A fair opportunity to be heard in review proceedings

The question is practical, not formal

In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH [2015] HCA 40, Gageler and Gordon JJ said procedural fairness meant a reasonable chance to put your case and answer adverse material ([52]). This means the opportunity a reasonable reviewer ought fairly to give, given all the circumstances ([53]).

Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ said there’s no fixed rule requiring an oral hearing every time. Whether one is needed depends on what fairness practically requires in that case ([33]). Both judgments focused on the decision-maker’s process, not whether their conclusion was correct ([42], [55]).

Two cautions follow. First, “legitimate expectation” (a party’s assumption about how they’ll be treated) is not how you work out the duty or its content.

Second, the relevant statute matters. In Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 72, the Court said the duty must fit the Act’s own provisions ([10]). The provisions in force at the time weren’t a complete list of what the Tribunal might need to do.

The Court also noted later amendments made one division of the Act a complete statement of natural justice for matters it covers ([10], note 7). So when applying VEAL to a later case, check what the statute currently says.

Adverse information the person has not seen

In VEAL, the Tribunal got a letter alleging the applicant admitted to a killing and government work. It did not tell him about the letter. It later said it gave the letter no weight.

The Court held the Tribunal should have told him the substance of the allegations first.

Information is “credible, relevant and significant” if the decision-maker cannot dismiss it before deciding. It can only be dismissed if it is clearly not credible, not relevant, or barely significant.

Saying afterwards that no weight was given does not fix the problem. The question is what procedure should have been followed, not what the decision-maker actually did.

The Court did not set a general rule for informer information. Here, fairness only required telling him the substance and letting him respond. His response would then be weighed knowing the informer’s credibility was untested.

A change in the process the person was told to expect

In WZARH, a first reviewer told an asylum seeker she would hold a fresh re-hearing and make a recommendation. She then became unavailable.

A second reviewer took over. Without telling the asylum seeker, this reviewer relied on written material and a recording of the first interview, and rejected part of his account on credibility grounds. The High Court dismissed the Minister’s appeal.

The judges agreed on the outcome but gave different reasons. Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ asked whether it was unfair to rely only on some material and credibility impressions from it, without letting him be heard on that change. They said yes: an interview might have affected the credibility findings, and fairness required telling him of the change and hearing his views on it.

Gageler and Gordon JJ reasoned differently. They said the changed procedure altered what the opportunity meant: from persuading a known assessor to facing an unknown one. Fairness therefore required notice of the change, a chance to add to his written submissions, and a chance to ask for further oral evidence.

They added a qualification: if the process had always involved one officer interviewing and another deciding, denying a reasonable opportunity to be heard would have been harder to establish.

An issue raised late

In Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26, a self-represented applicant had his visa cancellation reviewed. At the start, the Tribunal told him the changes to the relevant direction were minor and mostly about crimes against women and children. It said his conviction history was “of minor relevance”.

In closing, the Minister’s solicitor relied on a new passage of the direction. That passage said violence against a woman is viewed very seriously, regardless of sentence. The Tribunal never told him this new issue had arisen, and gave him no chance to respond.

The primary judge found this was procedurally unfair, meaning the hearing process was unjust. This finding was not challenged in the Full Court. The High Court’s reasoning assumes the unfairness was established.

The applicant knew domestic violence allegations were relevant. But he was never told they would be assessed under this new passage. He had instead been told the changes barely mattered.

What follows from a denial

Finding a denial of procedural fairness is not the end of the matter. In Nathanson, the High Court said the applicant must also show the denial was material. This means showing a realistic possibility the outcome would have been different.

This standard is not hard to meet. It is enough to raise a reasonable conjecture about a different outcome. Where a tribunal denies a reasonable opportunity to present a case, the applicant need not show exactly how they would have used that opportunity. In Nathanson itself, the applicant did not have to prove what extra evidence or submissions he would have made.

A fuller explanation of materiality is in the separate article on jurisdictional error and materiality.

This materiality requirement does not apply to every error. In LPDT, six Justices of the High Court said some errors are jurisdictional regardless of their effect on the outcome. They gave apprehended or actual bias as an example of this kind of error.

Applying this in a problem question

Start by identifying the decision-maker and the statute involved. Check whether that statute has its own procedures that change the general law. VEAL shows this for the Migration Act as it then stood.

Next, work out what opportunity the person was actually given. Ask whether a reasonable decision-maker would have given more in the circumstances. That question, not whether the final decision was correct, is what matters (WZARH [53], [55]).

Then pin down the complaint. If adverse material was not shown to the person, ask whether its substance was put to them. Do not accept the decision-maker’s claim that it gave the material no weight. If the process changed, ask whether the person was told and allowed to respond. If an issue arose late, ask whether the person was told of its importance and given a chance to reply.

Do not frame the complaint as a disappointed expectation — meaning a mere hope, not a legal entitlement to a particular process.

If a denial of fair hearing is shown, deal with materiality separately — that is, whether the error actually affected the outcome. Then say whether the error is the kind LPDT treats as jurisdictional regardless of its effect, meaning it goes to whether the decision-maker had lawful power to decide at all.

A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail, including whole topics, to stay short. The full article is the complete statement.

Read the full article →

Pop quiz

5 quick questions on this article, the authorities it cites and the articles it links to.

  • About 3 minutes, and no time limit.
  • You can only go forwards: each answer locks when you submit it.
  • After each question you see the right answer, why, and where to read more.
  • Free, and no account needed. Log in or create a free account to keep your scores.