Craig v South Australia
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Getting the law wrong and acting outside your power are not the same thing. Where does one become the other?
Clarified by Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531
Kirk makes the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error constitutionally significant for State courts, but it does not make jurisdictional error the whole of judicial review. French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [100]: “Legislation which would take from a State Supreme Court power to grant relief on account of jurisdictional error is beyond State legislative power. Legislation which denies the availability of relief for non-jurisdictional error of law appearing on the face of the record is not beyond power.” So review for non-jurisdictional error survives as a category and can be removed by statute; what cannot be removed is review for jurisdictional error. Kirk also treats Craig’s list as a guide rather than a closed taxonomy.
Clarified by Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123
An error of the Craig kind is not jurisdictional simply because it happened. Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Keane JJ hold that a statute imposing a condition on a decision-making process “is ordinarily to be interpreted as incorporating a threshold of materiality in the event of non-compliance” ([29]), and that the threshold “would not ordinarily be met ... if complying with the condition could have made no difference to the decision that was made in the circumstances in which that decision was made” ([30]). Jurisdictional error accordingly “consists of a material breach of an express or implied condition of the valid exercise of a decision-making power” ([31]). Naming a Craig category is therefore only half the argument; the other half is that compliance could have produced a different decision.
What happened?
Craig was charged by information in the District Court of South Australia with larceny of a motor car, receiving it knowing it to be stolen (charged in the alternative), and damaging it by fire. He applied for a stay until he could be provided with counsel at public expense. Russell DCJ found he lacked the means to obtain representation and “could not receive a fair trial unless he is properly represented by counsel”, and held that Dietrich required the trial to be “adjourned, postponed or stayed until legal representation (was) available”. He stayed the proceedings until further order.
The State applied to the Full Court of the Supreme Court under r 98 of the Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA). The Full Court, Olsson J dissenting, made an order in the nature of certiorari quashing the stay. Special leave to appeal was granted, limited to “the question of jurisdictional error and error of law on the face of the record”.
The High Court assumed, without deciding, that the District Court was an inferior court for these purposes. The question then was whether the error the Full Court had found was of a kind that certiorari could reach.
What did the Court decide?
The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Full Court’s order, and ordered that the State’s application for judicial review of Judge Russell’s stay order be dismissed, with liberty to the parties to apply in writing within fourteen days about the costs of the proceedings in the Full Court and in the High Court ([28]).
The reason given was that “there was no ground upon which an order in the nature of certiorari could properly be made by the Full Court” ([28]). The Court held that, even if Judge Russell had erred in applying Dietrich, the error would not have been jurisdictional error ([25]-[26]), and that the error the State alleged was not error on the face of the record, because the record included neither the transcript nor the reasons for decision ([20], [27]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Jurisdictional error is not a single fixed category but is illustrated by recurring examples — identifying a wrong issue, asking a wrong question, ignoring relevant material, relying on irrelevant material, and misunderstanding the extent of the power conferred. The first four are addressed to administrative tribunals, which ordinarily lack authority to determine questions of law authoritatively; where an inferior court makes mistakes of that kind in a matter entrusted to it, that will not ordinarily be jurisdictional error. Misconstruing the empowering instrument and thereby misconceiving the nature of the function or the extent of the power is jurisdictional error for an inferior court as well.
Their Honours’ words, on tribunals ([14]): “[i]f such an administrative tribunal falls into an error of law which causes it to identify a wrong issue, to ask itself a wrong question, to ignore relevant material, to rely on irrelevant material or, at least in some circumstances, to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, and the tribunal’s exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its authority or powers.” On courts ([15]): “[s]uch a mistake on the part of an inferior court entrusted with authority to identify, formulate and determine such issues and questions will not, however, ordinarily constitute jurisdictional error.”
But the line is not drawn around courts altogether. Earlier, at [12], their Honours list ways an inferior court does fall into jurisdictional error, and the last is the one to remember: “an inferior court will exceed its authority and fall into jurisdictional error if it misconstrues that statute or other instrument and thereby misconceives the nature of the function which it is performing or the extent of its powers in the circumstances of the particular case”. Their Honours add the warning that goes with it — in that category “the line between jurisdictional error and mere error in the exercise of jurisdiction may be particularly difficult to discern”.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ
Read judgment: pp 177–180 (opens in a new tab)
The distinction between an inferior court’s jurisdiction and error within that jurisdiction was needed to decide whether the District Court’s stay could be quashed. The Court’s ordinary authority to decide legal questions explains why a mistake within that task does not necessarily amount to jurisdictional error.
Classification unresolved · Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ
Read judgment: p 179 (opens in a new tab)
The administrative-tribunal examples supply the contrast used to explain the narrower position of inferior courts. The proceeding concerned a court, not a tribunal. Whether every part of that explanatory discussion was strictly necessary is left open: do not mistake a tribunal example for the actual decision about the District Court.
Why does this case matter?
Because it shows what judicial review of a court’s order is not. The Court describes certiorari as “not an appellate procedure enabling either a general review of the order or decision of the inferior court or tribunal” ([8]), and the State used it here because South Australian statute law gave the Crown no appeal against a District Court order of this kind (footnote 3 to [5]). The dispute in the Full Court was over how the judge had assessed the appellant’s own “fault” in lacking a lawyer ([22]-[24]). Craig is the case that makes a student ask what ground the supervising court actually has, rather than whether the lower decision was wrong.
Notice too how little of the case was about the categories of error. The Court declined to treat the reasons and transcript as part of the record, because that approach would “go a long way towards transforming certiorari into a discretionary general appeal for error of law” ([17]). The error the State alleged could be found only by reading the transcript ([27]), so the scope of the record did as much work in the outcome as the doctrine the case is remembered for. In judicial review the remedy’s own conditions can decide a case before the merits of the error are reached.
Exam and application relevance
Start with the body whose decision is under attack. Ask where its authority to decide questions of law comes from, and say what kind of body it is and what its empowering instrument gives it, before you name any error.
Then name the error alleged and prove it from the instrument. “The decision-maker asked the wrong question” means nothing until you have said what question the empowering provision required, and shown from the reasons that a different one was asked. Ask whether the alleged error is one the body was itself entrusted to make, or one about the nature of its function or the extent of its power, and say which you are alleging and why.
Then deal with materiality. After Hossain, a breach is ordinarily not jurisdictional unless compliance could have produced a different decision, so say what the decision-maker would have had to consider, and why it might have changed the outcome. An answer that stops at naming the category has done two-thirds of the work.
Finally, check the remedy. If your argument depends on the transcript or the reasons, ask whether the ground you rely on allows the court to look at them ([8]).
Check your understanding
Two decision-makers each misread the same statutory phrase. Name two reasons why that might be jurisdictional error for one and not the other.