Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs

High Court of Australia · 2022

Administrative LawJurisdictional Error

Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80

A tribunal told a man representing himself that a new direction was of minor relevance, then let the Minister rely on it in closing. Did he have to show what he would have said if heard?

Clarified by LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 280 CLR 321

LPDT restates the materiality principles for the whole Court and cites this case for them. At [8] the joint reasons of Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ said it was desirable ‘to give practical guidance in terms with which all the Court agree’ and that ‘differences of expression and emphasis previously adopted by individual Justices have been set aside in favour of the guidance that is now set out’. The guidance is that the applicant bears the onus, on the balance of probabilities, of the facts of what decision was made and how it was made ([10]), and that materiality is then ‘determined by inferences drawn from the evidence adduced on the application’ ([13]); the question is whether the decision could, not would, realistically have been different, and meeting that threshold ‘is not demanding or onerous’ ([14]). At [15] their Honours said that where the error is a denial of procedural fairness by failing to put the applicant on notice of a fact or issue, the court ‘may readily be able to infer’ that the applicant might have addressed it, and that it is then ‘no easy task’ for the court to be satisfied that the lost opportunity did not deprive the person of the possibility of a successful outcome. LPDT [6] gives apprehended or actual bias and unreasonableness in the final result as examples of errors that are jurisdictional irrespective of effect, or whose effect is inherent. Because LPDT states its guidance as the whole Court’s, it, rather than the separate formulations of individual Justices in this case, is the Court’s present statement of the threshold.

What happened?

The appellant, a New Zealand citizen born in Zimbabwe, arrived in Australia in 2010 and was granted a Special Category visa in 2013. In 2018 a delegate cancelled it under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), because he was serving a sentence of imprisonment for offences that included depriving a person of liberty, aggravated assault, stealing and dangerous driving ([3]). On 10 January 2019 a delegate decided not to revoke the cancellation ([4]). He applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for review ([7]).

On 28 February 2019 Ministerial Direction 65 was replaced by Direction 79, which added a factor: the principle that crimes of a violent nature against women or children are viewed very seriously, regardless of the sentence imposed ([8]). The appellant represented himself at the hearing. The Tribunal member told him there were “only minor changes to the direction” and that they were of “minor relevance” to the conviction history she had ([12]). He had not been convicted of any domestic violence offence, and the delegate had not mentioned domestic violence ([9]).

The Minister raised the new factor for the first time in closing submissions, contending that his violent conduct against his wife was extremely serious in light of Direction 79, and the Tribunal gave him no opportunity to address it ([14]-[15]). The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision on 4 April 2019 and treated the incidents seriously in finding that the nature of his offending was very serious ([16]).

Colvin J found that the course taken by the Tribunal was procedurally unfair but did not amount to jurisdictional error, and dismissed the application ([18]). A Full Court of the Federal Court (Steward and Jackson JJ, Wigney J dissenting) dismissed his appeal ([22], [29]).

What did the Court decide?

The appeal was allowed with costs. The Full Court’s orders and Colvin J’s orders were set aside; the application for review was allowed, the Tribunal’s decision was set aside, and the application was remitted to the Tribunal to be determined according to law ([40]).

There were four sets of reasons: Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ at [1]-[40], Gageler J at [41]-[59], Gordon J at [60]-[87] and Edelman J at [88]-[128]. All six Justices joined in the orders ([59], [87], [128]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Joint reasons, with Gageler J agreeing. Their Honours began from the common ground that the denial of procedural fairness was jurisdictional error only if it was material, meaning that it deprived the appellant of a realistic possibility of a different outcome, and that the appellant bore the onus of demonstrating this ([1], [32]). They explained that the standard of “reasonable conjecture” is undemanding ([33]). There will generally be a realistic possibility of a different outcome if a party was denied an opportunity to present evidence or make submissions on an issue that required consideration, and

“Where a Tribunal errs by denying a party a reasonable opportunity to present their case, ‘reasonable conjecture’ does not require demonstration of how that party might have taken advantage of that lost opportunity. Nothing said in MZAPC denies this.” ([33])

The case was analogous to Stead, because the only historical facts the appellant had to prove appeared from the Tribunal’s reasons for decision ([34]). The Minister’s argument, that the appellant had to adduce evidence of how the domestic violence issue could have been addressed, was rejected: additional evidence and submissions could realistically have affected the Tribunal’s evaluative fact-finding, and there was “no need for the appellant to establish the nature of any additional evidence or submissions” ([39]).

Gageler J. His Honour explained the statement he and Gordon J made in WZARH in light of SZMTA and MZAPC. Those cases are authority for two cumulative propositions, that a denial of procedural fairness results in jurisdictional error only if shown by the applicant to have been material, and that materiality is shown by a realistic possibility that the decision could have been different ([45]). They do not require the applicant to establish any part of what would have occurred on the balance of probabilities: the onus is “no greater than to show that, as a matter of reasonable conjecture within the parameters set by the historical facts established on the balance of probabilities, the decision could have been different” ([46]). Unless the historical facts support an inference that the decision could not have been different, establishing the reasonableness of that conjecture “will not be difficult” ([55]).

Gordon J. Her Honour held that a serious denial of procedural fairness on an important issue in an evaluative decision, as here, is an error for which there is “no additional or separate onus on Mr Nathanson to demonstrate that the error could realistically have resulted in a different decision” ([63], [76]-[77]). She said that not every denial falls in that category ([78]), and that where the error is not fundamental the respondent must show that the failure did not deprive the person of the possibility of a successful outcome ([81]).

Edelman J. His Honour set out three questions: whether the irregularity was capable of producing practical injustice, whether it was sufficiently serious to be material without more, and whether the denial could not have made any difference ([95]). He resolved the tension between injustice and incoherence by treating the onus of proving materiality, where it arises, as “so slight” that it can be satisfied by “nothing more than a ‘quadruple might’ at a high level of generality” ([124]-[127]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ (Gageler J agreeing)

Read judgment: [33] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab), [39] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab)

These reasons supply the ground for allowing the appeal: the lost opportunity to address an issue bearing on the Tribunal’s evaluative decision established a realistic possibility of a different outcome without proof of the particular evidence or submissions that would have been presented. The undemanding reasonable-conjecture standard was necessary to reject the Minister’s argument. Gageler J expressly agreed with the joint reasoning.

Separate reasoning · Gordon J

Read judgment: [76]–[77] (PDF p 32) (opens in a new tab)

Gordon J concurred in the orders but took a distinct route: this serious denial of a hearing on an important issue in an evaluative decision was fundamental, so no additional or separate onus to establish materiality arose. This explains her own ground for relief; it does not make that formulation the ground adopted by the joint reasons.

Separate reasoning · Edelman J

Read judgment: [127]–[128] (PDF p 51) (opens in a new tab)

Edelman J concurred in the orders. His resolution treated any onus of establishing materiality as so slight that a chain of possibilities at a high level of generality sufficed. This was his explanation for granting relief despite his criticism of the materiality doctrine, rather than an adoption by the other Justices of his distinct formulation.

Proposition 2

Separate reasoning · Gageler J

Read judgment: [45]–[46] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab), [55]–[59] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab)

Gageler J concurred in both the joint reasoning and the orders, expressly saying so at [59]. These additional observations reconcile WZARH with SZMTA and MZAPC by distinguishing proof of historical facts from reasonable conjecture about a different outcome, then apply that distinction to the lost hearing opportunity. They explain his concurrence; the detailed reconciliation is his separate exposition, rather than a passage adopted by the joint reasons.

Why does this case matter?

In a procedural fairness problem where the hearing was denied and the respondent says nothing the applicant could have said would have changed the result, this is the decision that answers the response. Students often quote the general materiality formula and stop, without applying it to the particular lost opportunity.

The four sets of reasons also make this a case in which “the High Court said” can hide which Justice said it.

Exam and application relevance

Where a denial of an opportunity to be heard is established, ask what facts about the decision and how it was made the applicant must prove, and what they are in the problem; here they appeared from the Tribunal’s reasons ([34]). Then apply the joint reasons’ account of reasonable conjecture to those facts ([33], [39]). If the other side argues that the applicant must show what would have been said, test the argument against [33] and [39].

Attribute Gordon J’s and Edelman J’s formulations to them, and for the present statement of the threshold apply LPDT ([8]-[16]).

Check your understanding

1. What did the Tribunal member tell the appellant about Direction 79 at the start of the hearing, and when was the new factor first relied on against him ([12]-[15])?

2. Which Justices wrote the joint reasons, and what did Gageler J say at [59] about them?

3. According to the joint reasons, what does “reasonable conjecture” not require when a party is denied a reasonable opportunity to present their case ([33])?

4. Why did the joint reasons compare this case with Stead ([34])?

5. How did Gordon J’s treatment of a serious denial of procedural fairness differ in emphasis from the joint reasons ([63], [77])?

6. What did Edelman J say at [127] about the onus of proving materiality, and did he join in the orders ([128])?