McNab Constructions Australia Pty Ltd v Queensland Building Services Authority
McNab Constructions Australia Pty Ltd v Queensland Building Services Authority [2010] QCA 380
A building authority directs a construction manager, who managed and supervised the project but did not build or design it, to repair defects. Does a direction power addressed to the builder of the work extend to a manager like that?
What happened?
McNab Constructions Australia Pty Ltd (McNab Constructions), a licensed builder, carried out the construction management of the W4 apartments in Skyring Terrace, Teneriffe, under a contract with the principal, Advanced Traders Pty Ltd, which required it to carry out and complete its construction services “free from any defect or omission” (McMurdo P at [1]). The apartments were built by separate trade contractors, each engaged by the principal, and the building was accepted as practically complete on 30 November 2006; the contract between McNab Constructions and the principal was terminated on or about 29 November 2007 (Chesterman JA at [28]). McNab Constructions did not erect or construct the apartments or prepare plans or specifications for them; its role under the contract was to coordinate aspects of construction, monitor progress, check quality, administer the individual trade contracts and report to the principal ([57]).
Between 3 October 2007 and 15 January 2009 the Queensland Building Services Authority (QBSA) issued 15 directions to McNab Constructions under s 72 of the Queensland Building Services Authority Act 1991 (Qld) to rectify building work in the apartments ([1]). The first direction was issued before amendments to s 72 and other provisions took effect on 21 December 2007, and the other 14 afterwards ([1]). McNab Constructions applied to the Commercial and Consumer Tribunal to review all 15 ([1]). Section 72(1), as it stood before the amendments, allowed the authority, if of the opinion that building work was defective or incomplete, to direct the person who carried out the building work to rectify it, and s 72(5) and (11) said who was taken to be such a person ([7]).
On a preliminary question of law the Tribunal concluded that it was open to QBSA before the amendments to direct McNab Constructions to rectify ([2]). A District Court judge granted leave to appeal and concluded that McNab Constructions was not a person who carried out the building work when the first direction was given, but that the effect of the amendments was that the other 14 directions could be lawfully given ([3]). Both sides sought leave to appeal or cross-appeal to the Court of Appeal ([3]).
What did the Court decide?
The Court of Appeal of Queensland (McMurdo P, Holmes JA and Chesterman JA) heard the application on 6 September 2010 and delivered its decision on 23 December 2010, each member giving separate reasons. The Court granted leave to appeal and to cross-appeal. By majority, it dismissed the appeal, allowed the cross-appeal and set aside the orders of the District Court, and remitted the matter to the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal for hearing in accordance with its reasons, with McNab Constructions to pay the QBSA’s costs of the appeal, the cross-appeal and the District Court proceeding ([17], [27]). Chesterman JA dissented ([133]). The merits of McNab Constructions’ review applications remained to be determined ([16]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
McMurdo P, who agreed with Holmes JA’s reasons ([16]), said that the appeal could be disposed of on the first point raised in the cross-appeal: McNab Constructions was, both before and after the 2007 amendments, “the person who carried out the building work” under s 72 ([4]). It was common ground that the definition of building work in the Act’s dictionary did not in terms encompass McNab Constructions’ work under its contract ([8]). McNab Constructions argued that s 72 should be read as s 42(2)(b) had been read in Puerto Galera Pty Ltd v JM Kelly (Project Builders) Pty Ltd, where Chesterman J held that the services listed in s 42(2)(b) counted only when provided by someone erecting or designing the structure ([9]-[11]).
McMurdo P found it unnecessary to express a view on the correctness of the narrow construction in Puerto Galera, because she did not consider that the construction of “building work” in s 42 informs its construction in s 72, which has “a very different purpose” from s 42, a licensing provision ([12]). She applied s 14A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) and the ordinary meaning of s 72, saying that the dictionary definition was “specifically and unequivocally widened by the plain language of s 72(5)(c) and (d) and s 72(11)”, that s 72(11)(b) operates independently of s 72(11)(a) despite the “and” at the end of the latter, and that the work McNab Constructions performed was therefore building work within s 72(5)(d) as explained in s 72(11) ([13]).
She said that the construction did not give an impossibly wide meaning, because the widened meaning applies only for s 72(5)(c) and (d) and because the services must be “for the work”, which “requires that there is some real and substantial connection between the carrying out of the building work of the type defined in the dictionary to sch 2 of the QBSA Act, and the services provided under s 72(11)(b)” ([14]). She considered it unnecessary to resort to the explanatory notes to the 2007 Bill, though if they were considered they supported her construction ([15]).
Her conclusion was that QBSA was able to give all 15 directions under s 72 as it stood before the 2007 amendments, which disposed of the cross-appeal and the appeal ([16]). Holmes JA held that McNab Constructions was a person who carried out building work within s 72 as it stood when the building contract was entered, because for reward it provided services for the work that fell within s 72(11)(b) ([18]). She disagreed with the premise that s 72 is not relevantly distinguishable from s 42: s 42 is concerned with the consequences of performing building work unlicensed and the ambit of its offence depends directly on the width of “carry out building work”, whereas s 72 is concerned with the rectification of defects by licensed or unlicensed persons and its only offence is non-compliance with a direction ([20]); a person who is not a licensed or building contractor is caught by s 72 only if the work was carried out “for profit or reward” ([21]).
Limiting the class in s 72(11)(b) to those who also erect or design the building would, in her view, render that subsection otiose, because a person erecting or designing the building is by definition already a person carrying out building work ([23]). The subsection does not capture all who provide such services to builders; it is limited to services provided for the building work, a connection that must be established, and here the work was the provision over some two years of supervisory, management and administration activities performed directly for the purpose of having the building constructed ([24]).
She noted that one of the Act’s objects is to provide remedies for defective building work, that hardship from the wider construction is answered by s 72(2), which requires the authority to take account of all reasonably relevant circumstances, and by s 72(14), which relieves it of giving a direction if it would be unfair, and that the 2007 amendments did not compel the conclusion that construction managers had not previously been within s 72 ([25]-[26]). Neither McMurdo P’s nor Holmes JA’s reasons discuss whether the 2007 amendments could operate retrospectively; each decided the matter on s 72 as it stood before them.
Chesterman JA, dissenting, held that McNab Constructions was not a person to whom QBSA could address directions to rectify, and would have set aside all 15 decisions to direct rectification ([132]-[133]). He accepted that the services McNab Constructions provided could properly be regarded as administration, management or supervisory services as those terms appeared in s 72(11)(b), but said that the question was whether they were provided “for the work” ([57], [61]). He treated s 42 and s 72 as “relevantly indistinguishable” in the language at issue and applied the reasoning in Puerto Galera, his own decision as a judge of the Trial Division: services are provided “for the work” if they were ancillary to building work (construction or designing) and were provided by the person during that building work ([64]-[67]).
He said that QBSA’s reading “operates so widely as to make persons with a peripheral connection to building work liable for making good the defects of others” ([66]) and that the argument that the authority’s discretion in s 72(14) answers the objection “misses the point”, because “What is in question is not how a power might be exercised, but whether the power exists” ([72]-[73]). He added that the 2007 amendments, which created the concept of a construction manager deemed by s 72(5)(f) to carry out building work, together with new supervision obligations and licences, were unnecessary if s 72(11)(b) had already reached anyone providing such services, and so pointed to the conclusion that before them the provision of those services by someone other than the builder did not make the provider the person who carried out the building work ([75]-[81]).
He then considered the cross-appeal’s second point, whether the power should be decided by the Act as it was when the Tribunal decided, and held that a rehearing on “the law as it then exists” is not a power to apply statutes retrospectively unless their terms require it or they are procedural ([82]-[92]). He distinguished R v His Honour Judge Given; Ex parte Builders’ Registration Board of Queensland, said that the authority of Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd v Beneficial Finance Corporation Ltd was called into question by its failure to recognise the differences, and concluded that Baulderstone Hornibrook should be regarded as wrongly decided ([97]-[111], [131]-[132]).
Because McNab Constructions did not provide building work services on any day after 21 December 2007, treating it as a person who carried out building work could only be by retrospectively giving its activities in 2005-2006 a character and consequence that they did not have until the amendment, which the presumption against retrospective operation opposed and nothing in s 72(5)(f) overcame ([126]-[132]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · McMurdo P and Holmes JA (separate reasons; McMurdo P agreeing with Holmes JA’s reasons)
Read judgment: [4]–[16] (opens in a new tab), [18]–[27] (opens in a new tab)
The orders allowing the cross-appeal and dismissing the appeal rest on the conclusion of McMurdo P and Holmes JA that McNab Constructions was a person who carried out the building work under s 72 as it stood before the 2007 amendments ([4], [16], [18], [27]).
Proposition 2
Separate reasoning · Chesterman JA (dissenting)
Read judgment: [57]–[133] (opens in a new tab)
Chesterman JA dissented from the orders: he would have allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal ([133]). His reasons are a different route to a different result and are not the decision of the Court.
Why does this case matter?
Use this case to compare how statutory purpose and the consequences of competing constructions influence interpretation, while keeping the majority’s reasoning distinct from the dissent.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem about a statutory power to direct someone to rectify building work, begin with the text of the Act in the form in force when the work was done and when the direction was given, because the Court construed s 72 as it stood before 21 December 2007. Identify what the person actually did in relation to the work under its contract, set that against the words of the section, and cite the paragraph and Justice for each step.
This is a decision of the Court of Appeal of Queensland. It binds courts below it in that State and is persuasive elsewhere in Australia. It concerns provisions of the Queensland Building Services Authority Act 1991 (Qld) as they stood before the 2007 amendments, and that Act has since been amended and is now titled the Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld), so a modern problem must start from the current text of the Act and from later decisions.
Check your understanding
1. What was McNab Constructions’ role in relation to the apartments, and what did it not do ([1], [28], [57])?
2. How many directions did QBSA give, between what dates, and when did the amendments to s 72 take effect ([1])?
3. What did the District Court judge conclude about the first direction and about the other 14 ([3])?
4. What did s 42(2)(b) provide, and what did Chesterman J decide about it in Puerto Galera, as McMurdo P and Chesterman JA describe it ([6], [11], [65]-[66])?
5. In what respects did Holmes JA say s 42 and s 72 differ ([20]-[21])?
6. What orders did the Court make, which Justices were in the majority, and who dissented ([17], [27], [133])?
7. What did Chesterman JA say about the presumption against retrospective operation and the facts of McNab Constructions’ contract ([126]-[129])?