A fair opportunity to be heard in review proceedings

Explains what a fair opportunity to be heard required in VEAL, WZARH and Nathanson: undisclosed adverse information, an undisclosed change of reviewer and an issue raised late, and how materiality then arises.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth
Subjects
administrative-law
Topics
procedural-fairness

Learning outcomes

  • Identify whether a hearing-rule complaint is about undisclosed adverse information, an undisclosed change of process or an issue raised late, and state the opportunity fairness required in each.
  • Explain why a decision-maker’s statement that it gave undisclosed material no weight does not answer a hearing-rule complaint.
  • Separate the question whether procedural fairness was denied from the question whether the denial was material, and identify an error for which materiality need not be shown.

The hearing rule is easy to state and hard to apply, because what it demands depends on what the decision-maker actually did. The prior question for a student is not whether the person had a hearing in the abstract, but whether, in the whole of the circumstances, the person was given the opportunity that a reasonable decision-maker ought fairly to have given. In the decisions discussed here the question arises in three situations: adverse information the person has not seen, a change in the process the person was told to expect, and an issue raised late. That grouping is a way of organising the cases, not a test any court has laid down. This article states Commonwealth law from High Court decisions, most of them on tribunal and other reviews under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). It does not state State or Territory law, and the content of the duty in any case depends on the statute under which the decision is made.

The question is practical, not formal

Gageler and Gordon JJ said in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH [2015] HCA 402 that procedural fairness in the processes before them required a reasonable opportunity to present an affirmative case and to answer material that might suggest otherwise ([52]). That requires at least an opportunity “which a reasonable assessor or reviewer ought fairly to give in the totality of the circumstances” ([53]). Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ said in the same case that there is no general rule that procedural fairness requires an oral hearing in every case; whether one is required depends on the practical requirements of fairness in the circumstances ([33]). Both sets of reasons treated the concern as the decision-maker’s processes, and not whether the decision-maker’s conclusions were right ([42], [55]).

Two cautions apply. First, “legitimate expectation” is not the route to the duty or its content, as the article on procedural fairness explains. Second, the statute matters. The Court in Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 721 said that the content of the obligation must accommodate the Act’s provisions, and that the provisions then in force were not an exhaustive statement of the steps the Tribunal might have to take ([10]). It noted that later amendments inserted a provision making a division of the Act an exhaustive statement of the natural justice hearing rule for the matters it deals with ([10], note 7). A student applying VEAL to a later decision must therefore check what the statute now provides.

Adverse information the person has not seen

In VEAL the Refugee Review Tribunal received an unsolicited letter, forwarded by the Department, alleging that the applicant had admitted being accused of killing a person prominent in the political affairs of Eritrea, and that he was working for its government. The Tribunal did not tell him of the letter or its contents, and in its reasons said it gave the letter no weight ([1]-[5]). The Court, in joint reasons, held that the Tribunal should have told him the substance of the allegations before deciding ([7]).

Three points in the reasoning carry the rule. First, “credible, relevant and significant” information, which calls for an opportunity to respond, is information the decision-maker cannot dismiss before deciding, and it can be dismissed only if it is evidently not credible, not relevant, or of little or no significance ([17]). Second, the decision-maker’s later statement that it gave the material no weight does not answer the complaint, because the inquiry is about what procedures should have been followed, not about what the decision-maker went on to do or whether it was subconsciously affected ([18]-[19]). Third, on the facts of that case fairness did not require the Tribunal to give him the letter or identify its author. The Court declined to state all-encompassing rules about information supplied by informers ([25]); here the public interest could be accommodated by telling him the substance of the allegations and asking him to respond, and his answer would then be weighed in light of the fact that the author’s credibility could not be tested ([29]).

A change in the process the person was told to expect

In WZARH an asylum seeker was interviewed by a reviewer who told him she would conduct a fresh re-hearing and make a recommendation. She became unavailable, and a second reviewer, without telling him, made an adverse recommendation without interviewing him, relying on written material and a recording and transcript of the first interview, and rejecting a central part of his account on credibility grounds ([5]-[8]). The High Court dismissed the Minister’s appeal ([49]).

The two sets of reasons reached the same result with different emphases. Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ asked whether it was unfair for the Second Reviewer to proceed by reference only to some of the information made available to the First Reviewer, and to the impressions of his credibility formed from those materials, and whether it was unfair to deny him the opportunity to be heard on whether the review should proceed that way ([38]). They held that it was, because an interview might have made a difference to credibility findings and because he was not told of the change, so that elementary considerations of fairness required that he be informed and heard on how the process should continue ([43]-[46]). Gageler and Gordon JJ held that the change of procedure altered the nature of the opportunity he had been given, from persuading an identified assessor to presenting a case to an unknown one, and that fairness required notice of the changed procedure, an opportunity to supplement the written submissions and an opportunity to request further oral evidence ([62]-[67]). They added that had the procedure at the outset been an interview by one officer and assessment by another, it would have been difficult to conclude that he was denied a reasonable opportunity to be heard ([63]).

An issue raised late

In Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 263 a self-represented applicant faced a review of a decision not to revoke the cancellation of his visa. At the start of the hearing the Tribunal member told him that there were only minor changes to the applicable ministerial direction, most of them about crimes involving women and children, and that on his conviction history she thought they were “of minor relevance”. In closing, the Minister’s solicitor relied on a new passage of the direction to say that violence against a woman is viewed very seriously, whatever the sentence. The Tribunal took no steps to tell him that a new issue had been raised or to give him a chance to address it ([12]-[15]). The primary judge found the course procedurally unfair ([19]), and the finding was not in issue in the Full Court ([22]); the High Court’s reasons proceed on the basis that the denial was established ([1]).

On the facts the Court recounts, the applicant knew that domestic violence allegations were in play, but he had not been told that they would be assessed under the new passage, and he had been told that the changes mattered little ([9]-[10], [12]).

What follows from a denial

A denial of procedural fairness does not by itself end the inquiry. In Nathanson Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ said that the applicant bears the onus of showing that the denial was material, in the sense that it deprived the applicant of a realistic possibility of a different outcome ([1]). The standard of “reasonable conjecture” is undemanding, and where a tribunal denies a reasonable opportunity to present a case, the applicant does not have to show how the lost opportunity might have been used ([33], [39]). Applied to the facts, the applicant did not have to establish what additional evidence or submissions he would have put ([39]). The fuller account of materiality, including how this stage is analysed, is in the article on jurisdictional error and materiality.

Not every error needs that showing. In LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 124 the joint reasons of six Justices said that in some cases an error is jurisdictional irrespective of its effect on the decision, and gave apprehended or actual bias as an example ([6]).

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify the decision-maker and the statute, and check whether it contains procedures that displace or modify the general law, as VEAL records for the Migration Act as it then stood.
  2. Identify what opportunity the person was actually given. Ask whether a reasonable decision-maker would have given more in the circumstances, and treat that, and not whether the conclusion was right, as the question ([53], [55] of WZARH).
  3. Place the complaint. If material adverse to the person was not disclosed, ask whether the substance was put to the person, and do not rely on the decision-maker’s statement that it gave the material no weight. If the process changed, ask whether the person was told and heard on how to proceed. If an issue arose late, ask whether the person was told of its significance and given a chance to respond.
  4. Do not frame the argument as a disappointed expectation.
  5. If a denial is established, deal with materiality as a separate step, and say whether the error is of the kind that LPDT identifies as jurisdictional irrespective of its effect.

Self-check

  • Have I checked the statute for procedures that modify the general law?
  • Have I attributed each reasoning to the Justices who stated it, and noted where two sets of reasons differ in emphasis?
  • Have I separated the finding of unfairness from the question of materiality?

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