Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH

High Court of Australia · 2015

Administrative LawProcedural Fairness

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH [2015] HCA 40

One reviewer interviewed an asylum seeker, then another decided his claim from the recording without telling him. The Full Court spoke of a legitimate expectation. What did the High Court make of that?

Clarified by Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80

In Nathanson Gageler J, who with Gordon J made this statement, said that it had been formulated in response to an argument that an applicant must always show what would have occurred, and that some elaboration of it might be warranted in light of SZMTA and MZAPC ([42]-[44]). His Honour explained that the statement’s foundation is that where the procedure adopted can itself be shown to have failed to afford a fair opportunity to be heard, a denial of procedural fairness is established by nothing more than that failure; the denial then results in jurisdictional error if the applicant establishes the reasonableness, within the parameters set by the historical facts, of the conjecture that the decision could have been different, which will not be difficult unless the historical facts support an inference that it could not have been ([55]). The joint reasons of Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ said that where a tribunal denies a party a reasonable opportunity to present their case, reasonable conjecture does not require demonstration of how that party might have taken advantage of the lost opportunity, and that nothing said in MZAPC denies this ([33]). So read the statement here together with that materiality requirement.

Clarified by LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 280 CLR 321

LPDT cites this passage at [58]-[60] in its guidance on materiality. At [8] the joint reasons of Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ said it was desirable ‘to give practical guidance in terms with which all the Court agree’ and that ‘differences of expression and emphasis previously adopted by individual Justices have been set aside in favour of the guidance that is now set out’. At [15] their Honours said that where the error is a denial of procedural fairness by failing to put the applicant on notice of a fact or issue, the court ‘may readily be able to infer’ that the applicant might have addressed it by further evidence or submissions, and that it is then ‘no easy task’ for the court to be satisfied that the loss of the opportunity did not deprive the person of the possibility of a successful outcome. The applicant still bears the onus, on the balance of probabilities, of the facts of what decision was made and how it was made ([10]), and materiality is ‘determined by inferences drawn from the evidence adduced on the application’ ([13]). So the passage here is now applied through that guidance.

What happened?

The respondent, a Tamil man from Sri Lanka, arrived by boat in 2010 and was detained. His refugee claim was rejected, so he sought an Independent Merits Review.

One reviewer interviewed him, promising a fresh hearing. She became unavailable. A second reviewer, without meeting him, took over and also rejected his claims, relying on the first interview’s transcript.

The Federal Circuit Court upheld this. The Full Federal Court disagreed, finding a procedural fairness breach.

What did the Court decide?

The appeal was dismissed with costs ([49]). There were two sets of reasons: Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ at [1]-[49] and Gageler and Gordon JJ at [50]-[69].

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ said “legitimate expectation” does not help decide whether, or what, procedural fairness is owed. The idea has been called misleading and confusing. Decision-makers must still give procedural fairness, unless legislation clearly says otherwise. There is no general rule requiring an oral hearing; it depends on the practical demands of fairness in each case.

Gageler and Gordon JJ made a similar point: the concept distracts from asking what opportunity a reasonable administrator ought fairly to have given.

On the facts, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ asked whether it was unfair for the Second Reviewer to rely on only part of the material, without telling the respondent or hearing him on that change. They held this was unfair, agreeing with the Full Court.

Gageler and Gordon JJ said procedural fairness concerns procedures, not outcomes. A breach matters if it removes a possible chance of success. An applicant need not always show what would have happened.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Obiter · Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ

Read judgment: [30]–[31] (PDF p 12) (opens in a new tab)

The general rejection of legitimate expectation as a basis for procedural fairness is treated as considered obiter: at [31] the plurality identifies the unfair change of process as a sufficient basis for the result without that concept. This is substantial guidance from three Justices, but distinguish it from the narrower ground that the respondent lost a fair opportunity to be heard.

Separate reasoning · Gageler and Gordon JJ

Read judgment: [61] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab)

These Justices likewise warn that legitimate expectation can distract from the inquiry into a fair opportunity. They allow an expectation relevance only insofar as it bears on that inquiry. This is their own formulation, rather than a statement that they adopted all of the plurality’s discussion.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ

Read judgment: [43]–[48] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab)

The plurality identified the lost opportunity caused by the undisclosed change of reviewer and upheld the conclusion that the process was unfair. This is the factual and legal ground for dismissing the appeal, rather than a general entitlement to an oral hearing in every review.

Separate reasoning · Gageler and Gordon JJ

Read judgment: [62]–[69] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab)

These Justices reached the same outcome by identifying how the undisclosed change altered the opportunity to present a case. Their own ground required notice and an opportunity to supplement the material; it did not establish an automatic entitlement to a fresh oral hearing.

Proposition 3

Separate reasoning · Gageler and Gordon JJ

Read judgment: [55]–[60] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab), [66]–[69] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab)

These passages supply the necessary ground of Gageler and Gordon JJ’s own reasons about denial and relief. The plurality did not join their formulation, so it is not presented as a holding shared by all five Justices. Read it with the later materiality authorities identified in the treatment notes.

Why does this case matter?

A changed review process raises an older concept students may misuse. Watch for conflating the two judgments’ separate reasoning. Later High Court cases revisit what an applicant must establish.

A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail. The full case note is the complete statement.