Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Baxter Healthcare Pty Limited

High Court of Australia · 2007

Administrative LawStatutory Interpretation

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Baxter Healthcare Pty Limited [2007] HCA 38

Five governments bought hospital fluids from one supplier under long-term exclusive contracts. The governments were not carrying on a business, and the supplier said the competition statute could not touch its dealings with them.

Affirmed by Mayfield Development Corporation Pty Ltd v NSW Port Operations Hold Co Pty Ltd [2026] HCA 12

In Mayfield the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal in which the State of New South Wales’s competition-law protection was said to extend to private companies dealing with it. Gageler CJ held that the principle of construction identified in Baxter continues to govern Part IV of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (the renamed Trade Practices Act) ([15]-[16]). Gordon, Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ said that no one challenged the correctness of Baxter’s outcome or reasoning and applied it ([93]). Edelman J described the same approach in Baxter ([124]-[125]) and said, as a separate observation, that the time may come to consider whether the remaining operation of the presumptions of Crown immunity should be abolished, at least prospectively ([117]).

What happened?

Baxter Healthcare Pty Limited, an Australian company, made and supplied sterile fluids used in hospitals, together with peritoneal dialysis products. Between 1998 and 2001 it had the only Australian manufacturing plant for two kinds of those fluids and sold about 90 per cent of the dialysis products ([5], [7]-[8]). In the same period it made five long-term contracts to supply them to the purchasing authorities of Western Australia, South Australia, New South Wales, Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory ([9]). Four followed formal requests for tender, to which Baxter responded with item-by-item prices and with substantially lower prices on a sole supply basis; the Australian Capital Territory adopted the terms on which Baxter had contracted with New South Wales ([10]).

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission sued Baxter under ss 46 and 47 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), seeking declarations, pecuniary penalties and injunctions ([26]). Section 2B provided that those provisions bound the Crown in right of a State or Territory so far as it carried on a business, and it was conceded that the authorities’ purchases were not in the course of carrying on a business ([1], [16]). Allsop J found that, but for what had been called derivative immunity, Baxter’s conduct would have contravened s 46 in one respect (an offer to South Australia known as Offer 1A) and s 47 in a number of respects (the bundling of tenders).

That conduct came before any contract, and the conduct under s 46 did not result in one ([3], [29]-[34]). He accepted that Baxter had a derivative immunity of the kind recognised in Bradken Consolidated Ltd v Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd (1979) 145 CLR 107, concluded that the Act did not apply to the conduct, and dismissed the application ([1], [3]). The Full Court of the Federal Court (Mansfield, Dowsett and Gyles JJ) accepted the same argument on appeal, felt bound by Bradken, and did not deal with the other issues ([1], [3], [35], [74]).

What did the Court decide?

Seven Justices sat and delivered three sets of reasons. The issues were whether, on the true construction of the Act, ss 46 and 47 applied to the conduct of a trading corporation in, or in connection with, negotiations for, entry into or performance of a contract with a State or Territory government whose conduct was not in the course of carrying on a business, and, if so, what remedies were available ([1]).

The Court allowed the Commission’s appeal, set aside the Full Court’s orders of 24 August 2006 and remitted the matter to the Full Court for further consideration in accordance with the Court’s reasons. Baxter and the other respondents were to pay the Commission’s costs of the appeal, and the costs of the proceedings to date were otherwise in the Full Court’s discretion ([78]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The principle of construction. The joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ held that the reasons given in Bradken for the conclusion that the Act did not apply to the Queensland Commissioner for Railways “must now be regarded, in the light of this Court’s decision in Bropho, as too widely expressed” ([52]). The Court’s statement in Bradken of the Crown immunity principle “no longer accurately represents the law” and “has been overtaken by the decision in Bropho”; both that proposition and its corollary are principles of statutory construction ([58]).

The principle to be applied is that, since the Act does not bind the Crown in right of a State or Territory when it is not carrying on a business, then, save to the extent to which a contrary intention appears, the Act “will not be read so as to divest the Crown of proprietary, contractual or other legal rights or interests” ([62]). The inquiry concerns the incidence in legal effect upon the Crown. General references to unspecified forms of prejudice to the Crown’s interests are unhelpful, and there is a risk of “confusing governmental, commercial, or even political interests with legal, equitable or statutory rights and interests” ([60]).

By s 2B, ss 46 and 47 did not apply to the conduct of the purchasing authorities, whose procurement was conceded not to be in the course of carrying on a business ([16], [36]-[37], [63]).

The contractor. The joint reasons held that Baxter, a trading corporation, was bound by ss 46 and 47 in its dealings with the authorities. The proposition that the Act does not bind the authorities “does not require, as a corollary, that it does not bind corporations dealing with” them ([76]). A general immunity for a corporation dealing with a government in the course of its own business, not available to the government when carrying on business itself, would be “remarkable”, impossible to reconcile with the object of the Act in s 2, and would go far beyond what is necessary to protect the legal rights of governments ([64]). The ideas that the Act preserves the Crown’s freedom to make any kind of contract, and that persons dealing with the Crown share that freedom from the Act, could not be supported by any established principle of statutory construction ([68]).

Allsop J’s proposition that the Act is to be construed as not applying to a contract between a State and a non-government party was inconsistent with Bropho if inflexible and, as a prima facie approach, “too wide”. To protect the Crown’s legal rights it was not necessary to deny that entering into or performing a contract could contravene s 46 or s 47 by a non-government party, and the consequences for the contract are determined by the Act’s detailed scheme of remedies ([69]-[70]). The joint reasons rejected the view that, because of the Crown’s freedom to contract, pre-contract conduct or a response to an invitation to tender was outside the Act ([72]-[73]). As to the conduct Allsop J found would otherwise have contravened ss 46 and 47, there was no sufficient reason to deny the remedies sought, including pecuniary penalties ([76]).

What was left. The joint reasons did not decide the notice of contention, by which Baxter challenged the findings that its conduct fell within ss 46 and 47. They remitted it, and the parts of the Commission’s appeal that had not been dealt with, to the Full Court ([3], [77]), and said it was not desirable to say anything about whether the contracts would be enforceable if the Full Court found that their making and performance contravened the sections ([77]).

Kirby J. Kirby J agreed in the orders ([143]). He considered that the parties’ premise that a State or Territory is a manifestation of the Crown, entitled to Crown immunity, was erroneous in the light of the Constitution ([82], [88]). Within the parties’ approach he was brought “to the same conclusions as are stated in the joint reasons” ([137]), and he said that Bradken “must now be viewed as qualified by later decisions of this Court” ([142]).

Callinan J. Callinan J dissented. He held that on its ordinary construction s 2B plainly exempts the States from the Act unless they are carrying on business ([155]), that Bradken remained authority covering the case despite Bropho ([160]), and that proscribing pre-contractual dealings with the States would effectively destroy the immunity s 2B gives them ([159]). He would have dismissed the appeal ([165]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [52] (PDF p 30) (opens in a new tab), [58]–[62] (PDF p 32) (opens in a new tab), [63] (PDF p 35) (opens in a new tab)

The question on appeal was whether the Act applied to Baxter given the claimed derivative immunity, and the joint reasons answer it by restating the principle of construction after Bropho ([58]-[62]) and applying s 2B ([63]). The first range runs from physical page 32 to page 34. They are the reasoning for the orders.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [64]–[76] (PDF p 35) (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs reject the respondents’ argument that dealing with a government that is not carrying on a business carries a general immunity, and conclude that Baxter was bound by ss 46 and 47 and that remedies for the conduct found were not denied. The range runs from physical page 35 to page 39. That is the ground on which the appeal was allowed.

Separate reasoning · Kirby J (agreeing in the orders)

Read judgment: [134]–[143] (PDF p 58) (opens in a new tab)

Kirby J agrees in the orders and reaches the same conclusions as the joint reasons, but on the footing that the Crown-immunity premise on which the parties argued is constitutionally unsound ([82], [88]). He concurs in the result; the joint reasons do not adopt his constitutional analysis.

Separate reasoning · Callinan J (dissenting)

Read judgment: [155]–[165] (PDF p 66) (opens in a new tab)

Callinan J would have dismissed the appeal: s 2B plainly exempts the States when they are not carrying on business, and Bradken remains authority. His reasons are not part of the Court’s holding. The range runs from physical page 66 to page 69.

Why does this case matter?

When a private party is accused of breaching a statute in dealing with government, students tend to start and end with the government’s position. An examiner looks for an answer that also analyses the private party’s own position, with reasons.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem where a private party says it cannot be liable under a statute because the government it dealt with is not bound, work through four steps. Identify the statute, the provision and the party sued. Read what the statute says about government, such as an application section like s 2B. Identify what the government says it would lose if the statute applied to the private party, and say what kind of interest that is. Consider separately whether the statute reaches the private party and what remedies are available.

State whose reasons carry each point, since there are three sets of reasons. The statute applied was the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), later renamed the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), and its competition provisions should be checked in their current form before they are applied to a present problem.

Check your understanding

1. What did the joint reasons say about the reasons given in Bradken in the light of Bropho ([52], [58])?

2. What principle of construction did the joint reasons state for deciding whether the Act reached Baxter, and what distinction did they draw between legal rights and other interests of government ([60], [62])?

3. Which section did Callinan J treat as decisive, and what would he have done with the appeal ([155], [165])?

4. What did Kirby J say about the parties’ premise that a State or Territory is a manifestation of the Crown, and on what footing did he nonetheless agree in the orders ([88], [137], [143])?