Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond

High Court of Australia · 1990

Administrative LawJudicial Review

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321

The respondents challenged eighteen decisions, findings and rulings at once. Which of them could be reviewed at all, and how wrong does a decision have to be?

Qualified by Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18

Li holds that unreasonableness is not confined to decisions that are irrational or bizarre: what reasonableness requires is a question of statutory construction, and a decision may be unreasonable where it lacks an evident and intelligible justification. So a formulation of Bond that presents the ground as reachable ONLY by the most extreme decisions now understates it. Bond’s distinction between a reviewable decision and conduct is untouched; it is the width of the unreasonableness ground that has moved.

What happened?

The respondents attacked a broadcasting tribunal’s inquiry wholesale, seeking relief in respect of eighteen decisions, findings and rulings at once — eleven of which they described as “decisions” and seven as “conduct”. The questions were which of those the ADJR Act let them review at all, and on what ground.

What did the Court decide?

The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Full Court’s orders and ordered that the applications for orders of review be dismissed. It also refused special leave to cross-appeal.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

Under the ADJR Act a reviewable “decision” is ordinarily an ultimate or operative determination and substantive in character, so a conclusion reached as a step along the way is not — unless the statute itself provides for a finding or ruling on that point. Findings that are not independently reviewable are still not beyond reach, because reviewing the operative decision on a permissible ground exposes the reasons given and the process followed.

Why does this case matter?

The trap is thinking that any of this converts a factual complaint into a legal one. It does not. Review still requires a permissible ground, and “the tribunal got the facts wrong” is not one however it is arranged on the page — the respondents here had findings described as erroneous and still could not have them set aside on that basis alone. The distinction matters when choosing how to frame a challenge.

Read the statute, not the slogan. This is a decision about what the ADJR Act reaches, and the supervisory jurisdiction at common law is not bounded the same way. Treating Bond as a general theory of judicial review is the most common way of overreading it, and it is an easy error to make because the language sounds constitutional.

Watch the date on the unreasonableness discussion too. The note on later authority below explains what has since changed, and a submission built on the 1990 formulation alone argues from a narrower ground than the law now provides.

Exam and application relevance

Identify each challenged act and the statutory setting before framing the grounds of review. Explain why the alleged error warrants judicial intervention rather than simply asking the court to prefer another view of the facts. On unreasonableness, consult the later-authority note before applying the case.

Check your understanding

How does Bond distinguish reviewable decisions from intermediate findings, and what scope remains for examining a finding that is not independently reviewable?