Day v Perisher Blue Pty Ltd [No 2]

Supreme Court of New South Wales, Court of Appeal · 2005

Ethics And Professional ResponsibilityDuties To Court

Day v Perisher Blue Pty Ltd [No 2] [2005] NSWCA 125

Before a trial, a defendant’s solicitors hold a teleconference with its witnesses. After a new trial is ordered, the Court of Appeal asks them to show cause why the papers should not go to the regulator. What can sworn denials achieve?

What happened?

Mr Day appealed to the New South Wales Court of Appeal from a District Court trial before Judge Patten in which Perisher Blue Pty Ltd was the defendant ([3], [6]). At the trial a letter dated 3 July 2003 from Mr Connelly, a solicitor employed by the defendant’s solicitors, Dibbs Barker Gosling, to the defendant, was admitted into evidence; it was subscribed “Partner Responsible: Geoffrey Brookes” ([2], [3]). A document headed “Witness Protocols for Court Cases and Arbitration Hearings” was also in evidence, produced with the letter by a witness, Mr Laing; there was no evidence that it came from the solicitors, and Mr Laing was never asked where he got it ([4], [6]). A teleconference had been held on 27 June 2003 in which witnesses for the defendant took part, together with Mr Brookes and Mr Connelly ([5]).

On 11 April 2005 the Court of Appeal (Sheller JA, McColl JA and Windeyer J) allowed the appeal and made consequential orders, including an order that gave the defendant’s solicitors seven days to show cause why, after the proceedings were disposed of by a new trial or otherwise, the judgment and the appeal papers should not be referred to the Legal Services Commissioner ([1]). A new trial was ordered because Judge Patten had never dealt with the part of the plaintiff’s written submissions attacking the credibility of several defence witnesses, whose evidence he accepted, on the footing that they had taken part in the teleconference and otherwise discussed their evidence with other witnesses ([6]).

The first judgment, as quoted in this one, included Sheller JA’s statement “What was done was improper” and his view that what happened was “of sufficient seriousness prima facie for the papers to be sent to the Legal Services Commissioner” ([5], [6]).

On 19 April 2005 the solicitors, represented by Mr Bathurst QC and Mr Tyson, applied on notice to show cause and read affidavits sworn that day by Mr Brookes, a partner, and by Mr Connelly, who was employed by the firm between August 2001 and March 2004 ([2]). Mr Brookes swore that he did not understand the teleconference to be one for witnesses to discuss their evidence among themselves, that he did not intend to ensure that the witnesses would speak with one voice, and that its purpose was procedural matters such as reading statements, travel, accommodation and dress ([8]).

Mr Connelly recalled the teleconference as dealing with travel, dress and conferences with counsel; he did not recall any discussion of the contents of the evidence, and said that his handwritten file note was not a verbatim note and that he was not sure whether all of it recorded the teleconference or whether part was made after it ended ([13], [14], [15]). The file note lists the participants by name and records matters against the names of Chris Bevan and Jai Palmer ([14]).

Counsel emphasised that, of the oral evidence at the trial, only Mr Dean said that the witnesses’ statements were gone through at the teleconference ([18]). Counsel also submitted that any decision to refer should wait until the proceedings between the parties were resolved, and the two solicitors offered undertakings not to take a point that a later referral was out of time and to notify the Registrar if the proceedings were settled or otherwise disposed of ([19]). It was submitted that, if there was to be a reference, it should relate only to Mr Brookes, a solicitor of over twenty years standing, and not to Mr Connelly, who was admitted in October 2000 and worked on the proceedings as an employee ([20]).

What did the Court decide?

The Court of Appeal rejected the solicitors’ application to prevent the reference.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The Court of Appeal (Sheller JA, McColl JA and Windeyer J, in one judgment headed THE COURT) was “not persuaded that the judgment of 11 April 2005 and this judgment and the appeal papers should not be referred to the Legal Services Commissioner” ([20]). It noted that the solicitors’ evidence was sworn but that there was no contradictor ([7]). It observed that the one witness who said at trial that “each of the statements was gone through” appeared to have been confused about the date and seemed to contradict his earlier evidence ([18]).

It then said that it “might well be open to conclude” from the file note set out beside the names of four of the witnesses that the discussion at the teleconference “extended to the evidence that they would give and was not limited in the manner suggested by Mr Connelly in his affidavit” ([18]). The Court did not accept the submission that the decision to refer should wait until the proceedings between the parties were resolved, a submission supported by undertakings from the two solicitors ([19]); it said “On further reflexion the Court regards it as preferable that the reference be made forthwith”, and left it to the Commissioner to determine whether any investigation should proceed immediately or await the outcome of a new trial ([21]).

The Court described what it was doing in limited terms: “The proposed reference by the Court to the Legal Services Commissioner is no more than that”, and “What follows is a matter for the Legal Services Commissioner in terms of his powers under the” Legal Profession Act 1987 ([20]). The order is expressed as a referral to investigate whether the Commissioner ought to initiate a complaint (Orders). The Court recorded no finding that either solicitor had engaged in professional misconduct.

Told that Mr Brookes was a solicitor of over twenty years standing and a partner, that Mr Connelly was admitted in October 2000 and worked on the proceedings as an employee, and that any reference should relate only to Mr Brookes, the Court did not confine the reference to him ([20], Orders). It said that Mr Connelly’s inexperience “may be a factor in determining the extent and nature of his responsibility for what happened”, but “that is a matter for the Legal Services Commissioner” ([20]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Sheller JA, McColl JA and Windeyer J (joint judgment, THE COURT)

Read judgment: [7] (opens in a new tab), [18]–[21] (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs are the Court’s reasons for the direction it made on the application to show cause: why it was not persuaded, why it declined deferral and why the referral was to be made immediately. The observation at [18] is expressed as what might be open to conclude, so it is part of the reasons but is not a finding of fact. The Court sat as the Court of Appeal in its own appeal, so the decision binds only courts below it in New South Wales and is persuasive elsewhere.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Sheller JA, McColl JA and Windeyer J (joint judgment, THE COURT)

Read judgment: [20] (opens in a new tab)

The Court’s statement of what the reference is, and what follows from it, is part of its explanation for making the direction in the face of the solicitors’ response. It is stated about this reference under the Legal Profession Act 1987 and is not offered as a general statement about all referrals.

Proposition 3

Ratio · Sheller JA, McColl JA and Windeyer J (joint judgment, THE COURT)

Read judgment: [20] (opens in a new tab)

Naming both solicitors in the orders required the Court to reject the submission that the reference be confined to Mr Brookes, and [20] gives its reason. The remark about inexperience bearing on responsibility explains why the Court left that matter to the Commissioner.

Why does this case matter?

A problem about how a solicitor prepared witnesses invites an answer that goes straight to professional misconduct. This decision concerns an earlier and different step: what a court does when the conduct comes to light on an appeal, what it makes of the solicitors’ response, and what follows from the step it takes. An examiner rewards the answer that identifies which step has been taken, by whom and on what material.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem where a court has criticised a lawyer’s conduct, ask what step the court has actually taken, on what material, and who is to take any further step. Cite this decision for what the Court of Appeal did on this application to show cause, naming the three Justices as the authors of the joint judgment.

This is a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, so it binds the courts below it in that State and is persuasive elsewhere. It was decided under the Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW), which AustLII marks as repealed; the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) repealed that Act, and the Legal Profession Uniform Law framework (applied in New South Wales by the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW)) later replaced the 2004 regime in 2015, so the referral-for-investigation reasoning is a historical illustration of what that Court did under the Act then in force; it is not described here as overruled.

This judgment does not say what provisions now govern a court’s referral to the Legal Services Commissioner, so identify and read the current provisions before applying it to a present problem. What is said above about the first judgment of 11 April 2005 is limited to what this judgment quotes or describes; read that judgment for its full reasons.

Check your understanding

1. What did order 6 of 11 April 2005 require of the defendant’s solicitors, and what evidence did they put in on 19 April 2005 ([1], [2])?

2. What did Mr Connelly’s affidavit say about his file note, and what did the Court say about the character of the solicitors’ evidence ([7], [15])?

3. What did the Court say about the file note when compared with the way Mr Connelly’s affidavit described the teleconference ([18])?

4. What submission was made about timing, what undertakings were offered, and what did the Court say at [21] about when the reference should be made ([19], [21])?

5. Why was it submitted that the reference should be confined to Mr Brookes, and what did the Court say about Mr Connelly’s inexperience ([20])?

6. Which Justices sat, and does the judgment record any separate reasons (the heading to the judgment, [1])?