PRS v Crime and Corruption Commission

Supreme Court of Queensland · 2019

Administrative LawStatutory Bodies And Regulators

PRS v Crime and Corruption Commission [2019] QSC 83

Queensland’s corruption body has finished examining a man, and a seconded police officer is about to charge him with official corruption. Can the Supreme Court stop the charge by making orders against the corruption body?

What happened?

The Crime and Corruption Commission (Qld) (the Commission) investigated alleged corrupt conduct by a person, AB, who held an appointment in a unit of public administration, and the investigation concerned, among other things, dealings between AB and the applicant, identified in the judgment as PRS ([1]). In the course of the investigation the Commission used its coercive powers, including compulsory examination of the applicant ([2], [7]). The investigation of AB was at an advanced stage if not completed, and AB and others had been charged with criminal offences ([7]).

A police officer swore that he had formed a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence of official corruption and intended to charge the applicant by issuing a notice to appear, and had not done so only because the applicant’s proceeding had not been resolved; no further investigation of the applicant was planned and the investigation of him was completed ([8]).

The applicant applied under s 332 of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld) for injunctive relief against the Commission, by an originating application ([1]-[2]). By his amended application and points of claim he sought, among other things, orders restraining the Commission from proceeding further in the prosecution of any charges against him, restraining the Commission’s chairman from chairing a corruption hearing, directing the Commission to instruct seconded police officers not to charge him or refer his matter to other officers for that purpose, and requiring the Commission to close the investigation or conduct it fairly ([4]).

He alleged that the Commission had no jurisdiction to charge a person with corruption offences, and that the investigation had been conducted unfairly, with apprehended and actual bias ([5]). Davis J grouped the relief into orders that would regulate or stop the investigation and orders that would prevent the applicant’s prosecution from being commenced ([19]). The Commission offered an undertaking to the Court not to have the applicant charged before the proceedings were concluded ([51]).

What did the Court decide?

Davis J, sitting in the Trial Division of the Supreme Court of Queensland, heard the application on 21 March 2019 and delivered judgment ex tempore the same day. He dismissed the application, and ordered that the parties be heard on costs and on the release of the undertaking ([67]). Before the hearing he had refused an application for disclosure on 22 February 2019 and directed the applicant to file an amended application and points of claim ([3], [66]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Davis J, on an application under s 332 of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld) to regulate or stop the Commission’s investigation, held that ss 332 and 334 assume a current investigation, that s 332 “does not contemplate a review of the past exercise of powers where no further exercise of the powers is contemplated”, and that the Act’s policy of judicial regulation attaches to the exercise of invasive investigative powers ([24]-[26]). He followed Le Grand v Criminal Justice Commission, where the Court of Appeal held that the equivalent provision of the earlier Act regulated an investigation being conducted and not one that had concluded ([26]-[27]).

The investigation of the applicant was complete on a police officer’s uncontested evidence ([8], [28]), and the applicant was really seeking a review of a completed investigation, its reopening and orders for the conduct of the reopened investigation, which s 332 does not authorise ([27]). He rejected the submission that the Commission was still “dealing with” the complaint within s 35 and the dictionary definition, so that s 332 continued to operate ([28]-[30]). He said that the Court may have jurisdiction to regulate the exercise of the Commission’s statutory powers independently of s 332, citing Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission and Annetts v McCann, but that all such relief is discretionary ([31]-[32]).

Discretionary considerations pointed inevitably towards refusal: no further exercise of coercive investigative powers against the applicant was contemplated, and a court exercising criminal jurisdiction, once the applicant was charged, could exclude improperly obtained evidence and regulate the prosecution, to the point of a permanent stay if necessary ([33]). Any effect of the conduct of the investigation on the criminal proceedings was a matter for the court in which those proceedings were brought, and he considered it undesirable to review the applicant’s complaints or express views on them ([20], [34]).

On appeal, Morrison JA held that the evidence gave a solid foundation for the finding that the investigation of the applicant had been completed before the application was filed on 6 September 2018, and that ss 332 and 334 depend on an ongoing investigation, as counsel for the appellant accepted ([44], [46]). Bradley J agreed with Morrison JA’s reasons on grounds 1 to 5 ([113]), and McMurdo JA agreed with his reasons on the grounds other than 6 to 11 ([112]).

As to the orders sought to prevent the applicant’s prosecution, Davis J said that the applicant’s submissions assumed that the Commission would charge him by directing a police officer to do so, and misunderstood both the Act and the legislation governing criminal procedure ([35]). He said that s 49 contemplates that action on a report is taken by the person to whom the Commission reports and not by the Commission ([36]-[37]), and that s 50 does not concern criminal prosecution but empowers the Commission to bring disciplinary proceedings in QCAT against a “prescribed person”, a definition that does not include the applicant ([38]-[39]).

He accepted, as the applicant seemed to submit, that nothing in ss 49 to 51 or other provisions of the Act authorises the Commission to charge the applicant with an offence of corruption, but said it was not contemplated that the Commission would charge him; what was contemplated was that a police officer would ([40]). Davis J outlined commencement by arrest, by complaint and summons, or by notice to appear ([41]-[47]). The contemplated notice to appear depended on the requisite reasonable suspicion.

A police officer seconded to the Commission under s 255 is subject to its direction and control, but continues to be a police officer with the functions and powers of one and retains the responsibility for exercising those powers lawfully; the Commission cannot direct a seconded officer to act unlawfully, and if the officer forms the requisite suspicion it is the officer, not the Commission, who charges ([48]-[52]). Whether the Commission can lawfully direct officers not to exercise powers vested in them by the legislature did not need to be determined because there were overwhelming discretionary reasons for not making the orders ([53]).

He added that the executive decides who is to be prosecuted and decisions to prosecute are generally not reviewable, while a court, once the criminal process has been commenced, can stay a proceeding or make other orders to prevent an abuse of its process ([58]-[61]). He rejected the submission that the Act did not contemplate giving investigative material to a police officer who might then charge ([62]-[64]), said that an inquiry at this stage into whether the officer held a reasonable suspicion of guilt was not warranted ([54]-[57]), and held that s 332 concerns the regulation of investigations and not prosecutions, and that to the extent that the Court otherwise has jurisdiction to make such orders he would, for the reasons given, refuse them as a matter of discretion ([65]).

On appeal, Morrison JA held that there was no evidence that the seconded officer had taken coercively obtained material into account in forming his suspicion, that a seconded officer retains his or her police powers under ss 174(2) and 255(5), and that, while the Commission cannot direct an officer to issue a notice to appear without the requisite suspicion, an officer who issues one is the person who charges, not the Commission ([67], [78]-[82]). McMurdo JA said that the arguments overlooked the distinction between the Commission and a police officer, that the applicant had been charged on 7 April 2019 by the officer and not by the Commission ([58], [111]), and that the appellant’s arguments, if they had any merit, were for another day, in a case to which the prosecutor is a party ([111]). Bradley J agreed with Morrison JA’s conclusions on the factual evidence on grounds 6 to 11 and with McMurdo JA’s reasons on those grounds ([113]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Davis J

Read judgment: [24]–[30] (opens in a new tab), [33]–[34] (opens in a new tab)

Davis J refused relief against the investigation because s 332 assumes a current investigation and there was none ([30]), and because discretionary considerations pointed inevitably towards refusal in any event ([33]); he concluded that there was no basis, under s 332 or otherwise, to grant injunctive relief about the exercise of the investigative powers ([34]). Each ground was stated as a reason for the dismissal of that part of the application.

Ratio · Morrison JA (Bradley J agreeing on grounds 1 to 5; McMurdo JA agreeing on the grounds other than 6 to 11)

Read judgment: [38]–[47] (opens in a new tab)

On the appeal, the dismissal of grounds 3 to 5 rested on Morrison JA’s conclusions that the investigation was complete before the application was filed and that ss 332 and 334 depend on an ongoing investigation ([44], [46]-[47]); Bradley J agreed with his reasons on grounds 1 to 5 ([113]) and McMurdo JA with his reasons on the other grounds ([112]).

Classification unresolved · Davis J

Read judgment: [31]–[32] (opens in a new tab)

Davis J said only that the Court “may have jurisdiction” to regulate the exercise of the Commission’s statutory powers independently of s 332 ([31]); he did not decide the point, because relief would in any case be refused as a matter of discretion ([33]).

Proposition 2

Ratio · Davis J

Read judgment: [41]–[52] (opens in a new tab), [58]–[61] (opens in a new tab), [64]–[65] (opens in a new tab)

The refusal of orders to prevent the prosecution rests on the seconded officer’s own police powers and responsibility to form a reasonable suspicion ([48]-[52]), on the executive’s responsibility for prosecution decisions and the criminal court’s power to prevent abuse ([58]-[61]), and on the conclusions that s 332 does not reach prosecutions and that any other jurisdiction would not be exercised ([65]).

Ratio · Morrison JA (Bradley J agreeing on the factual evidence)

Read judgment: [66]–[67] (opens in a new tab), [78]–[82] (opens in a new tab)

On the appeal, Morrison JA rejected grounds 6 to 11 because there was no evidence that the seconded officer had taken coercively obtained material into account ([67], [82]) and because a seconded officer retains police powers and it is the officer, not the Commission, who charges ([78]-[81]). Bradley J agreed with his conclusions on the factual evidence for those grounds but adopted McMurdo JA’s reasons on them ([113]).

Separate reasoning · McMurdo JA (Bradley J agreeing on grounds 6 to 11)

Read judgment: [108]–[111] (opens in a new tab), [113] (opens in a new tab)

McMurdo JA agreed that the appeal should be dismissed ([112]) but on grounds 6 to 11 gave his own short reasons: the arguments overlooked the distinction between the Commission and a police officer, the charge having been made by the officer, and the appellant’s arguments were for another day in a case to which the prosecutor is a party ([109]-[111]). Bradley J agreed with those reasons on grounds 6 to 11 ([113]).

Classification unresolved · Davis J

Read judgment: [37]–[40] (opens in a new tab), [53] (opens in a new tab)

Davis J’s observations that s 49 contemplates action by the recipient of a report, that s 50 concerns disciplinary proceedings and that nothing in ss 49-51 authorises the Commission to charge the applicant ([37]-[40]) are reasoning about the Act’s text, but he left undetermined whether the Commission can lawfully direct seconded officers not to exercise their powers ([53]) and dismissed the application on other grounds. Whether the Commission can ever prosecute a criminal offence was not decided as a general proposition.

Why does this case matter?

Applications against an integrity body often bundle together an attack on how it investigated, an attack on how it conducted hearings, and an attempt to control what happens next to the person investigated. A good answer sorts them by target and asks, for each, what remedy a statute or the court’s general jurisdiction provides, from which court and at what stage.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem about a challenge to an integrity body, separate any complaint about the exercise of investigative powers from any attempt to stop or shape a prosecution. For each, identify the provision or jurisdiction relied on, whether the investigation is still current, and which person holds the power that the applicant wants restrained. Attribute each statement to Davis J with the paragraph, and distinguish what he decided from what he said he did not need to determine or declined to comment on ([20], [31], [34], [53]).

This is an ex tempore decision of a single judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland at first instance, so it does not bind other judges of that Court and is persuasive elsewhere. It deals with the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld) and the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) as the judgment sets them out in March 2019. The decision concerned the position before the Act was amended by an Act of 2024 (2024 No 41), which inserted ss 49A to 49C.

For a corruption offence arising from a corruption investigation, the current text requires the Commission, before it reports to a prosecuting authority (a term that includes a seconded police officer) for consideration of whether to commence a prosecution, to report to the Director of Public Prosecutions and seek written advice (s 49B(1)-(2)). Despite ss 174(2) and 255, the prosecuting authority may then commence a prosecution only if the Director has advised in writing that the person should be prosecuted for the offence, subject to s 49C, which permits commencement in exceptional circumstances with the report and advice sought afterwards (s 49B(5); s 49C).

That text applies to corruption offences arising from a corruption investigation only. For present-day problems, consult the current Act and distinguish corruption investigations from the Commission’s other functions. An appeal from this decision was dismissed with costs by the Court of Appeal on 19 November 2019 (PRS v Crime and Corruption Commission [2019] QCA 255, [107]). The Western Australian Court of Appeal considered a different Act in A v Maughan [2016] WASCA 128, and each integrity body is governed by its own statute.

Check your understanding

1. What did the police officer swear, and why had he not yet issued a notice to appear ([8])?

2. Into what two categories did Davis J group the relief the applicant sought ([19])?

3. What does s 332(1) allow a person who makes a claim of the kinds it describes to apply for, and what two things does s 334(1) allow a judge to do ([16], [25])?

4. Which earlier case did Davis J compare with s 332, and what had the Court of Appeal held about the provision in that case ([26]-[27])?

5. What argument did the applicant’s solicitor base on s 35 and the definition of “deal with”, and how did Davis J answer it ([28]-[30])?

6. What did Davis J say about s 50 and the meaning of “prescribed person” ([38]-[39])?

7. What did Davis J say about the position of a police officer seconded to the Commission under s 255, and who would charge the applicant ([48]-[53])?

8. What did Davis J say at [53] that he did not need to determine, and why?