The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543; [2002] HCA 49
A regulator serves a notice on a firm of solicitors requiring it to produce documents it holds for a client, and the statute says nothing about privilege. Can the firm refuse?
Clarified by Glencore International AG v Commissioner of Taxation [2019] HCA 26
In Glencore a single joint judgment of Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ said that legal professional privilege “is only an immunity from the exercise of powers which would otherwise compel the disclosure of privileged communications, as Daniels Corporation holds” ([12]). It read the joint reasons’ description of the privilege as an “important common law immunity” as “a considered correction of a possible misunderstanding arising from the description of it as a common law right” ([25]), and rejected the argument that the privilege is a legal right capable of being enforced so as to found a cause of action or an injunction ([12]). So describe the privilege in Daniels as an immunity from compulsory disclosure; Glencore does not alter what Daniels decided about s 155.
Affirmed by legislation: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), from 1 January 2007
Section 155 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), now the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), has since been amended to say expressly what Daniels decided for documents. Section 155(7B), inserted by the Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2006 (Cth) (No 131 of 2006), Sch 8 item 18, with effect from 1 January 2007, provides that “This section does not require a person to produce a document that would disclose information that is the subject of legal professional privilege”. Section 155(10) adds that “legal professional privilege” includes privilege under Division 1 of Part 3.10 of the Evidence Act 1995. Subsection (7B) is about producing a document; it does not mention giving information or evidence. For a notice governed by the current section, the express provision answers the question for documents, and Daniels remains the High Court’s reasoning on the principle of construction and on the privilege.
What happened?
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (“the ACCC”) served notices under s 155 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) on Meerkin & Apel, solicitors who had acted for The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd, requiring them to produce documents they held as a result of acting for it ([1]). Section 155(1) allowed a member of the Commission, where it had reason to believe that a person was capable of producing documents relating to a matter that constitutes or may constitute a contravention of the Act, to require the person by written notice to produce them. Section 155(5) forbade a person to refuse or fail to comply with a notice to the extent the person was capable of complying, and s 155(6A) made contravention an offence ([5], [7]).
The solicitors produced some documents but not others. They and the Corporation said the remaining documents were the subject of legal professional privilege and that s 155 did not authorise the ACCC to require their production ([2]). The ACCC sued for a declaration that the Corporation was not entitled to refuse production on that ground and for an order requiring production, and the solicitors were later joined ([3]).
The question whether s 155 authorises a notice requiring production of privileged documents was tried as a preliminary issue and referred to the Full Court of the Federal Court. The Full Court answered yes, relying principally on Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission and Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Yuill, and declared that the solicitors were not entitled to refuse to comply with the notices on the ground of legal professional privilege. It did not decide whether privilege attached to any of the documents ([4]). The ACCC argued in the High Court that s 155 should be construed as in Pyneboard and Yuill, and that investigation of contraventions would be impaired if privilege could be used to resist a notice ([23]).
What did the Court decide?
The appeal was allowed with costs. The orders of the Full Court were set aside, a declaration was substituted, and the matter was remitted to the Federal Court ([37]; Orders 1-4).
Seven Justices sat. Four gave joint reasons (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ, [1]-[37]), and McHugh J ([38]-[56]), Kirby J ([57]-[117]) and Callinan J ([118]-[144]) each gave separate reasons.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The joint reasons began with the nature of the privilege. “It is now settled that legal professional privilege is a rule of substantive law” that may be availed of to resist giving information or producing documents that would reveal communications between a client and lawyer made for the dominant purpose of giving or obtaining legal advice or services, including representation in legal proceedings ([9]). Being a rule of substantive law and not merely a rule of evidence, it is not confined to discovery, inspection and the giving of evidence in judicial proceedings, and in the absence of provision to the contrary it may be availed of to resist the giving of information or the production of documents in accordance with investigatory procedures of the kind for which s 155 provides ([10]).
The joint reasons gave as an example Baker v Campbell, where documents to which the privilege attaches could not be seized under a search warrant issued under s 10 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ([10]).
“Legal professional privilege is not merely a rule of substantive law. It is an important common law right or, perhaps, more accurately, an important common law immunity. It is now well settled that statutory provisions are not to be construed as abrogating important common law rights, privileges and immunities in the absence of clear words or a necessary implication to that effect.” ([11])
They described that rule, traced to Potter v Minahan, as the foundation of Baker v Campbell, and as strictly applied since Re Bolton; Ex parte Beane, with the decision in Yuill as a possible exception ([11]).
Applying the rule, the joint reasons examined s 155 and found no clear words or necessary implication. Subsections (1) and (2) were expressed in general terms and, standing alone, supplied no basis for an implication that they abrogate the privilege ([32]). Section 155(2) authorises what would otherwise be a trespass and is similar to s 10 of the Crimes Act, which Baker v Campbell and Propend held did not authorise seizure of privileged material, and it would be incongruous to construe s 155(1) differently ([27], [32]).
It was “very much to be doubted” that the reference in s 155(5)(a) to a person “capable of complying” was exhaustive of what may be raised in answer to a notice ([33]). The only feature that positively suggested an intention to abrogate was the express preservation in s 155(7A) of Cabinet documents of a State or Territory, but little could be implied from that in a context where the privilege against self-incrimination is expressly abrogated, and any implication from the maxim expressio unius could hardly be a necessary one ([34]).
Nor was it obvious that retaining privilege would significantly impair the ACCC’s functions: a communication made to “seek help to evade the law by illegal conduct” is not privileged ([24], [35]). Section 155 therefore “cannot be construed, consistently with the rule expressed in Potter v Minahan, as impliedly abrogating legal professional privilege” ([35]).
On the earlier cases, the joint reasons said the approach taken in Pyneboard, which concerned the privilege against exposure to penalties, should not be followed for legal professional privilege, because it concentrated on s 155(1) without regard to s 155(2) and made the express abrogation of the privilege against self-incrimination in s 155(7) redundant ([26]-[29]). “So to say, is not to say that Pyneboard was wrongly decided” ([29]). Yuill concerned a different statute, and the joint reasons added: “it may be that Yuill would now be decided differently” ([35]).
The joint reasons did not decide whether privilege attached to any of the documents: that was for the Federal Court on remitter, and no view was expressed on the present litigation ([36]-[37]).
McHugh J would also have allowed the appeal. General words in a statute are not read as taking away a right the general law classifies as fundamental unless the context or subject matter points irresistibly to that conclusion, and a provision does so by necessary implication whenever it would be rendered inoperative, or its object largely frustrated, if the right prevailed; s 155 would neither become inoperative nor useless if privileged documents were withheld, since they would be a small percentage of the documents that could be required ([39], [43]-[45]). He held that neither Pyneboard nor Yuill assisted the Commission ([52]-[55]), and would have substituted a declaration that powers conferred by s 155 are subject to any claim of legal professional privilege ([56]).
Kirby J allowed the appeal on the ground that Yuill should be confined to its own facts, so that the authority of the Court otherwise requiring clarity before important rights are overridden applied ([92]-[93], [113]); he said that a mere claim of privilege would not be enough, since the party claiming must bring each communication within the applicable principles, and that the privilege survives the enactment of s 155 ([114]-[115]). He agreed in the orders proposed in the joint reasons ([117]). Callinan J treated the Act as silent on privilege, so that abrogation would have to be implied, said that the ratio of Pyneboard was no more than that the privilege, if it existed, would frustrate the operation of the relevant provision, which would not follow here, and distinguished Yuill because the Companies Code referred specifically to the privilege ([133], [140], [142]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [9]–[11] (PDF p 9) (opens in a new tab), [24]–[28] (PDF p 16) (opens in a new tab), [32]–[37] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state the nature of the privilege and the principle of construction ([9]-[11]) and apply the principle to s 155 to conclude that the section does not abrogate the privilege by necessary implication ([24]-[28], [32]-[35]), with the disposition ([36]-[37]). They are necessary to the allowing of the appeal.
Separate reasoning · McHugh J (concurring in the result)
Read judgment: [39]–[45] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab), [52]–[56] (PDF p 27) (opens in a new tab)
McHugh J reached the same result by his own reasons: general words in s 155(1) cannot take away a fundamental immunity unless the legislation does so expressly or by necessary implication, which arises when the provision would be rendered inoperative or its object largely frustrated, and that was not so here. He framed the declaration as one that the powers conferred by s 155 are subject to any claim of legal professional privilege.
Separate reasoning · Kirby J (concurring in the result)
Read judgment: [92]–[93] (PDF p 41) (opens in a new tab), [113]–[115] (PDF p 48) (opens in a new tab)
Kirby J allowed the appeal on the footing that Yuill should be confined to its own facts and the approach of the Court in Baker v Campbell and later cases restored, and that the privilege survives the enactment of s 155. He agreed in the orders proposed in the joint reasons ([117]).
Separate reasoning · Callinan J (concurring in the result)
Read judgment: [133]–[134] (PDF p 59) (opens in a new tab), [140]–[142] (PDF p 62) (opens in a new tab)
Callinan J treated the Act as silent on the privilege so that abrogation would have to be implied, said that the ratio of Pyneboard was no more than that the privilege, if it existed, would frustrate the operation of the relevant provision, and distinguished Yuill because the Companies Code made specific reference to the privilege.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [25]–[30] (PDF p 16) (opens in a new tab)
The joint reasons declined to follow the Pyneboard approach for the purpose of the legal professional privilege question, which was necessary to deciding that s 155 did not abrogate that privilege.
Obiter · Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [35] (PDF p 20) (opens in a new tab)
The statements that Pyneboard was not wrongly decided and that it may be that Yuill would now be decided differently are tentative remarks on decisions that were not before the Court for reconsideration, and were not necessary to the disposition of the appeal.
Separate reasoning · Kirby J (concurring in the result)
Read judgment: [92]–[93] (PDF p 41) (opens in a new tab)
Kirby J would confine Yuill to its particular facts. This is his own reasoning and is not attributed to the joint reasons.
Why does this case matter?
When a regulator has a statutory power to demand documents, students tend to ask only whether the words are wide enough to catch what is held by a law firm, and to answer yes. An examiner who sets a problem built on a notice, a search warrant or a subpoena directed at lawyers is looking for the question that comes before that one, and for a clear account of what is left for a court to decide once the point of principle is settled.
It is also a decision an examiner expects you to keep apart from earlier cases that sound similar.
Exam and application relevance
Identify the compulsory power and the statute that confers it, ask whether the statute speaks to the privilege in express terms, and say what the other provisions of the statute show. Then ask whether the particular documents meet the conditions for privilege, because a claim has to be established for each document or communication and a communication made to obtain help to evade the law is outside the privilege.
The statute in issue was s 155 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) as it stood when the notices were served. The result for another statute, or for a different privilege, turns on that statute’s own words.
Check your understanding
1. What were the notices, who were they served on, and what was the Full Court asked to decide first ([1]-[4])?
2. What did the joint reasons say about the nature of legal professional privilege, and what principle of construction did they apply to s 155 ([9]-[11])?
3. What did the joint reasons make of s 155(7) and s 155(7A) ([28], [34])?
4. What did the joint reasons say about the decisions in Pyneboard and Yuill ([29], [35]), and how did Kirby J and Callinan J deal with Yuill ([92], [142])?
5. What did the Court leave for the Federal Court to decide ([36]-[37])?
6. What did Glencore later say about describing the privilege as a right or an immunity ([12], [25])?