A v Maughan

Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia · 2016

Administrative LawStatutory Bodies And Regulators

A v Maughan [2016] WASCA 128

A special constable who investigates for Western Australia’s anti-corruption commission signs notices charging a police officer with assaults the commission looked into. Did the commission’s Act let its officers bring those charges?

What happened?

The applicant, identified in the judgment only as A, was a police officer stationed at Broome in March and April 2013 ([4]). The Corruption and Crime Commission (WA) (the Commission) received a notification from WA Police about his conduct in connection with the arrest and detention of two people, B and C, and in April and May 2013 it began investigations into his possible misconduct under s 33(1)(a) of the Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003 (WA) (the Act) ([5]). He was summoned to a public examination before the Commission, and was examined on 11 June 2013, after the Commissioner rejected an application by his lawyers for the examination to be held in private ([10]-[11]). The transcripts of the public examinations were posted on the Commission’s website on 14 June 2013 ([13]).

Ms Susan Baker was the Commission’s Principal Investigator and an authorised officer under s 184 of the Act ([6]). On 6 May 2013 the Commissioner of Police appointed her a special constable under s 35 of the Police Act 1892 (WA), and senior counsel for Ms Baker and the Commission accepted that the condition imposed on her appointment meant that she could use those powers only for the purposes of investigations or operations lawfully undertaken by the Commission ([6]-[8]). She took responsibility for the investigation of the applicant in March 2014, and on 17 April 2014 she signed two prosecution notices ([15]).

One alleged an unlawful assault on B at Broome on 29 March 2013, contrary to s 313(1) of the Criminal Code (WA), and the other alleged an assault on C at Broome on 19 April 2013 causing bodily harm, contrary to s 317(1) ([1], [15]). The notices were lodged at the Kalgoorlie Magistrates Court on 5 May 2014 ([15]). Ms Baker deposed, and the Chief Justice saw no reason to doubt, that all evidence relevant to the prosecution of the applicant was obtained before the Commission’s examinations, other than evidence relating to continuity of exhibits and other evidence, and that no evidence to be adduced in support of the prosecution was derived from the examinations, although copies of the transcripts were included in the prosecution brief served on the applicant ([16]).

On 27 August 2014 the applicant applied under s 76 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) for orders permanently staying each charge, and on 28 November 2014 Magistrate Maughan dismissed the applications ([18]). The applicant then sought a review under s 36 of the Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA), a judge of the General Division granted a review order, and the order was referred to the Court of Appeal for determination ([19], [21]). The Chief Justice described the jurisdiction as judicial review, so that the question was not whether the magistrate had erred ([20]). He identified two issues: whether the Commission’s possession of the transcript of the applicant’s public examination made the prosecution an abuse of process, and whether the Magistrates Court lacked jurisdiction because Ms Baker had no lawful authority to issue the prosecution notices ([22]).

What did the Court decide?

The Court of Appeal (Martin CJ, McLure P and Corboy J) determined the application for review at first instance on the referral ([21]), after a hearing on 17 December 2015, and delivered its decision on 15 July 2016. It granted the application in part. It quashed the prosecution notices issued by Ms Baker and the proceedings commenced in the Magistrates Court, without prejudice to the capacity of some other person with appropriate authority to commence similar proceedings. It dismissed the application for a stay of proceedings on the ground of abuse of process, and it dismissed the application by the Commission and Ms Baker to set aside the suppression orders ([151], [195]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Martin CJ, with whose reasons on authority to prosecute McLure P agreed “generally” ([152]) and Corboy J agreed ([166]), began with s 20(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), under which a prosecution may be commenced “by, and only by” the persons it lists, who include a police officer and an employee of a public authority, each acting in the course of his or her duties ([103]-[104]). Ms Baker was both an employee of the Commission and a special constable whose powers could be used only for the Commission’s investigations or operations ([8], [105]), so her authority depended on whether the Commission’s functions included prosecuting the applicant for offences against the Criminal Code (WA) ([105], [107]).

The Commission’s functions are those conferred by the Act or another written law (s 16), and the only one relevant was the misconduct function in s 18 ([111], [134]). The Chief Justice held that s 18 describes that function in specific detail but makes no reference to the Commission prosecuting offences, that the steps it lists are generally anterior to the commencement of a prosecution ([115]-[117]), and that s 18(2)(h), the paragraph that does refer to prosecutions, limits the Commission to assembling evidence and furnishing it to an independent agency or another authority ([118]-[119]).

He treated s 43, which lets the Commission recommend whether consideration should be given to the prosecution of particular persons ([123]-[124]), and s 152(4), which allows disclosure of official information “for the purposes of a prosecution” ([125]-[126]), as consistent with that reading. He rejected the Commission’s arguments that the “appropriate way” language of s 18(1) is wide enough to include prosecution ([120]), that the omission is explained by the enactment of s 18 before the Criminal Procedure Act ([121]-[122]), that s 25(6), which reserves one offence to the Director of Public Prosecutions, implies a general power ([129]-[130]), and that the risk of conflicts of interest in police investigating police supports a power to prosecute ([131]-[132]).

He concluded that the function of prosecuting offences arising from the Commission’s investigations “which have no other connection with the Commission or the administration of the Act” is not within s 18 ([134]). Ms Baker therefore was not acting in the course of her duties when she signed the notices, was not authorised by s 20(3), and the proceedings were invalid and were to be quashed ([135]). McLure P recorded that Ms Baker and the Commission conceded that, if she lacked authority, the notices were invalid and a valid notice is an essential preliminary to the court’s jurisdiction to hear the charges ([152]), and Corboy J agreed ([167]).

Corboy J added his own statement that he did not consider that the Commission has power to prosecute a person, “at least where the offence alleged is under a statute other than the CCC Act” ([189]). The Chief Justice said that whether Commission officers have authority to commence proceedings for offences related to the administration and enforcement of the legislation establishing the Commission did not arise and should await a case in which it does ([2], note 3; compare [120]).

On the second issue, whether the Commission’s possession of the transcript of the applicant’s compulsory public examination made the prosecution an abuse of process, Martin CJ held that it did not. He said that the answer to whether prosecution access to the transcript altered the criminal trial process in a fundamental respect was provided by the plurality in R v Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commissioner [2016] HCA 8, which confined Lee v The Queen (No 2) to a case where compulsorily acquired material was furnished to the prosecution in contravention of the statute authorising its acquisition, and that the Court of Appeal was bound to follow that reasoning ([63]-[64]).

No proceedings had been commenced when the applicant was examined, and there was no suggestion that the transcript had been given to the prosecutor in contravention of an order, direction or express provision, so neither the “fundamental principle” nor the “companion principle” was engaged ([65]). He said that it was of the utmost significance that the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions had conceded the derogation in R v OC, and that the contrary approach in that case had been overtaken by R v IBAC ([67]-[68]).

He treated that conclusion as sufficient to dispose of the contention ([69]). “For the sake of completeness”, he added that, if a contrary conclusion were assumed, the Act authorised prosecution access to the transcript by necessary implication, relying on s 145(2), s 18(2)(h), s 43(5) and s 152(4) ([69], [87]-[101]), and he concluded that the stay application on the ground of abuse of process must be dismissed ([102], [151]). McLure P said that this ground was misconceived because it assumed that the Commission could lawfully commence and prosecute the charges; she reasoned that if it could, the Act authorised it to possess and use the compulsorily acquired information, and she said that the Court was not called upon to decide whether the information could lawfully be given to an external prosecuting authority ([153], [164]-[165]).

Corboy J concluded that the Commission may compulsorily examine a person suspected of an offence who has not been charged, may possess and use the transcript for further investigation, and may furnish it to the Director of Public Prosecutions or another prosecuting authority, which may receive and use it, subject to s 145 ([189]-[190]); he made no finding about the Commission’s powers in relation to a person who has been charged ([194]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Martin CJ (McLure P agreeing generally and Corboy J agreeing)

Read judgment: [103]–[107] (opens in a new tab), [111]–[135] (opens in a new tab), [152] (opens in a new tab), [166] (opens in a new tab)

The order quashing the prosecution notices rests on the conclusion that the Commission’s functions did not include prosecuting the offences charged, so that Ms Baker was not acting in the course of her duties and lacked authority under s 20(3) ([134]-[135]). McLure P agreed generally for the Chief Justice’s reasons ([152]) and Corboy J agreed for his reasons ([166]).

Separate reasoning · Corboy J

Read judgment: [189] (opens in a new tab), [192] (opens in a new tab)

Corboy J agreed that Ms Baker was not authorised to prosecute “for the reasons given by the Chief Justice” ([166]), and that agreement is the ratio recorded above. This separate entry covers only his additional statement, made in his own reasons on the use of compulsorily acquired evidence, that he does not consider that the Commission has power to prosecute a person, at least where the offence alleged is under a statute other than the CCC Act ([189]); that formulation carries its own limit.

Classification unresolved · Martin CJ

Read judgment: [2] (opens in a new tab), [120] (opens in a new tab), [134] (opens in a new tab)

The Chief Justice said that whether Commission officers have authority to commence proceedings for offences related to the administration and enforcement of the establishing legislation does not arise and should await a case in which it does (note 3 to [2]), and at [120] left room for prosecution action necessary for the proper administration and enforcement of the Act. The holding is therefore limited to offences with no other connection with the Commission or the administration of the Act ([134]).

Proposition 2

Ratio · Martin CJ, with McLure P and Corboy J relying on R v IBAC in a similar way

Read judgment: [63]–[69] (opens in a new tab), [163] (opens in a new tab), [169]–[170] (opens in a new tab)

The Chief Justice treated the application of R v IBAC as sufficient to dispose of the abuse of process contention ([69]). McLure P said that the onus and companion principles have no application to the compulsory examination of suspects ([163]) and Corboy J that the companion principle is not engaged when the examinee has not been charged ([169]-[170]); they reached the same result on this ground by their own reasons.

Obiter · Martin CJ

Read judgment: [69] (opens in a new tab), [87]–[102] (opens in a new tab)

The Chief Justice addressed the construction of the Act “for the sake of completeness” and on the assumption that a contrary conclusion on the first question had been reached ([69]); having found the first conclusion sufficient, this alternative reasoning was not necessary to the result.

Separate reasoning · McLure P

Read judgment: [153]–[165] (opens in a new tab)

McLure P agreed with the orders ([152]) and held the ground misconceived, reasoning conditionally on the Commission’s power to prosecute ([164]) and leaving open the position of an external prosecuting authority ([165]). That route is different from the Chief Justice’s.

Separate reasoning · Corboy J

Read judgment: [168]–[194] (opens in a new tab)

Corboy J concurred in the result and gave his own construction of the Act ([189]-[191]), expressly making no finding about a charged person ([194]).

Why does this case matter?

Questions about integrity bodies often move from the investigation to the prosecution without asking which statute authorises each step, or whose authority is in issue when a prosecution notice is signed. A person charged after a compulsory examination may also have two quite different complaints, one about the fairness of the process and one about the standing of the person who began it, and the Court dealt with them on separate footings. A good answer keeps them apart in the same way.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem about an investigative commission and a later prosecution, identify who started the prosecution, in what capacity, and under which statute that capacity is said to give authority to do so. Separately identify any complaint about the use of compulsorily obtained material. Attribute each step to the judge who took it, with the paragraph, and say where a judge agreed generally or added a statement of his or her own. Distinguish what the Court needed to decide from what it reserved or said for completeness (note 3 to [2]; [69]; [165]; [194]).

This is a decision of the Court of Appeal of Western Australia, so it is authority within the Western Australian courts and persuasive elsewhere. The Chief Justice analysed the Act as it stood when the notices were issued ([111], [113]). The judgment records that the Act was renamed the Corruption, Crime and Misconduct Act 2003 (WA) from 1 July 2015 (note 4 to [5]) and that it had been amended after the applicant’s examination (note 14 to [25]), and a problem set today needs the current text of the Act and of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), which are not stated here. Another jurisdiction’s integrity body is governed by its own statute.

Check your understanding

1. What positions did Ms Baker hold, and what limit applied to the use of her powers as a special constable ([6]-[8])?

2. What did the two prosecution notices allege, and on what date did Ms Baker sign them ([15])?

3. What two issues did the application for review raise ([22])?

4. What did s 20(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) say about who may commence a prosecution, and on what did the Chief Justice say Ms Baker’s authority to sign the notices turned ([103]-[105])?

5. Which section of the Act did the Chief Justice identify as the only function relevant to authority to prosecute, and what did he say about its paragraph (h) ([118]-[119], [134])?

6. Which arguments for the Commission did the Chief Justice reject at [120]-[122] and [129]-[132]?

7. How did McLure P and Corboy J each express their agreement with the Chief Justice on authority to prosecute, and what did Corboy J say at [189] ([152], [166], [189])?

8. On abuse of process, what did the Chief Justice treat as sufficient to dispose of the contention, and what did he add for the sake of completeness ([69])?

9. What did McLure P say the Court was not called upon to decide, and what did Corboy J say he had made no finding about ([165], [194])?