Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH [2015] HCA 40
One reviewer interviewed an asylum seeker, then another decided his claim from the recording without telling him. The Full Court spoke of a legitimate expectation. What did the High Court make of that?
Clarified by Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80
In Nathanson Gageler J, who with Gordon J made this statement, said that it had been formulated in response to an argument that an applicant must always show what would have occurred, and that some elaboration of it might be warranted in light of SZMTA and MZAPC ([42]-[44]). His Honour explained that the statement’s foundation is that where the procedure adopted can itself be shown to have failed to afford a fair opportunity to be heard, a denial of procedural fairness is established by nothing more than that failure; the denial then results in jurisdictional error if the applicant establishes the reasonableness, within the parameters set by the historical facts, of the conjecture that the decision could have been different, which will not be difficult unless the historical facts support an inference that it could not have been ([55]). The joint reasons of Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ said that where a tribunal denies a party a reasonable opportunity to present their case, reasonable conjecture does not require demonstration of how that party might have taken advantage of the lost opportunity, and that nothing said in MZAPC denies this ([33]). So read the statement here together with that materiality requirement.
Clarified by LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 280 CLR 321
LPDT cites this passage at [58]-[60] in its guidance on materiality. At [8] the joint reasons of Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ said it was desirable ‘to give practical guidance in terms with which all the Court agree’ and that ‘differences of expression and emphasis previously adopted by individual Justices have been set aside in favour of the guidance that is now set out’. At [15] their Honours said that where the error is a denial of procedural fairness by failing to put the applicant on notice of a fact or issue, the court ‘may readily be able to infer’ that the applicant might have addressed it by further evidence or submissions, and that it is then ‘no easy task’ for the court to be satisfied that the loss of the opportunity did not deprive the person of the possibility of a successful outcome. The applicant still bears the onus, on the balance of probabilities, of the facts of what decision was made and how it was made ([10]), and materiality is ‘determined by inferences drawn from the evidence adduced on the application’ ([13]). So the passage here is now applied through that guidance.
What happened?
The respondent, a Tamil national of Sri Lanka, arrived at Christmas Island by boat on 7 November 2010 and was detained as an unlawful non-citizen ([1]). He requested a Refugee Status Assessment; a delegate interviewed him and made an adverse assessment on 29 April 2011, and he requested an Independent Merits Review ([2]-[4]).
On 16 January 2012 an independent merits reviewer (the First Reviewer) interviewed him. She told him that she would undertake “a fresh re-hearing of [his] claims” and make a recommendation, and that she would consider all the information he had provided and any further articles or information ([5]). For undisclosed reasons she became unavailable, and another person (the Second Reviewer) assumed responsibility for the review, unbeknown to the respondent ([6]). The Second Reviewer did not interview him. On 25 July 2012 he recommended against recognising him as a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations, relying on written materials that included a recording and transcript of the First Reviewer’s interview ([7]). He rejected what he described as a central plank of the respondent’s fear on the basis of inconsistencies in his account and did not accept that they were due to memory lapse or confusion ([8]).
The Federal Circuit Court (Judge Raphael) dismissed the respondent’s application for judicial review. The Full Court of the Federal Court allowed his appeal and declared that the Second Reviewer had acted in breach of procedural fairness (Flick and Gleeson JJ jointly; Nicholas J separately) ([9], [15]).
What did the Court decide?
The appeal was dismissed with costs ([49]). There were two sets of reasons: Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ at [1]-[49] and Gageler and Gordon JJ at [50]-[69].
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Legitimate expectation. Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ noted that the concept had been called “apt to mislead”, “unsatisfactory” and “superfluous and confusing” ([28]-[29]) and held:
“The ‘legitimate expectation’ of a person affected by an administrative decision does not provide a basis for determining whether procedural fairness should be accorded to that person or for determining the content of such procedural fairness.” ([30])
Absent a clear contrary legislative intention, decision-makers must accord procedural fairness, and resort to the notion “is both unnecessary and unhelpful”; it may distract from “what is required in order to ensure that the decision is made fairly in the circumstances having regard to the legal framework within which the decision is to be made” ([30]). Their Honours also said that there is “no general rule” that procedural fairness requires an oral hearing in every case; whether one is required “depends on the practical requirements of procedural fairness in the circumstances of the case” ([33]). Gageler and Gordon JJ made the point in their own terms: the concept can distract from “the true inquiry into the opportunity that a reasonable administrator ought fairly to have given” ([61]).
Application, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ. Their Honours treated the question as whether it was unfair for the Second Reviewer to proceed by reference only to some of the information available to the First Reviewer, and whether it was unfair to deny the respondent an opportunity to be heard on whether the review should proceed that way ([38]). The First Reviewer’s interview was a practical indication of what fairness required ([40]), and an interview by the Second Reviewer might have made a difference ([43]-[44]). Because the respondent was not told of the change, he was denied an opportunity to be heard on how the changed process might be completed ([45]-[46]). The Full Court was right to treat the case as one in which departure from a stated procedure resulted in unfairness ([47]-[48]).
Gageler and Gordon JJ. Their Honours said that the concern of procedural fairness, which here operates as a condition of the exercise of a statutory power, “is with procedures rather than with outcomes”, so that failing to give the opportunity to be heard which a reasonable assessor ought fairly to give is, without more, a denial of procedural fairness ([55]). The breach is material if it deprives the person of “the possibility of a successful outcome” ([56]). Lam is not authority that an applicant must always demonstrate what would have occurred ([58]), and where the procedure itself failed to afford a fair opportunity, the denial is established by nothing more than that failure ([60]).
Here the change of procedure, made without notice after the interview and the submissions to the First Reviewer, failed to afford a reasonable opportunity to be heard; fairness required notice of the change and an opportunity to supplement the submissions and to request further oral evidence ([62], [67], [69]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Obiter · Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ
Read judgment: [30]–[31] (PDF p 12) (opens in a new tab)
The general rejection of legitimate expectation as a basis for procedural fairness is treated as considered obiter: at [31] the plurality identifies the unfair change of process as a sufficient basis for the result without that concept. This is substantial guidance from three Justices, but distinguish it from the narrower ground that the respondent lost a fair opportunity to be heard.
Separate reasoning · Gageler and Gordon JJ
Read judgment: [61] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab)
These Justices likewise warn that legitimate expectation can distract from the inquiry into a fair opportunity. They allow an expectation relevance only insofar as it bears on that inquiry. This is their own formulation, rather than a statement that they adopted all of the plurality’s discussion.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ
Read judgment: [43]–[48] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab)
The plurality identified the lost opportunity caused by the undisclosed change of reviewer and upheld the conclusion that the process was unfair. This is the factual and legal ground for dismissing the appeal, rather than a general entitlement to an oral hearing in every review.
Separate reasoning · Gageler and Gordon JJ
Read judgment: [62]–[69] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab)
These Justices reached the same outcome by identifying how the undisclosed change altered the opportunity to present a case. Their own ground required notice and an opportunity to supplement the material; it did not establish an automatic entitlement to a fresh oral hearing.
Proposition 3
Separate reasoning · Gageler and Gordon JJ
Read judgment: [55]–[60] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab), [66]–[69] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab)
These passages supply the necessary ground of Gageler and Gordon JJ’s own reasons about denial and relief. The plurality did not join their formulation, so it is not presented as a holding shared by all five Justices. Read it with the later materiality authorities identified in the treatment notes.
Why does this case matter?
Facts in which a promised or conducted step is later changed invite an older vocabulary, and a problem built on those facts is a prompt to use it. An answer that reaches for that vocabulary without noticing what the Court said about it, or that treats the two sets of reasons as one, will lose marks that a more careful attribution would keep.
Later High Court decisions, including MZAPC ([59]) and Nathanson ([41]-[44]), return to the statement of Gageler and Gordon JJ on what an applicant must show.
Exam and application relevance
Where a procedure was promised, begun or changed, identify the opportunity to be heard that was given or foreshadowed, what changed, and what the decision-maker ought fairly to have done in the circumstances ([53], [62], [67]). Attribute each statement to the reasons it comes from ([30], [55]-[60]).
For what an applicant must now show about the effect of a denial, read the Gageler and Gordon JJ statement with Nathanson.
Check your understanding
1. What did the First Reviewer tell the respondent at the interview on 16 January 2012, and what did the respondent not know about the review ([5]-[6])?
2. What had Flick and Gleeson JJ said about legitimate expectation in the Full Court ([17]), and what did the plurality say about the concept at [30]-[31]?
3. What did the plurality say at [33] about oral hearings?
4. What opportunity did the plurality say the respondent was denied as a result of not being told of the change ([45]-[46])?
5. On what basis did Gageler and Gordon JJ hold that the respondent was denied a reasonable opportunity to be heard ([62], [67])?
6. What did Gageler and Gordon JJ say Lam does not stand for ([58])?