Jurisdictional error: courts, tribunals and materiality
Jurisdiction, and the conditions a statute imposes
In Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123, three judges explained what “jurisdiction” means in this area of law. It means the scope of authority a statute gives to a decision-maker.
That scope includes every precondition the statute needs before the process starts. It also includes every condition the statute requires, whether stated directly or implied, during the process.
Jurisdictional error happens when a decision-maker fails to meet these preconditions or conditions. The failure must be serious enough that the decision lacks what it needs to count as a valid decision under the statute.
Why Australian law keeps the distinction
England stopped distinguishing jurisdictional error from error within jurisdiction. Australia has not followed that path.
In Craig v South Australia, the High Court said this distinction still matters here. It has not been dropped, unlike in England.
In Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW), the High Court repeated this point. England treats any error of law as making a decision ultra vires (beyond power), whether made by a court or tribunal. The High Court said Australia has not taken that step.
Why a State Supreme Court’s supervisory jurisdiction cannot be taken away
Kirk concerns State Supreme Courts only. The Court held that their supervisory jurisdiction (power to review other bodies through prohibition, certiorari and mandamus, remedies that correct unlawful decisions) is a defining feature of these courts.
Because s 73 of the Constitution gives the High Court appeals from “the Supreme Court of any State,” this supervisory jurisdiction stays subject to the High Court’s oversight. Removing it would create “islands of power immune from supervision and restraint.”
The limit is precise. A State cannot pass a law removing a Supreme Court’s power to give relief for jurisdictional error (a decision made beyond legal power). But a State can validly deny relief for a non-jurisdictional error of law on the face of the record.
Heydon J dissented on the orders made, but agreed with the majority’s reasoning, subject to one qualification.
Materiality
Not every breach of a statutory condition causes jurisdictional error. In Hossain, the court held that conditions usually carry an implied threshold of materiality. This means breach alone does not void a decision, unless the breach passed that threshold.
Materiality is usually not met if complying with the condition would have made no difference. But the court said some statutes might set the threshold higher or lower.
In MZAPC, the majority held materiality means a realistic possibility the decision could have been different without the breach. The plaintiff (the person challenging the decision) must prove the facts supporting that possibility, on the balance of probabilities. They do not need to prove a different decision would actually have resulted.
The plaintiff carries this onus, meaning the burden of proof. Three judges disagreed, saying the other side should have to prove immateriality instead. But the majority view is the binding holding, since the court split four to three.
Some conditions are inherently material, the majority said. Examples given were freedom from bias, and a decision staying within the bounds of reasonableness.
Separately, in Hossain, Nettle J noted an error can still be jurisdictional even without destroying a party’s chance of winning.
Later, in LPDT, the High Court gave united practical guidance on applying MZAPC’s language, without overruling it. The Court said earlier reasoning had caused “uncertainty or confusion,” so it set out guidance all judges agreed with, setting aside prior individual differences of expression.
Beech-Jones J agreed with this joint reasoning on jurisdictional error and materiality. He only wrote separately on how it applied to the facts. So the guidance reflects the whole Court’s view.
That guidance separates two ideas students often merge together: first, that the applicant bears the onus of proof.
What follows from jurisdictional error
When a decision is made outside jurisdiction, the law treats it as “no decision at all”. This means it is invalid or void.
But the High Court in Hossain ([24]) added a qualification. The decision is not necessarily a nullity, because it still exists as a fact and may have some status in law.
Courts can respond with supervisory relief. Certiorari quashes the decision. Prohibition stops it being acted on. Mandamus compels a duty to be performed.
These High Court decisions bind lower Australian courts. However, the High Court itself can later reconsider its own decisions.
Applying this in a problem question
Start by finding the statute that gives the power. List its preconditions and conditions, the requirements the decision-maker must meet.
Then name the error precisely. Say exactly which precondition or condition it breaches.
Classify the decision-maker first. For a tribunal, work through the Craig categories (a framework for sorting errors). For an inferior court, start from the idea that mistakes in identifying issues or weighing relevant matters are not ordinarily jurisdictional. These categories are only examples, not a strict taxonomy.
Next, test materiality, but only where the breached condition affects the decision-making process. Materiality asks whether proving certain facts could realistically have changed the outcome. Bias and legal unreasonableness don’t need this separate materiality test.
If a State privative provision (a law trying to limit court review) is involved, ask whether it denies relief for jurisdictional error. State law cannot validly do that. It may, however, validly deny relief for a non-jurisdictional error of law on the face of the record.
Finally, state the legal consequence and the relief sought. Note whether the decision still has any legal force.
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