D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid
D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1
A man pleaded guilty at committal on his lawyers’ advice, was convicted at trial, had the conviction quashed and was acquitted on retrial. Can he sue the lawyers who gave that advice?
Qualified by Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd (2016) 259 CLR 1
In Attwells, French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ declined to overrule D’Orta-Ekenaike and Giannarelli but held that the test they state “is not satisfied where the work of the advocate leads to an agreement between parties to litigation to settle their dispute” ([5]). They described both earlier cases as concerned with claims that impugned a judicial determination to which the allegedly negligent work of the advocate contributed, and required “a functional connection between the advocate’s work and the judge’s decision”: advice given out of court “must affect the conduct of the case in court and the resolution of the case by that court” ([5]-[6]). The immunity therefore does not extend to negligent advice that leads to the settlement of a claim in civil proceedings ([45]), even where the parties’ agreement is embodied in consent orders that did not themselves require the exercise of judicial power ([6], [62]). The majority did not consider settlements whose orders themselves require the resolution of issues by the exercise of judicial power, such as the settlement of representative proceedings ([61]).
What happened?
In February 1996 Mr D’Orta-Ekenaike was charged with rape. He sought legal assistance from Victoria Legal Aid (VLA), a body established by the Legal Aid Act 1978 (Vic), and VLA retained Mr McIvor as his barrister at the committal proceeding in the Magistrates’ Court ([4]). At the committal he entered a plea of guilty, although he was not bound to enter a plea, and was committed for trial in the County Court ([5]).
At trial in February 1997 he pleaded not guilty. His committal plea was led in evidence, he was convicted and he was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment ([6]). The Court of Appeal of Victoria set the verdict aside and directed a new trial, because the trial judge had not given sufficient directions about the use that might be made of the plea. On the retrial the plea was not admitted and he was acquitted ([7]-[8]).
In 2001 he sued VLA and Mr McIvor in the County Court. He alleged that Ms Greensill, who had carriage of the matter at VLA, and Mr McIvor had advised him that he had no defence, that a guilty plea at committal would bring a suspended sentence, and that contesting the charge and losing would bring a custodial penalty. The advice was said to have been given at a conference in chambers two days before the committal and at a further conference on the day, at which “undue pressure and influence” was said to have been exerted ([10]). He claimed loss of liberty and income, psychotic illness and costs ([11]).
The respondents applied to have the proceeding terminated summarily. The primary judge, Judge Wodak, ordered that it be forever stayed, holding that the advice at each conference “was so intimately connected with the conduct of the trial as to come within the immunity defence principle” ([12]). The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, and Mr D’Orta-Ekenaike applied for special leave, which was referred for argument as on an appeal before the whole Court ([2], [13]). The Court was asked whether it should reconsider its decision in Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543 and, if not, whether the immunity applied to what was alleged ([1]).
What did the Court decide?
The Court granted special leave to appeal, treated the appeal as instituted and heard instanter, and dismissed it with costs ([92]).
Four sets of reasons were given: the joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ ([1]-[92]), the reasons of McHugh J ([93]-[207]), the reasons of Kirby J ([208]-[348]) and the reasons of Callinan J ([349]-[388]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ declined to reconsider Giannarelli. They preferred the construction adopted by the majority in that case, under which s 10(2) of the Legal Profession Practice Act 1958 (Vic) did not make a barrister liable for negligence in court of which a solicitor-advocate in 1891 would have been immune ([24]). On the common law, they said that chief attention must be given to “the nature of the judicial process and the role that the advocate plays in it” ([30]).
They found the central justification in finality: “the central justification for the advocate’s immunity is the principle that controversies, once resolved, are not to be reopened except in a few narrowly defined circumstances” ([45]). That principle is “a central and pervading tenet of the judicial system”, reflected in the rules on res judicata and issue estoppel and in the restraints on appeals and fresh evidence ([34]-[35]), and the immunities of witnesses and judges rest ultimately, though not solely, on the same consideration ([40]). To show that an advocate’s negligence caused damage a client would have to relitigate the controversy already quelled ([43]), and the relitigation would be “of a skewed and limited kind”, because no one had challenged the immunities of judge and witness, so only the advocate’s contribution could be examined ([45]).
Other matters were put aside. The link with the advocate’s inability to sue for fees, a supposed competition between the duty to the court and a duty of care to the client, and the cab-rank rule were of marginal relevance at most ([25]-[27]). The difficulty of an advocate’s decisions was “distracting and irrelevant” ([28]), and the chilling effect of a threat of suit was not of determinative significance ([29]). Nothing in the later Victorian legislation suggested reconsideration: s 442 of the Legal Practice Act 1996 (Vic) provided that “[n]othing in this Act abrogates any immunity from liability for negligence enjoyed by legal practitioners before the commencement of this section”, and a recommendation of the Victorian Law Reform Commission to remove the immunity was not adopted ([48]-[50], [54]).
The House of Lords’ decision in Arthur J S Hall & Co v Simons could not be transposed automatically to Australia, where the profession is differently organised and the decision was influenced by Art 6 of the European Convention ([59]-[60], [64]).
The joint reasons then held that the rules about abuse of process do not sufficiently protect finality. The client’s complaint is always that a consequence has befallen him that has not been, and cannot be, corrected within the litigation ([66]-[70]). No sufficient distinction could be drawn between civil and criminal proceedings ([76]-[79]). Remedy could not depend on showing that a different final result should have been reached ([80]), and “[i]f final results cannot be challenged, intermediate results should not be treated differently” ([82]). A claim for wasted costs usually involves a direct or indirect challenge to the outcome on which costs depended ([83]).
On reach, they saw no reason to depart from the Giannarelli test, that is, work done in court or “work done out of court which leads to a decision affecting the conduct of the case in court” or, in the language of the Explanatory Memorandum for the 1996 Act, “work intimately connected with” work in a court, the two statements not differing in any significant way ([86]). As Mason CJ had said in Giannarelli, it “would be artificial in the extreme to draw the line at the courtroom door” ([87]).
Advice about whether to enter a plea at committal was work done out of court that led to a decision affecting the conduct of the case at the later trial, since committal proceedings are part of the controversy the trial determines and a plea entered could be used in evidence there ([88]). VLA stood in no different position, because the Legal Aid Act deemed it a firm of solicitors for the purposes of the professional obligations of its staff, and the advice of the instructing solicitor and that of the barrister was of the same kind ([89]-[91]).
McHugh J agreed in the result. He described the immunity as another name for the conclusion that, as a matter of legal policy, advocates owe no actionable duty of care for conduct in court or intimately connected with it ([95]), and attributed that to the difficulty of proving that a different result would have followed and to the principle of finality ([97]). He agreed with the joint reasons on the adverse consequences of relitigating issues already decided ([165]) and held that the immunity extends to any work which, if made the subject of a negligence claim, would require the impugning of a final decision of a court or the relitigation of matters already finally determined ([168]).
Kirby J dissented. He would have allowed the appeal and remitted the matter for trial ([348]), regarding as unwarranted an immunity that extends to out-of-court advice and to solicitors ([346]), and he would have left for a later case whether Giannarelli should stand for negligence in court ([339]-[340]). Callinan J agreed that the appeal should be dismissed, and held that the immunity of a solicitor advising jointly with counsel could not be considered apart from that of counsel, and that nothing turned on the proceedings being criminal or on the advice being given for committal proceedings ([384]-[385], [388]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [43]–[45] (PDF p 20) (opens in a new tab), [76]–[82] (PDF p 30) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state the ground on which the joint reasons refused to reconsider Giannarelli: relitigating a resolved controversy is the central objection to suing the advocate ([43]-[45]), and the rules about abuse of process do not answer it, because no sufficient line can be drawn between civil and criminal proceedings ([76]-[79]) or between final and intermediate results ([80]-[82]). They are necessary to the orders.
Separate reasoning · McHugh J
Read judgment: [95]–[97] (PDF p 36) (opens in a new tab), [165]–[168] (PDF p 62) (opens in a new tab)
McHugh J agreed that the appeal should be dismissed. He treated the immunity as a conclusion of legal policy that advocates owe no actionable duty of care for the conduct in question ([95]), attributing it to the difficulty of proving that a different result would have followed and to the principle of finality ([97]), agreed with the joint reasons on the consequences of relitigation ([165]), and extended the immunity to any work that would require the impugning of a final decision or the relitigation of matters already finally determined ([168]). It is his own route, so it is not attributed to the joint reasons.
Separate reasoning · Kirby J (dissenting)
Read judgment: [339]–[340] (PDF p 123) (opens in a new tab), [346]–[348] (PDF p 126) (opens in a new tab)
Kirby J dissented. He would have granted special leave, allowed the appeal and remitted the matter for trial ([348]), considering the immunity for out-of-court advice, and its extension to solicitors, unwarranted ([346]), and he would have left for a later case whether Giannarelli should stand for negligence in court ([339]-[340]). His reasons are a dissent and are not the law stated by the Court.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [86]–[91] (PDF p 33) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs apply the Giannarelli test to the alleged advice and are necessary to the dismissal of the appeal: the test is kept ([86]-[87]), the advice about a plea at committal falls within it ([88]) and the same follows for the Victoria Legal Aid officer ([89]-[91]).
Why does this case matter?
Students tend to answer a claim by a client against a lawyer over how litigation was conducted as an ordinary professional negligence problem, starting with duty and breach. This case is where an examiner expects the threshold question to be asked and the reasons for it to be stated, with each judge’s reasons kept apart. Because the High Court has since returned to how far the principle reaches, an answer that stops at 2005 is incomplete.
Exam and application relevance
Identify the lawyer’s act or advice, when and where it was given, and what decision of a court it led to or would require a claimant to challenge. State the justification the joint reasons gave and say separately what McHugh J and Kirby J said. If the facts involve advice that led to an agreement settling the dispute, consider Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd (2016) 259 CLR 1 before applying [88]-[91]. The case arose from Victoria and the Legal Profession Practice Act 1958 (Vic) and Legal Practice Act 1996 (Vic); say which jurisdiction’s legislation applies to a problem set elsewhere.
Check your understanding
1. What did the joint reasons identify as the central justification for the immunity, and which matters did they put aside as irrelevant, marginal or not determinative ([25]-[29], [45])?
2. Why did the joint reasons hold that the rules about abuse of process do not answer the finality concern, and what did they say about the distinctions between civil and criminal proceedings and between final and intermediate results ([76]-[82])?
3. How did McHugh J’s account of why the immunity exists differ from the joint reasons ([95]-[97], [165]-[168]), and what did Kirby J say about out-of-court advice ([339]-[340], [346])?
4. Why did the joint reasons treat the advice about a plea at committal, and the advice attributed to the VLA officer, as falling within the test ([88]-[91])?