Day v Perisher Blue Pty Ltd
Day v Perisher Blue Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 110
A resort’s solicitors hold a teleconference with its staff witnesses and send management the topics each should expect to be asked about. The judge accepts their evidence without mentioning any of it. What can the plaintiff do on appeal?
Clarified by Day v Perisher Blue Pty Ltd [No 2] [2005] NSWCA 125
Having heard the solicitors’ response to order 6 on 19 April 2005, the same Court (Sheller JA, McColl JA and Windeyer J) delivered a joint judgment on 20 April 2005. It was not persuaded that the judgment of 11 April 2005, its own judgment and the appeal papers should not be referred to the Legal Services Commissioner ([20]), and on further reflection regarded it as preferable that the reference be made forthwith rather than after the new trial ([21]), leaving it to the Commissioner to decide whether any investigation should proceed immediately or await the outcome of the new trial ([21]). The later decision completed the show-cause step; it did not alter the Court’s reasons for order 6 or the new trial order.
What happened?
Darrel Day was a J-Bar operator at the Guthega ski fields who said that on or about 7 August 2000, while loading skiers onto the Cowpasture J-Bar in the course of his employment by Perisher Blue Pty Ltd, he was struck by a skier who skied through the ski school line, and that his employer had failed to take reasonable care for his safety ([1], [2]). Judge Patten of the District Court thought it more probable than not that Mr Day was struck by a wayward or out of control skier, but on 1 October 2003 held that a breach of the employer’s duty of care had not been established and entered a verdict and judgment for the defendant ([1], [4], [9]). The defendant’s witnesses included Mr Bevin, Mr Palmer and Mr Dean, who worked for it, and an expert, Mr Gow, whose evidence the judge accepted ([5]-[9]).
Evidence about how the defendant’s witnesses had been prepared emerged at the trial. Mr Laing, the defendant’s first witness, said he had read statements before giving evidence, that they had given him some guidance as to how he should give it, and that he had discussed his evidence with other witnesses staying at the same hotel ([19], [20]). The documents he produced became exhibit K. They included a letter of 3 July 2003 from Mr Connelly of the defendant’s solicitors, Dibbs Barker Gosling, to the defendant, with the partner responsible named as Geoffrey Brookes ([22]). The letter referred to a telephone conference on 27 June 2003 “including the relevant witnesses” and set out, witness by witness, areas of questioning to be passed on to the respective witnesses ([22], [23]). Exhibit K also contained a document headed “Witness Protocols for Court Cases and Arbitration Hearings” ([24]).
Mr Dean said that the teleconference was attended by Mr Bevin, Mr Palmer, Mr Laing, himself, Ken Randall and Sharon Jack on the defendant’s side and by Mr Brookes and Mr Connelly at the other end, that no specifics of the case were discussed, and, asked whether each of the statements was gone through, that they were ([26]). Mr Palmer said that at two meetings of 45 minutes to an hour with Mr Dean, Mr Bevin and Sharon Jack they discussed the case, not “the actual evidence”, and he agreed that he had told Mr Dean what his evidence would be ([25]).
After the evidence closed, counsel agreed to make submissions in writing ([28]). The plaintiff’s written submissions attacked the reliability of the defence witnesses by reference to the letter and the teleconference, and the defendant replied that, apart from Mr Dean, it was not put to any witness that his evidence had been pressured and that the letter did no more than identify areas of evidence ([31], [32]). The trial judge’s reasons made no mention of the letter or the teleconference ([29]).
Mr Day appealed; the grounds ultimately relied on went to procedural matters, and grounds 5 and 6 (improper coaching of the witnesses, and the absence of reasons for rejecting the submission about their unreliability) were in the forefront ([10], [12]).
What did the Court decide?
The Court of Appeal (Sheller JA, McColl JA and Windeyer J) allowed the appeal and set aside the verdict and judgment for the defendant of 1 October 2003. It ordered a new trial, ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs of the hearing before Judge Patten and the appellant’s costs of the appeal (with a certificate under the Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 if so qualified), and made a separate order concerning the defendant’s solicitors ([37]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Sheller JA, with whom McColl JA and Windeyer J agreed ([38], [39]), said: “It has long been regarded as proper practice for legal practitioners to take proofs of evidence from lay witnesses separately and to encourage such witnesses not to discuss their evidence with others and particularly not with other potential witnesses.” He added that witnesses do not always abide by those instructions and that their credibility suffers accordingly ([30]). Of the teleconference in which the defendant’s witnesses discussed amongst themselves the evidence they would give, he said it was “hard to see” that its intention was for any reason other than to ensure, so far as possible, that the defendant’s witnesses would all speak with one voice about the events that occurred.
The evidence of one witness about a matter that was in fact true, he said, might be overborne by what that witness heard several others say. He concluded: “This seriously undermines the process by which evidence is taken. What was done was improper.” He described the process adopted as one more concerned with ensuring that all the witnesses gave evidence which would best serve their employer’s case, and said that this made “particularly sinister” the precept “Not about facts about credibility” in the Witness Protocols document ([30]), while noting that the evidence did not show who produced or disseminated that document ([24]).
Sheller JA accepted that there was “force in the defendant’s response” to the plaintiff’s written submissions on the witnesses, and that the disclosure of the solicitors’ letter and the witness protocols “opened up areas for cross-examination of the defendant’s witnesses which were not fully pursued” ([32], [33]). He observed that nowhere in his reasons did the trial judge deal with that part of the plaintiff’s submissions or say anything about the attack on the credibility of several defence witnesses whose evidence he accepted ([34]).
He accepted that it was arguable that the witnesses’ credibility could have survived the attack, but held that the trial judge’s failure to deal with the submissions led to the conclusion that “in the result his Honour failed to have regard to critical evidence”, so that the verdict and judgment had to be set aside and a new trial ordered ([35], comparing Mifsud v Campbell). Because there was to be a new trial he thought it undesirable that the Court say anything about the other grounds of appeal ([36]).
Sheller JA said: “I regard what happened here as of sufficient seriousness prima facie for the papers to be sent to the Legal Services Commissioner” ([35]). The order made was not itself a referral but an order to show cause why the judgment and the appeal papers should not be referred to the Commissioner once the proceedings were disposed of ([37], order 6).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Classification unresolved · Sheller JA (McColl JA and Windeyer J agreeing)
Read judgment: [30] (opens in a new tab)
Sheller JA’s statement of the long-regarded practice and his characterisation of the teleconference as improper are part of his reasons for treating what happened as serious enough to found the show-cause order ([35]). The verdict was set aside on a different ground ([34]-[35]), and he accepted that it was arguable the witnesses’ credibility could have survived the attack ([35]), so a binary label would hide that the characterisation was neither the ground of the new trial nor an observation unrelated to any order.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Sheller JA (McColl JA and Windeyer J agreeing)
Read judgment: [33]–[35] (opens in a new tab)
This is the ground on which the appeal was allowed and the verdict and judgment set aside: Sheller JA states the conclusion that the trial judge failed to have regard to critical evidence and, in the same sentence, that the verdict and judgment must therefore be set aside and a new trial ordered ([35]). He found it undesirable to say anything about the other grounds of appeal ([36]), so the Court did not decide them.
Proposition 3
Ratio · Sheller JA (McColl JA and Windeyer J agreeing)
Read judgment: [35] (opens in a new tab), [37] (opens in a new tab)
[35] states Sheller JA’s reason for order 6, and order 6 is among the orders the Court made ([37]). It requires the solicitors to show cause and does not itself refer anything to the Commissioner.
Why does this case matter?
A problem about witness preparation can be answered as if it asked a single question, whether the lawyers behaved badly. The consequences in this litigation attached to different people at different stages, and an examiner reading an answer will look for whether each consequence has been tied to the part of the reasons that explains it.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem where a party’s lay witnesses have conferred with each other or with that party’s lawyers before giving evidence, identify who took part, what the evidence shows was said about the evidence to be given, what the lawyers asked the witnesses or the client to do, and how the other side used the material at the trial. Then take each statement you want to use from Sheller JA’s reasons and ask whose reasons it is in, which order it explains, and what the judgment says elsewhere that limits it.
This is a decision of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales. It binds the lower courts of that State and is persuasive elsewhere. The judgment applies no statutory conduct rule and states a long-standing practice, and it was decided in 2005, so in a modern problem check the conduct rules and the complaints and discipline framework in force in the relevant jurisdiction at the relevant time. The later step in the same litigation, in which the solicitors were heard on the show-cause order, is taught in Day v Perisher Blue [No 2].
Check your understanding
1. Who wrote the letter of 3 July 2003, to whom was it addressed, and what did it set out for each witness ([22], [23])?
2. What did Mr Dean and Mr Palmer say in cross-examination about the teleconference and about their discussions with other witnesses ([25], [26])?
3. What did the plaintiff’s written submissions at trial say about the defendant’s witnesses, what did the defendant reply, and what did the trial judge’s reasons say about that part of the submissions ([29], [31], [32], [34])?
4. Whose reasons state the practice of taking proofs of evidence from lay witnesses, and which other judges agreed with that Justice ([30], [38], [39])?
5. What did Sheller JA accept about the defendant’s response and about the witnesses’ credibility, and what did he conclude from the trial judge’s silence ([33]-[35])?
6. What did Sheller JA say about the other grounds of appeal, and why ([36])?
7. What did order 6 require of the defendant’s solicitors, and what was the stated reason for making it ([35], [37])?