Aurizon Network Pty Ltd v Queensland Competition Authority

Supreme Court of Queensland · 2018

Administrative LawProcedural Fairness

Aurizon Network Pty Ltd v Queensland Competition Authority [2018] QSC 246

While a regulator is deciding how much a rail owner may earn, its chair is negotiating to chair a port company that the rail owner says could benefit from the regulator’s draft decision. Is that a ground for challenging the draft decision?

What happened?

Aurizon Network Pty Ltd (Aurizon) is the proprietor and operator of the rail infrastructure of the Central Queensland Coal Network (CQCN) up to the top of the rails, on land it leases from the State, and it enters into access agreements with railway operators to run rolling stock on that network ([3], [4]). The CQCN was taken to be a service declared under Part 5, Division 2 of the Queensland Competition Authority Act 1997 (Qld) (QCA Act), Part 5 of which establishes a third party access regime.

Under that regime the Queensland Competition Authority (the Authority) may require the owner or operator of a declared service to give it a draft access undertaking, may investigate it, and may either approve it or refuse to approve it and give notice of the way in which it considers it appropriate to amend it. In conducting an investigation the Authority is expressly obliged to comply with natural justice ([7], [69]).

The Authority required a draft access undertaking from Aurizon for the period from 1 July 2017, and Aurizon provided it on 30 November 2016 ([9], [11]). On 15 December 2017 the Authority issued a Draft Decision that did not approve it ([16], [17]). Aurizon had proposed a weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of 6.78 per cent, maintenance costs of $921 million and a maximum allowable revenue of $4.892 billion; the Draft Decision would allow 5.41 per cent, $817 million and $3.983 billion ([31], [34]). The Authority had three members, including Professor Green as chair, and all three approved the Draft Decision at a meeting on 14 December 2017 ([36], [52]).

While the investigation was under way Professor Green was in discussions about a different role. On 20 May 2017 a consultant to the trustee of a shareholder in the Port of Newcastle contacted him, and he later met representatives of that shareholder on 20 September, 2 October and 4 October 2017 ([54], [58], [60], [61]). On 6 December 2017 he signed a consent to act as a director of the Port of Newcastle, on 7 December he negotiated an increase in his proposed remuneration, and on 18 December 2017 he was appointed chair of the companies that own and operate the port ([63]-[65]).

At the meeting on 14 December he told the Authority that he had been invited to join the Port of Newcastle as chair and asked it to investigate whether there was any real or perceived conflict of interest ([51]). He was provided with working drafts of the Draft Decision, accepted Professor Menezes’s mark-ups of one draft, and on the rate of return chapter sought Professor Menezes’s views and adopted them ([44]-[46], [50]).

Aurizon applied to the Supreme Court of Queensland for judicial review of the Authority’s conduct during the investigation of its draft access undertaking ([1]). It submitted that the Authority’s investigation and views on WACC and maintenance costs might reduce sales of coal carried on the CQCN, and so increase throughput at the Port of Newcastle, and that this gave rise to an apprehension of bias on Professor Green’s part and, through him, the Authority’s ([66], [67]). It also alleged that he breached s 219(5) of the QCA Act and sought a declaration of contravention and an order requiring the draft undertaking to be considered afresh ([126]-[128]). The Authority was the first respondent and a group of coal producers were the second respondents.

What did the Court decide?

Jackson J dismissed the application ([152]), ordering Aurizon to pay the Authority’s costs and reserving the question of costs between Aurizon and the second respondents. Both the allegation of apprehended bias and the allegation of contravention of s 219 failed ([125], [143]). His Honour found it unnecessary to resolve the respondents’ arguments about why relief should be refused in any event ([144]-[148]), and, because Aurizon failed, gave no reasons for the order he had made on the first day of the hearing extending time to file the application to 30 April 2018, other than to record the principal reasons for it ([149]-[151]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Jackson J, the sole judge, began from the High Court’s statement in Ebner v Official Trustee of the apprehension of bias principle, under which a decision-maker is disqualified if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the decision-maker might not bring an impartial mind to the question to be decided, and from its two-step application: first, identifying what is said might lead the decision-maker to decide other than on the merits, and second, articulating “the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation” ([73]-[74]).

He said that none of the cases cited by the parties was a close analogue ([71]). He did not accept that the step to a reasonable apprehension is more readily taken in a conflict of interest case than in a pre-judgment case: the required logical connection “is not truncated because the case is characterised as one that involves a possible “conflict of interest”” ([76]). The knowledge to be attributed to the hypothetical lay observer is “a contextual finding to be made, having regard to the circumstances of the case” ([79]), and, because of the volume and expert technical nature of the evidence, he found it counterintuitive to suggest that the observer would have known all of it, and noted that no basis had been suggested for attributing knowledge of the expert opinions in reports obtained to advance one side or the other ([78]).

He found that the observer knows, among other things, that the text of the Draft Decision was prepared and proposed by others who did not know of Professor Green’s possible appointment, that Professor Green was one of three members who decided unanimously, that the access undertaking would operate over a four-year horizon, and that many other factors affect the supply of coal ([93]-[94], [99], [120]). He found that the observer does not know that the Adani Carmichael mine would have to use part of the Central Queensland Coal Network ([116]).

He said that Aurizon’s postulated connection from the Draft Decision to a benefit for the Port of Newcastle required some significant causal processes ([89]), and he concluded that the connections urged by Aurizon were “too tenuous or theoretical” to raise the requisite reasonable apprehension ([125]). He described the standard required as lower than the balance of probabilities ([122]). The ground of apprehended bias therefore failed.

Section 219 of the Queensland Competition Authority Act 1997 (Qld), as set out in the judgment, applied to a member who, or whose related person, had “a direct or indirect interest in an issue being considered, or about to be considered, by the authority” that “could conflict with the proper performance of the member’s duties” on the issue. Such a member had to disclose the interest to a meeting of the authority and, unless the Minister otherwise directed, could not be present when the authority considered the issue or take part in a decision on it ([70]).

Jackson J regarded the disclosure requirement and the prohibitions as relating, prima facie, to the authority considering an issue and making a decision at a meeting ([133]). Professor Green did not take part in the November meeting, and at the time of the September meeting the negotiations with the Port of Newcastle were preliminary and no detailed argument was put as to why they should have been disclosed then ([134]). His Honour accepted that Professor Green had no direct interest in the issue ([136]).

He held that, in a context like this one, “indirect interest” in s 219 “does not include all possible or hypothetical connections, and does not include an interest that is too “remote or insubstantial”” ([139]), and that the statutory context supported that construction ([140]). Alternatively, even on a wider view of indirect interest, s 219 did not apply unless the interest was one that “could conflict with the proper performance” of Professor Green’s duties about the issue, and whether his appointment could do so raised “the same considerations”, in general, as the apprehended bias question ([141]-[142]). He concluded that there was no contravention of s 219(5) ([143]). He noted that no decision on comparable provisions was identified by the parties ([137]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Jackson J (sole judge)

Read judgment: [73]–[76] (opens in a new tab), [78]–[79] (opens in a new tab), [88]–[125] (opens in a new tab)

Jackson J dismissed the application so far as it rested on apprehended bias because the fair-minded lay observer, with the knowledge he attributed to that observer, would not reasonably apprehend that Professor Green might not bring an impartial mind to the investigation and Draft Decision; the connections urged were too tenuous or theoretical ([125]). The statements of principle at [73]-[76] and [121]-[122] and the findings about what the observer knows at [91]-[120] are the steps to that conclusion. He did not decide whether, had bias been found, relief would have been refused ([148]).

Proposition 2

Ratio · Jackson J (sole judge)

Read judgment: [139]–[140] (opens in a new tab)

Jackson J’s primary construction of indirect interest in s 219 as not including all possible or hypothetical connections or an interest that is too remote or insubstantial was a ground for finding no contravention of s 219(5) ([143]).

Ratio · Jackson J (sole judge)

Read judgment: [141]–[143] (opens in a new tab)

Jackson J’s alternative route, that even on a wider view of indirect interest the interest must be one that could conflict with the proper performance of the member’s duties, which raised the same considerations in general as the apprehended bias question, was a second and independently sufficient ground for the conclusion at [143]; it is a stated alternative and not obiter.

Classification unresolved · Jackson J (sole judge)

Read judgment: [133]–[134] (opens in a new tab)

Jackson J gave a prima facie reading of s 219 as relating to the authority considering and deciding an issue at a meeting, and noted that Professor Green did not take part in the November meeting and that no detailed argument was put about disclosure at the September meeting ([133]-[134]). He expressed both points provisionally and then decided the case on the indirect interest question for December 2017 ([135]-[143]), so it is not clear that either was necessary to the order and a binary label would conceal that.

Why does this case matter?

A regulator, a commercial party with a great deal at stake and an awkward fact about the person chairing the regulator make it tempting to answer a bias question by how the facts look. This case is a worked example of testing that first impression against the evidence about the decision and the people affected by it. It also sets a common law principle and a statutory conflict-of-interest provision side by side, and an answer needs to say which of them it is applying and why.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem about a decision-maker with an outside interest, identify the interest, the decision, the decision-maker’s part in the decision, and what an informed member of the public would have known when it was made. Address the common law question and any statutory conflict provision each in its own terms, and read the words of the statute, as Jackson J did with s 219 ([70], [139]-[143]). Attribute each statement to Jackson J and compare the facts you are given with the facts he treated as known to the lay observer ([91]-[120]) before reaching a conclusion.

This is a decision of a single judge of the Trial Division of the Supreme Court of Queensland. It is a first-instance decision that does not bind other judges of the Supreme Court and is persuasive elsewhere. It applied the QCA Act as quoted in the judgment at [70] in 2018, and the Act may have been amended since, so check its current text before relying on the wording of s 219. The decision was about apprehended bias and s 219 and not about the merits of the Authority’s draft decision on the access undertaking, which the judgment does not assess.

Check your understanding

1. What did Aurizon propose for WACC, maintenance costs and maximum allowable revenue, and what would the Draft Decision allow ([31], [34])?

2. When did Professor Green first have contact with representatives of a shareholder in the Port of Newcastle, when was he appointed chair, and what did he tell the Authority on 14 December 2017 ([51], [54], [58], [65])?

3. What two bases did Aurizon put forward for the logical connection between the Draft Decision and a benefit to the Port of Newcastle ([86], [87])?

4. What did Jackson J say about whether the step to a reasonable apprehension is easier to take in a conflict of interest case than in a pre-judgment case ([76])?

5. What did he say about the lay observer’s knowledge of the parties’ expert reports, and what kind of finding is the extent of that knowledge ([78], [79])?

6. Which facts about the preparation and approval of the Draft Decision did he treat as known to the lay observer ([93], [94])?

7. What did s 219(5) of the QCA Act provide, and on what two routes did Jackson J conclude that it was not contravened ([70], [139], [141])?

8. Which questions about relief did Jackson J find it unnecessary to resolve ([144]-[148])?