio · Brereton J (sitting alone)
Read judgment: [92]–[97] (opens in a new tab)
The jurisdiction is discretionary and the weighing of the party’s choice of lawyer against the stage of the proceedings and the administration of justice, with the orders, completes the ground of decision.
Proposition 3
Obiter · Brereton J (sitting alone)
Read judgment: [33]–[35] (opens in a new tab), [60]–[61] (opens in a new tab), [76] (opens in a new tab)
These statements describe the position of an existing client and of a former client, but the application was brought by another party on the inherent jurisdiction alone, with no confidence of the plaintiffs in issue ([1], [31]), so they frame the review and do not decide the order.
Why does this case matter?
Conflict and confidentiality rules are the usual starting points in a problem about a lawyer acting, and a student who stops there can miss another source of objection to a lawyer’s role. This decision shows how an objection of that other kind is argued and weighed, and what a court weighs against it.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem about removing a lawyer from a case, begin with who is applying and on what footing: a client or former client who says information is at risk, or another party who relies on the lawyer’s own position in the dispute. Then work through the facts that bear on that footing, and deal separately with the considerations that go to discretion.
Cite the decision for the order and for the reasons that supported it, and say what weight each part of the reasons carries. The practitioner conduct rule quoted at [87] was a 1995 rule and the judgment states the position in 2005, so check the conduct rules and decisions in force in the jurisdiction in your problem.
Check your understanding
1. Who applied for the order, and what did he say he was not relying on ([1], [31])?
2. What part did Mr Moloney play in the sales of lots 3, 11, 12 and 13, and where did the balance of the proceeds go on lots 3, 12 and 13 ([14]-[17])?
3. Which three bases for restraining a solicitor from acting had been advanced before Prince Jefri, and what did Brereton J say distinguished the third from the first two ([33]-[34])?
4. Why did Brereton J say Prince Jefri did not decide the question whether the supervisory jurisdiction survives ([48]-[49])?
5. What was counsel for the defendants prepared to concede about Mr Moloney, and what did Brereton J say he was not doing ([78])?
6. What three possible explanations for the payments did Brereton J consider, and why did he say Mr Moloney’s evidence would matter on each ([81]-[84])?
7. What did Brereton J say about senior and junior counsel having been retained, and about whether ceasing to act would solve all the difficulties about Mr Moloney’s evidence ([91])?
8. Which features of the stage the proceedings had reached did Brereton J rely on in the exercise of the discretion ([93]-[94])?
9. What did Brereton J say at [61] about Brooking JA’s judgment in Spincode?