Toodayan v Anti-Discrimination Commissioner

Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland · 2018

Administrative LawHuman Rights And Anti Discrimination LawStatutory Bodies And Regulators

Toodayan v Anti-Discrimination Commissioner [2018] QCA 349

Two former interns say a hospital’s report of their night-time visit to counter-terrorism police was driven by race and religion. A delegate rejects the complaint as lacking in substance. What question governs that opinion?

What happened?

The appellants were twin brothers, Nadeem and Zaheer Toodayan, who were born in Brisbane to Afghani parents, identify as Muslim, graduated in medicine in 2011 and in January 2012 began work as interns at the Princess Alexandra Hospital ([4]). The first appellant resigned in November 2013 and the second completed his internship in January 2014 ([4]). In the early hours of 4 April 2014 they returned to the hospital, entered with their still-active access cards and went to the colorectal unit, where they accessed a computer to look at and photograph a pathology result for a deceased patient and took other photographs; a nurse and a security guard challenged them ([8]-[9]).

The hospital sought advice from a unit of the Department of Health, and the Queensland Police Service became involved, first through the G20 Taskforce QPS Liaison and then through its Counter Terrorism Unit ([9]). A search warrant was executed at the appellants’ home on 8 May 2014, they were charged with serious criminal offences and remanded in custody overnight, and in April 2015 the charges were discontinued in favour of less serious offences to which they pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court ([10]).

They then made complaints to the Anti-Discrimination Commission alleging discrimination on the basis of race and religion in the hospital’s conduct after the visit ([5], [11]). Their third complaint, lodged on 14 September 2016 with documents obtained since the earlier complaints, was rejected by a delegate of the commissioner on 23 November 2016, and the delegate confirmed on 25 November 2016 that he had considered religion as well as race and regarded the complaint as lacking in substance under s 139 ([22]-[25]).

The rejection was made under s 139(b) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), which required the commissioner to reject a complaint if of the reasonable opinion that it was misconceived or lacking in substance ([3], [35]). On 16 January 2017 the appellants applied under the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) for a statutory order of review, contending that the delegate applied the wrong test ([26]). The primary judge dismissed the application, finding that even if the appellants’ test applied there was no evidence to link the actions of hospital staff with discrimination ([28]). The commissioner took no active part in the appeal, and the President appointed an amicus curiae as contradictor ([7]).

What did the Court decide?

The Court of Appeal (Fraser JA, Philippides JA and Burns J) heard the appeal on 14 May 2018 and gave judgment on 14 December 2018. It allowed the appeal and set aside the decision of the delegate rejecting the appellants’ complaint. It made no order as to costs, because the respondent took no active part in the appeal ([53]-[55]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Burns J, with whose reasons and orders Fraser JA ([1]) and Philippides JA ([2]) agreed, said that under s 136(b) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) a complaint must set out “reasonably sufficient details to indicate an alleged contravention”, that there is no requirement at the lodgement stage to support a complaint with evidence, and that the obligation on the complainant at that stage does not extend beyond providing reasonably sufficient details to indicate a contravention ([40]). He said that s 139 operates differently from s 168, which applies after a complaint has been accepted and requires the complainant to show cause, because under s 139 there is no onus on the complainant to prove anything ([41]).

The nature of the commissioner’s task under s 139(b) is informed by those features and by the protective purpose of the legislation: a complaint cannot be expected to allege the relevant facts with the particularity of an indictment or a pleading, and the question for the commissioner is whether the details provided in and with the complaint, if proved at a hearing of the tribunal, are indicative of a contravention that is neither misconceived nor lacking in substance ([42]). A complaint is misconceived if it is based on a false conception or notion, such as an allegation of discrimination on the basis of an attribute not protected by the Act, and is lacking in substance where the detail provided fails to point to conduct on the part of the named respondent that is capable, if proved, of amounting to a contravention; and because rejection deprives the complainant of a hearing, it must clearly appear that the complaint is misconceived or lacking in substance before the requisite opinion may reasonably be formed ([42]).

Where a conclusion of discrimination depends on inference, the commissioner considers whether the details indicate circumstances that, if proved, are capable of supporting the inference; where more than one inference is reasonably open on the indicated circumstances, it is not for the commissioner to decide which is more probable, which is a matter within the exclusive province of the tribunal ([43]). He said that it is no part of the commissioner’s functions to decide the complaint ([44]), and that s 139(b) does require an evaluation of the substance of each complaint, so that there might be an irremediable defect in the chain of reasoning or an incurable gap in the evidence that might be gathered which makes it clear that there can be no substance in a complaint, but where the details are indicative of circumstances that, if ultimately proved, are capable of supporting a conclusion of discrimination, it cannot reasonably be concluded that the complaint lacks substance ([51]).

He also said that the primary judge was right to hold that the statutory test was not to be glossed in the ways the appellants contended, because s 139(b) means what it says ([52]).

Applying that approach, Burns J held that the delegate had treated the details contained in, with and subsequent to the complaint as though they were comprehensive of the matters the appellants relied on to support an inference of discrimination, which was the wrong approach where the appellants had told the Commission that requests for potentially relevant material from the hospital were outstanding, and because s 139(b) requires no more of a complainant than reasonably sufficient details to indicate a contravention ([48]-[50]).

The delegate had accepted that it was possible to infer from the circumstances that race or religion might have operated as a factor in the hospital’s decision making, but regarded the inference as improbable ([46]-[47]); Burns J said that the correct approach was to reach an opinion whether the details were indicative of a contravention that was not lacking in substance, and that the delegate erroneously evaluated the competing inferences and preferred the one that would not support the contravention ([50]).

The delegate therefore appeared to decide the complaint, which is no part of the commissioner’s functions ([44]). The primary judge, although right not to gloss the statutory test, had not had his attention directed to all of the evidence before the Commission that supported an inference of discrimination, and Burns J had little doubt that had that occurred the primary judge would not have found an absence of such evidence or endorsed the delegate’s conclusion ([52]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Burns J (Fraser JA and Philippides JA agreeing)

Read judgment: [40]–[44] (opens in a new tab), [52] (opens in a new tab)

Burns J’s statement of the task under s 139(b) is the ground on which he held that the delegate applied the wrong test ([50], [52]); Fraser JA agreed with his reasons ([1]) and Philippides JA agreed with the orders for the reasons he gave ([2]).

Obiter · Burns J (Fraser JA and Philippides JA agreeing)

Read judgment: [51] (opens in a new tab)

The observation that there might be an irremediable defect in the chain of reasoning or an incurable gap in the evidence that might be gathered, which would make it clear that a complaint lacks substance, is stated as a possibility and was not engaged on the facts, since the details were found to be indicative of a contravention.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Burns J (Fraser JA and Philippides JA agreeing)

Read judgment: [44]–[50] (opens in a new tab), [52] (opens in a new tab), [53]–[54] (opens in a new tab)

The order allowing the appeal and setting aside the delegate’s decision rests on the conclusions that the delegate approached the task as though the details were comprehensive and evaluated competing inferences ([50]), and that the primary judge had not been taken to all of the evidence supporting an inference of discrimination ([52]).

Why does this case matter?

A body that screens complaints can seem to be doing no more than sorting the promising from the hopeless, and a rejection at that point lapses the complaint and bars a further complaint about the same act or omission ([36]). Questions about such provisions are easy to answer from the label on the power rather than from its words, and from the decision-maker’s view of the merits rather than from the stage at which the power is exercised. The Court of Appeal’s reasons show why the stage and the statutory words matter, and what a person seeking review of a rejection needs to identify.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem about a rejected complaint, identify the statutory words that fix the decision-maker’s task, what the complainant was required to provide at that stage, what material was before the decision-maker, and what the decision-maker did with it. Attribute each statement to the judge who made it, with the paragraph.

This is a decision of the Court of Appeal of Queensland, so it is authority within Queensland courts and persuasive elsewhere. It deals with s 139 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) as the judgment sets it out in 2018, and with a decision made under that section by a delegate. A problem set today needs the current text of s 139 and of the provisions for any other kind of complaint, and should check whether later decisions have applied or explained these paragraphs.

Check your understanding

1. What did the appellants do at the hospital in the early hours of 4 April 2014, and which police unit became involved ([8]-[9])?

2. On what date and on what ground was the appellants’ third complaint rejected, and what did the delegate say on 25 November 2016 about religion ([24]-[25])?

3. What did the appellants argue in the Supreme Court about the standard under s 139(b), and what did the primary judge find ([27]-[28])?

4. What does s 136(b) require a complaint to set out, and what did Burns J say about evidence at the lodgement stage ([34], [40])?

5. How did Burns J say that s 139 differs from s 168, and who bears an onus under each ([41])?

6. In what terms did Burns J describe a complaint that is misconceived and a complaint that is lacking in substance ([42])?

7. What did Burns J say about a case in which more than one inference is reasonably open ([43])?

8. What two features of the delegate’s approach did Burns J criticise at [50], and what did he say about the primary judge at [52]?

9. What orders were made, and why was there no order as to costs ([53]-[55])?