Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 72
A visa applicant’s review tribunal received a confidential letter accusing him, never mentioned it to him, and later wrote that it gave the letter no weight. What, if anything, was he owed before the decision?
What happened?
In June 2001 the appellant and his partner applied for protection visas, and in December 2001 a delegate of the Minister refused them. While the Refugee Review Tribunal was reviewing the refusals, the Department received an unsolicited letter about the appellant. It was not anonymous: it gave the author’s name and address. The author alleged that the appellant had admitted to being accused of killing a person prominent in Eritrean political affairs, and that he was a supporter of, and working for, the Eritrean government. The author advised the Department to keep the information secret ([1]-[2]).
The Department sent the letter to the Tribunal. The Tribunal did not tell the appellant that it had received the letter, that the allegations had been made, or ask him about them ([3]-[4]). It affirmed the refusals and wrote at the end of its reasons that it gave the letter “no weight”, adding that it was unable to test the claims in it ([5]). The appellant succeeded before the primary judge in the Federal Court, but the Full Court of the Federal Court allowed the Minister’s appeal by majority (Whitlam and Mansfield JJ; Gray J dissenting). The appellant appealed to the High Court by special leave ([6]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed the appeal with costs. It set aside the Full Court’s orders of 9 July 2004 and, in their place, ordered that the appeal to that Court be dismissed with costs ([30]). The reasons were a single joint judgment of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
In a single joint judgment (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ), the High Court held that, on the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in the form it took before the 2002 amendments that inserted s 422B, the Refugee Review Tribunal’s statutory duties were conditioned on observing procedural fairness, and the Act’s procedural provisions were not an exhaustive statement of what fairness might require ([10] and fn 7). Information adverse to a person must be put to them unless the decision-maker can dismiss it from further consideration, which it can do only if the information is evidently not credible, not relevant, or of little or no significance to the decision; that is decided before the final decision is reached and does not depend on how the decision-maker later characterises the information in its reasons ([17]).
A statement in the reasons that the information was given no weight therefore does not show that there was no obligation to disclose it and give an opportunity to respond, and whether the information may have subconsciously affected the decision is not the relevant inquiry, which is what procedures should have been followed ([18]-[19]). The allegations in the letter could not be dismissed in that way, so fairness required the Tribunal to tell the appellant at least the substance of what was said against him, even though the letter was given in confidence ([20]-[21], [27]).
It did not require the Tribunal to give him a copy of the letter, to tell him who wrote it, or even to tell him the information had arrived in writing ([29]). The Court declined to attempt to state all-encompassing rules about how decision-makers should deal with information supplied by informers ([25]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [17]–[18] (PDF p 11) (opens in a new tab), [19] (PDF p 12) (opens in a new tab)
The joint reasons state when information must be put to the affected person and hold that the decision-maker’s later statement of no weight, and any question of subconscious effect, do not answer that question. This is the ground on which the Full Court’s decision was reversed.
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [20] (PDF p 12) (opens in a new tab), [21] (PDF p 13) (opens in a new tab), [24] (PDF p 13) (opens in a new tab), [26]–[27] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab), [28]–[29] (PDF p 15) (opens in a new tab)
Applying that test to the letter, the joint reasons hold that the Tribunal had to tell the appellant the substance of the allegations but not give him the letter or name its author, accommodating the public interest in receiving information with the need to accord fairness. This fixes the content of the obligation on these facts and is necessary to the orders.
Obiter · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [25] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab)
The Court says that the public interest in informer information does not mean there is an absolute rule against disclosing it or the informer’s identity and declines to state all-encompassing rules; that general caution is not needed for the result, which rests on [26]-[29].
Why does this case matter?
Migration review problems are decided on the statute in force when the decision was made, and a student who recites a general principle of fairness without asking which version of the Migration Act governed describes the Act as it stood before the 2002 amendments, which may not be the Act that governs the decision in the problem. Examiners also look for whether the student asks what the statute itself provides before reaching for the common law.
Exam and application relevance
Use VEAL when a problem involves material adverse to an applicant that the decision-maker holds and has not disclosed, including where it came to the decision-maker in confidence. Work through the questions in order: what the material is, what the decision-maker could properly do with it at the stage it had reached, and what form of disclosure would give the person a fair opportunity to respond. Then set the answer against the Court’s treatment of the letter at [20]-[21], [27] and [29].
State the statutory limit in the Court’s terms. The Court decided the case on the Act as it stood before the 2002 amendments ([10] and fn 7), and it declined to state all-encompassing rules about informers ([25]).
The current Act is different. The provision the Court mentioned in footnote 7, s 422B, does not appear in the Act’s present table of contents. For reviews by the Administrative Review Tribunal, s 357A in Part 5 provides that the relevant provisions are taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to the matters they deal with. Check the provisions in force at the date of the decision under review.
Check your understanding
1. Which Justices gave reasons in VEAL, and was there any separate judgment?
2. Which provisions of the Act did the joint reasons say were not engaged, or whose preconditions were not met, and why ([12]-[13])?
3. What did the joint reasons say about the Tribunal’s statement that it gave the letter no weight ([14], [18])?
4. What did procedural fairness require the Tribunal to tell the appellant, and what did it not require ([21], [27], [29])?