Confidentiality under rule 9 and compulsory disclosure

States the confidentiality duty and its six permitted disclosures as rule 9 of the Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules words them, and explains, through Baker v Campbell and Daniels, why the exception for disclosure the law compels does not reach a privileged communication unless the statute clearly says so.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
nsw, vic, wa, au-commonwealth
Subjects
ethics-and-professional-responsibility
Topics
confidentiality

Learning outcomes

  • State the duty in rule 9.1 and identify who inside and outside a law practice it permits a solicitor to tell.
  • List the six disclosures rule 9.2 permits and apply the words that limit them, including the sole-purpose conditions and the imminent serious physical harm limit.
  • Explain why disclosure the law compels does not reach a privileged communication unless the statute contains clear words or a necessary implication, and attribute Baker v Campbell and Daniels accurately.

Confidentiality and privilege separates the broad duty of confidentiality from the narrower rule about compulsion. This article states the duty as the Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015 put it, and then takes up the exception that does the most work in a problem question: disclosure the law permits or compels. A statute may demand a client’s documents from the solicitor holding them, and rule 9 does not say whether that demand reaches a privileged communication. The High Court answered that as a question of statutory construction. The rule text was read as the New South Wales consolidation of the Rules; the Uniform Law and its Rules are applied in New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia by those jurisdictions’ application provisions, and this article states them for solicitors there.1 Barristers are governed by a separate instrument that is not stated here.

The duty in rule 9.1

Rule 9.1 forbids a solicitor to disclose “any information which is confidential to a client and acquired by the solicitor during the client’s engagement” to anyone outside two groups.2 The first is a solicitor who is a partner, principal, director or employee of the solicitor’s law practice (r 9.1.1). The second is a barrister, or an employee of or person otherwise engaged by the practice or an associated entity, who is involved for the purposes of delivering or administering legal services in relation to the client (r 9.1.2). The ordinary working of a practice therefore needs no exception: the duty is a bar on going outside those groups, and everything else is an exception in r 9.2.

The six permitted disclosures

Rule 9.2 says a solicitor “may” disclose client-confidential information in six situations. Taken in the rule’s own order:

  1. the client expressly or impliedly authorises disclosure (r 9.2.1);
  2. the solicitor is permitted or is compelled by law to disclose (r 9.2.2);
  3. the solicitor discloses in a confidential setting, for the sole purpose of obtaining advice in connection with the solicitor’s legal or ethical obligations (r 9.2.3);
  4. the solicitor discloses for the sole purpose of avoiding the probable commission of a serious criminal offence (r 9.2.4);
  5. the solicitor discloses for the purpose of preventing imminent serious physical harm to the client or to another person (r 9.2.5); or
  6. the information is disclosed to the insurer of the solicitor, law practice or associated entity (r 9.2.6).

Two features repay close reading. Rule 9.2 is permissive, so a rule that allows disclosure does not itself require it; any compulsion has to come from the law, which is r 9.2.2’s work. And the narrower exceptions are tied to words that limit them. Rules 9.2.3 and 9.2.4 require a “sole purpose”. Rule 9.2.4 looks, on its words, to an offence that is “probable” and not yet committed. Rule 9.2.5 is confined to harm that is imminent, serious and physical, so harm to property or reputation, or serious harm that is not imminent, is outside that paragraph as worded. Whether another paragraph, such as consent or compulsion by law, covers such a case has to be asked separately.

“Permitted or compelled by law”

Rule 9.2.2 borrows its content from outside the Rules. A court order, a statutory notice and a search warrant are the usual examples of the law compelling disclosure; that grouping is a way of organising examples and is not a list in the rule. The rule’s question is whether the law permits or compels the disclosure. It does not say whether a particular statute reaches a communication that is protected by legal professional privilege, and that is the question the next two cases answer.

Statutory compulsion and privilege: Baker v Campbell and Daniels

In Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 523 solicitors held documents for a client who had consulted them about a scheme to minimise his sales tax liability, and a member of the Australian Federal Police attempted to seize them under a search warrant issued under s 10 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). The question stated for the Court was whether, if privilege attached to the documents and was maintained, they could properly be made the subject of such a warrant. Murphy, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ, each in separate reasons, answered no; Gibbs CJ, Mason J and Brennan J dissented. Wilson J said a statute is not construed to take away a common law right unless a legislative intent to do so “clearly emerges whether by express words or necessary implication”, and found none in the general terms of s 10. Dawson J concluded that the doctrine is, absent a legislative provision restricting it, applicable to all forms of compulsory disclosure, and that s 10 did not restrict it.

The Court returned to the point in The Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2002] HCA 494. The Commission served notices under s 155 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) on the solicitors who had acted for the Corporation, requiring documents they held, and the solicitors claimed privilege. All seven Justices allowed the appeal. In the joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ, privilege was described as “a rule of substantive law and not merely a rule of evidence”, so that it may be availed of to resist the production of documents under an investigatory procedure of that kind (at [10]). Their Honours added that statutes are not construed as abrogating important common law rights, privileges and immunities “in the absence of clear words or a necessary implication to that effect”, the rule that underlay Baker v Campbell (at [11]), and held that s 155 did not impliedly abrogate privilege (at [35]). The Court declared that s 155 does not require production of documents to which privilege attaches and remitted to the Federal Court the question which documents were in fact privileged. The reasons of McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ are separate and are not stated here.

Both are High Court decisions, which bind lower Australian courts; the High Court can reconsider its own decisions. Baker v Campbell was a four-to-three decision in separate reasons, so a proposition drawn from it should be attributed to the Justices who stated it. Both concerned Commonwealth statutes. The construction rule they apply is general, but its result for any other statute depends on that statute’s words: clear words or a necessary implication can displace privilege.

What rule 9.2.2 does and does not settle

Read together, the rule and the cases give a layered answer. Rule 9.2.2 is satisfied when the law, properly construed, reaches the communication. Where a statute does not abrogate privilege and the communication is in fact privileged, the demand does not reach it, and disclosure cannot be justified as one the law compels. Whether a communication is privileged is a separate question, answered by the dominant purpose test discussed in Confidentiality and privilege and, under the uniform Evidence Acts, by the provisions in Client legal privilege under the uniform Acts; in Daniels the Court did not decide it for the documents before it. This article does not establish whether a solicitor must assert privilege on the client’s behalf, or how a contested claim is to be resolved before disclosure, and the sources cited do not state either.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Confirm the jurisdiction. Rule 9 as stated here is for solicitors in New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia, and the information must be confidential to a client and acquired during the engagement before r 9.1 is engaged.
  2. Identify the recipient. A solicitor who is a partner, principal, director or employee of the practice is outside the prohibition (r 9.1.1), as is a barrister, or an employee or other person engaged by the practice or an associated entity, who is involved in delivering or administering legal services for the client (r 9.1.2); a non-solicitor must satisfy r 9.1.2.
  3. Test any other disclosure against r 9.2 by its words, noting the “sole purpose” conditions in rr 9.2.3 and 9.2.4 and the “imminent serious physical harm” limit in r 9.2.5, and that r 9.2 permits and does not oblige.
  4. If the reason for disclosure is a notice, warrant or order, name the statute and ask whether it contains clear words or a necessary implication abrogating privilege. The cases above are the starting point, with the qualifications stated: High Court authority, separate reasons in Baker v Campbell, Commonwealth statutes in both.
  5. Ask separately whether the communication is privileged, and attribute any answer to the test that governs, not to confidentiality.

Self-check

  • Have I named the rule paragraph relied on, and kept its limiting words (“sole purpose”, “imminent”, “physical”)?
  • Have I kept the rule’s permission to disclose apart from any legal compulsion to do so?
  • Have I stated what the statute says before relying on Baker v Campbell or Daniels, and attributed Baker v Campbell to the Justices in the majority?

Where the authority sits

The duty and its exceptions are in r 9 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, which apply in New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia. Whether a statutory demand overrides privilege is not answered by the Rules but by the construction of the particular statute, under the rule the High Court applied in Baker v Campbell and Daniels.

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