Jurisdictional error: courts, tribunals and materiality
Explains what makes an error jurisdictional, why Australia keeps the jurisdictional / non-jurisdictional distinction and applies it differently to inferior courts and administrative tribunals, the entrenched supervisory jurisdiction of State Supreme Courts, the materiality threshold, and the consequence that a decision outside jurisdiction has no force.
Learning outcomes
- Identify the statutory preconditions and conditions whose breach can take a decision outside jurisdiction, and distinguish them from errors made within jurisdiction.
- Apply the distinction Craig draws between an administrative tribunal and an inferior court, and explain why the same error is classified differently in each.
- Explain what a State law may and may not do to a State Supreme Court’s power to grant relief for jurisdictional error.
- Apply the materiality threshold, state who must prove it, and name the conditions that need no separate materiality enquiry.
Australian judicial review turns on authority rather than correctness: did the decision-maker stay inside the limits of the power a statute conferred? Before arguing that a decision was wrong, a student must ask a prior question: was this error jurisdictional? An error made inside those limits does not take the decision outside the power the statute conferred, however wrong it is, although it may still be corrected on appeal or, where available, by certiorari for error of law on the face of the record, while an error that breaches a limit may leave the decision with no legal force, and beyond the reach of legislation that tries to shut review out. This article states general principles of Australian law settled by the High Court of Australia.
Jurisdiction, and the conditions a statute imposes
In Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 1234 Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Keane JJ explained jurisdiction, in the generic sense this field uses, as the scope of the authority a statute confers on a decision-maker. That scope takes in every precondition the statute requires before the process may begin, and every condition it requires, expressly or impliedly, to be observed in the process. Jurisdictional error is a failure to comply with those preconditions or conditions to an extent that leaves the decision lacking the characteristics it needs to be given force by the statute ([23]–[24]).
Why Australian law keeps the distinction
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 1631 held that the distinction between jurisdictional error and error within jurisdiction, which had come to be seen as effectively abolished in England, “has not, however, been discarded in this country”. In Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 5312 the joint reasons of French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ said of the English conclusion that any error of law rendered a decision ultra vires, whether by an inferior court or a tribunal, that “that is a step which this Court has not taken” ([65]).
Inferior courts and administrative tribunals are not treated alike
Craig applies the distinction differently to inferior courts and to administrative tribunals. Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ, in the single judgment of the Court, held that an administrative tribunal exceeds its authority where it falls into an error of law which causes it to identify a wrong issue, ask itself a wrong question, ignore relevant material, rely on irrelevant material or, at least in some circumstances, make an erroneous finding or reach a mistaken conclusion, and its exercise of power is thereby affected. Such an error of law is jurisdictional error which invalidates any decision reflecting it. An inferior court is in a different position, because its ordinary jurisdiction includes authority to decide questions of law. Identifying issues, formulating questions and determining relevance are routine steps in that jurisdiction, so a demonstrable mistake of that kind by an inferior court “will not, however, ordinarily constitute jurisdictional error”; and nor ordinarily will taking account of an irrelevant matter, or failing to take account of a required one, in deciding a question within jurisdiction.
Kirk maintained the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error ([66], [100]) and added two cautions that matter more than any list of categories. It is “neither necessary, nor possible” to attempt to mark the metes and bounds of jurisdictional error ([71]). And the reasoning in Craig is “not to be seen as providing a rigid taxonomy of jurisdictional error”: its examples are examples, not the boundaries of the field ([73]).
Why a State Supreme Court’s supervisory jurisdiction cannot be taken away
The constitutional holding in Kirk concerns the Supreme Court of a State. The joint reasons held that the supervisory role of those courts, exercised through the grant of prohibition, certiorari and mandamus, was at federation and remains “a defining characteristic of those courts”; and that because s 73 of the Constitution gives the High Court appellate jurisdiction over appeals from “the Supreme Court of any State”3, the exercise of that supervisory jurisdiction is ultimately subject to the High Court’s superintendence ([98]). To deprive a State Supreme Court of it would be to create “islands of power immune from supervision and restraint” ([99]). The limit is precise: legislation which would take from a State Supreme Court the power to grant relief on account of jurisdictional error is beyond State legislative power, while legislation which denies relief for non-jurisdictional error of law appearing on the face of the record is not ([100]). Heydon J dissented from the orders but agreed with the substance of the majority’s reasoning, subject to one question ([113]).
Materiality
Not every breach of a statutory condition is jurisdictional error. In Hossain the plurality held that a statute impliedly requiring a condition to be observed is ordinarily to be interpreted as incorporating a threshold of materiality, rather than as denying legal force to every decision made in breach of it ([29]). That threshold would not ordinarily be met where complying with the condition could have made no difference to the decision that was made, though a statute on its proper construction might set a higher or a lower threshold ([30]).
In MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] HCA 175 Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ held that materiality involves a realistic possibility that the decision in fact made could have been different had the breach not occurred ([2]). The plaintiff bears the onus: the plaintiff must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the historical facts needed to satisfy the court of that possibility, not that a different decision would have been made ([38]–[39]). Gordon and Steward JJ, and Edelman J, would have put the onus of establishing immateriality on the party asserting it, so the Court divided four to three and the plurality’s view is the holding. Some conditions incorporate materiality of their nature: the plurality’s examples are freedom from actual or apprehended bias, and that the decision lie within the bounds of reasonableness ([33]). In Hossain Nettle J, writing separately, observed that an error may be jurisdictional despite not depriving a party of the possibility of a successful outcome ([40]).
State MZAPC with what came after it. In LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12 the Court gave agreed practical guidance on the language of MZAPC without overruling it, explaining that the reasons below and other decisions showed “uncertainty or confusion” about the language the Court had used, “[i]t is desirable to give practical guidance in terms with which all the Court agree”, and “differences of expression and emphasis previously adopted by individual Justices have been set aside in favour of the guidance that is now set out” ([8]). Beech-Jones J agreed with the joint reasons on jurisdictional error and materiality and wrote separately only on their application, so the guidance is the whole Court’s.7
The guidance ([9]–[16]) separates two things a student answer regularly runs together. The applicant bears the onus, on the balance of probabilities, of the historical facts — what decision was made and, depending on the error, how it was made — and proof of those facts “ought to be neither difficult nor contentious”: where the error alleged is a breach of a condition governing the decision-maker’s reasoning, the onus “is discharged by nothing more than the tender of the decision-maker’s statement of reasons”. Materiality itself is not proved as a further historical fact. It is “determined by inferences drawn from the evidence adduced on the application”, the question being whether the decision “could, not would, ‘realistically’ have been different” — “realistic” marking off a possibility that is fanciful or improbable — and “meeting that threshold is not demanding or onerous”. The summary is that unless a basis is identified for affirmatively concluding that the outcome would inevitably have been the same, the threshold is met once an error is established and a realistic possibility of a different outcome is demonstrated ([16]). Some errors need no separate threshold at all, because materiality is inherent in them: apprehended or actual bias, and unreasonableness in the final result ([6]).7
The point is sharpest where the error is procedural. In Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26 Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ held that the standard of reasonable conjecture is undemanding and that it “does not require demonstration of how that party might have taken advantage of that lost opportunity” — a party denied a fair hearing need not prove what they would have said with it.6 So the four-to-three division in MZAPC is not a live contest of formulations to be argued out; the onus is the applicant’s as the plurality said, but it is an onus about the facts, and LPDT is the statement of the threshold to apply to them.
What follows from jurisdictional error
A decision made outside jurisdiction is properly to be regarded, for the purposes of the law under which it was purported to be made, as “no decision at all”, and in traditional parlance it is invalid or void: Hossain ([24]). The plurality attached a qualification worth carrying: such a decision is not necessarily a nullity, because it remains a decision in fact which may yet have some status in law. The relief is supervisory: certiorari to quash, prohibition to restrain, mandamus to compel performance of a duty. The High Court decisions discussed here bind lower Australian courts, although the High Court can reconsider its own decisions.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the statute conferring the power and list the preconditions and conditions it imposes.
- Name the error precisely and say which precondition or condition it breaches.
- Classify the decision-maker before classifying the error: for an administrative tribunal work through the Craig categories, and for an inferior court start from the proposition that a mistake in identifying issues or weighing relevant matters will not ordinarily be jurisdictional. Treat those categories as examples, not a taxonomy.
- Test materiality where the condition breached governs the decision-making process: identify the facts the applicant must prove to support a realistic possibility of a different decision, and note that bias and legal unreasonableness need no separate materiality enquiry.
- Ask, where a State privative provision is in issue, whether it denies relief for jurisdictional error, which State legislation cannot validly do, or instead denies relief for non-jurisdictional error of law on the face of the record, which it may.
- State the consequence and the relief sought, and say what force, if any, the decision retains.