Spincode Pty Ltd v Look Software Pty Ltd
Spincode Pty Ltd v Look Software Pty Ltd [2001] VSCA 248
A firm of solicitors advised a company, including through a quarrel among its shareholders, then began acting for one shareholder against the company and the others. On what grounds could a court stop the firm?
Doubted by Kallinicos v Hunt [2005] NSWSC 1181
In Kallinicos v Hunt [2005] NSWSC 1181 Brereton J, sitting alone at first instance in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, summarised the authorities as establishing that after the termination of a retainer there is no continuing equitable or contractual duty of loyalty to provide a basis for the court’s intervention, and listed Spincode among the decisions to the contrary ([76]). He added that Brooking JA’s judgment had not won acceptance in New South Wales insofar as it differs from Prince Jefri ([61]). In the same summary he cited Spincode among the decisions recognising the court’s inherent jurisdiction to restrain solicitors from acting as an incident of its jurisdiction over its officers ([76]). So the doubt expressed there is about the duty-of-loyalty basis, and a first-instance decision of another State does not bind a Victorian court.
What happened?
Look Software Pty Ltd was a software company incorporated in October 1995. By September 1996 its shareholders were Spincode Pty Ltd (the company of Mr Moore, one of its founders), G-Wiz Pty Ltd (controlled by Mr Rogers, the other founder) and Mr Dee, and in 1997 there were discussions about allotting shares to two brothers named Kay who worked for it. From about September 2000 the participants disagreed about shareholdings and about payment for their services.
The solicitors, McPherson + Kelley, had acted for the company since its incorporation, on the uncontradicted evidence in all legal matters concerning it until the internal disputes arose, including software licence and distributorship agreements and trade marks. The appellant conceded that in the disputes from about September 2000 the firm had the company as its client, and that those disputes would naturally culminate in an application to wind the company up. A member of the firm, Mr Kirton, gave instructions in October 2000 for the opening of a file naming the company as the client, the firm’s bills of costs were directed to and paid by the company, and he drafted a shareholders’ agreement and an employee share plan, altering the draft in accordance with Mr Moore’s suggestions, and attended meetings of the participants.
After an unsuccessful mediation another partner wrote on 1 February 2001 to the company’s managing director, Mr Dee, that the firm acted for Mr Moore and Spincode, raising the possibility that the company would be wound up. In later correspondence the firm at first asserted that it had not acted for the company in the dispute and then that it no longer acted for it.
Spincode started the principal proceeding in May 2001 against the company, Mr Dee, G-Wiz and the Kays, seeking a winding up or an order for the purchase of its shares at a valuation, on the oppression and just and equitable grounds. On 21 June 2001 the defendants applied for an injunction directed to Spincode and to the firm. The firm, although a respondent to the application, played no part in its hearing, counsel for Spincode telling the judge that the firm adopted a neutral stance, and it did not appeal. Warren J granted the injunction on 17 August 2001, restraining the firm from acting or continuing to act in the proceeding for Spincode or Mr Moore until the final hearing. Spincode appealed.
What did the Court decide?
The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Brooking, Ormiston and Chernov JJA, each giving separate reasons) dismissed Spincode’s appeal, so the injunction restraining the firm from acting for Spincode and Mr Moore until the final hearing stood. The appeal was heard on 27 and 28 November 2001 and judgment was delivered on 21 December 2001. This is a decision of a State intermediate appellate court: it binds courts below it in Victoria and is persuasive elsewhere in Australia.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
All three members of the Court agreed that the appeal against the injunction should be dismissed, and the ground they shared was the risk that confidential information the firm had obtained would be misused. Brooking JA held that Warren J was right to find that the firm had obtained confidential information from the company that was relevant to the matters in dispute. The information was discussed with Mr Kirton or in his presence at meetings of some or all of the participants, and the fact that Mr Moore was present during those discussions did not mean that it was not confidential in the necessary sense.
He saw no reason to doubt her Honour’s view that the appellant had failed to show that there was no real risk of the misuse of the confidential information and that the respondents had shown a real and sensible possibility of that misuse. He treated as relevant the potentially wide-ranging nature of the inquiry in the principal proceeding: a range of matters discussed with or in the presence of Mr Kirton were likely to be investigated, and the firm had acted for the company on the ownership of copyright in the software, a question likely to arise at least indirectly.
He said that it would be enough to say that the decision below could be supported, on the most narrow view of the law, as resting on confidential information and its possible misuse. Ormiston JA agreed that the appeal should be dismissed essentially for the reasons Brooking JA put forward as necessary for his decision. He added that, however the information the firm held was characterised, there was a real risk that some of it could be used against the respondents in ways that could not yet be identified, and that whatever the precise limits of a former solicitor’s obligations, there should never have been any question of the company’s former firm acting for the appellant.
Chernov JA agreed essentially for the reasons Brooking JA gave, on the footing that the information the solicitors obtained when acting for the company and its members was confidential to them and that the appellant had not established that there was no risk of its misuse in the potentially wide-ranging principal proceeding, in which oppression was alleged.
Brooking JA then took the opportunity of considering what he called a much wider question, although he said that, strictly, the Court need not consider it. He reasoned that Australian law has diverged from English law (which the House of Lords had stated in Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG) and that the danger of misuse of confidential information is not the sole touchstone for intervention where a solicitor acts against a former client: it can and usually will warrant intervention but is not the only ground.
He identified two other possible bases. The first was breach of duty. He thought it fair and just to hold that the equitable obligation of loyalty is not observed by a solicitor who acts against a former client in the same matter, so that loyalty imposes an abiding negative obligation not to act against the former client in the same matter, and he suggested as another possibility an implied term of the contract of retainer, which he said he need not pursue.
He would deny that the obligation depends on the solicitor having discharged himself, a requirement he said was in any event met in this case. The second was the court’s jurisdiction over solicitors as its officers. If he thought that the solicitors were subject neither to a negative equitable nor to a negative contractual obligation, he would say that their conduct as a whole was so offensive to common notions of fairness and justice that they should be brought to heel as officers of the Court even though they had not infringed any legal or equitable right, and that this jurisdiction permits regard to the solicitors’ conduct at all stages.
He read Warren J’s reasoning as according in its essentials with resting the injunction on three independent bases: the danger of misuse of confidential information, breach of the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty, and the desirability of restraining the solicitors as officers of the Court. Ormiston JA did not adopt the wider reasoning. He said that he would like to have been able to reach a conclusion on the other aspects raised in Brooking JA’s judgment, especially the principle of fiduciary loyalty and the precise obligation owed by solicitors to former clients, but that those aspects raised issues only touched on in argument, that he might have reached agreement with Brooking JA on each of them had he had time to consider them, and that the case had come on urgently.
Chernov JA said that it was not necessary to decide for the purposes of the appeal whether there is an absolute obligation on solicitors not to act against their former clients in the same or substantially the same proceeding, although Brooking JA’s judgment makes a compelling case for that view; his reasons say nothing more about the wider bases.
Why does this case matter?
Questions about a lawyer acting against a former client are often answered by quoting one passage from a leading case. With a decision in which the judges wrote separately, ask before relying on a passage whose reasons it is in, whether the other judges adopted it, and whether the appeal turned on it. Ask the same of a later court that cites the decision.
Exam and application relevance
Begin with the facts that decide which ground of restraint is in play: whether the lawyer’s retainer had ended or the firm was still acting for the client when it took the new instructions, what the firm learned while acting, and how the new proceeding relates to the old one. Then identify the court in your problem and its place in the hierarchy. This is a 2001 decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal, so check what binds the court you are writing about, and whether later decisions in that jurisdiction have addressed the same grounds, before treating any part of it as settled there.
When you cite the decision, attribute each proposition to the judge who stated it and say how each of the other judges dealt with it. Name the judge for each pinpoint and take paragraph numbers from the authorised report, (2001) 4 VR 501.
Check your understanding
1. Whose order was under appeal, and what did it restrain the firm from doing?
2. What did the appellant concede, as Brooking JA records, about the firm’s client in the disputes from about September 2000, and about where those disputes would naturally lead?
3. Which judgment did Ormiston JA and Chernov JA each say their reasons were essentially those of, and what ground did the three judges share for dismissing the appeal?
4. What did Brooking JA say about whether the Court needed to consider the wider question?
5. What two other possible bases for intervention did Brooking JA identify, and what did he say about the requirement that the solicitor have discharged himself?
6. Why did Ormiston JA say that he did not reach a conclusion on the principle of fiduciary loyalty and the precise obligation owed by solicitors to former clients?
7. What did Chernov JA say it was not necessary to decide, and what did he say about Brooking JA’s judgment?
8. In Kallinicos v Hunt, what did Brereton J say about the survival of a duty of loyalty after the retainer, and for what did he also cite Spincode in the same summary?