MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

High Court of Australia · 2021

Administrative LawJurisdictional Error

MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] HCA 17; (2021) 273 CLR 506

The Tribunal sat on adverse police-sourced information and never told the appellant, a breach the Minister conceded. He still lost. What did he have to prove, and who said so?

Clarified by LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 280 CLR 321

LPDT clarified this case and did not overrule it. At [8] the joint reasons of Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ said that other decisions suggested ‘uncertainty or confusion about the meaning and effect of some of the language used by the Court’ in identifying the principles for assessing materiality, that it was desirable ‘to give practical guidance in terms with which all the Court agree’, and that ‘differences of expression and emphasis previously adopted by individual Justices have been set aside in favour of the guidance that is now set out’. Beech-Jones J agreed with what their Honours stated about jurisdictional error and materiality ([38]). The guidance at [9]-[16] asks two wholly backward-looking questions: has an error occurred, and if so was it material. The applicant bears the onus, on the balance of probabilities, of the facts of what decision was made and how it was made, and proof of those facts ‘ought to be neither difficult nor contentious’ ([10]); where the error is a breach of a condition governing the decision-maker’s reasoning, the onus is discharged by tendering the statement of reasons ([11]). Whether the error is material is then ‘determined by inferences drawn from the evidence adduced on the application’ ([13]). The question is whether the decision could, not would, realistically have been different, and meeting that threshold ‘is not demanding or onerous’ ([14]). So state the onus in LPDT’s terms: it is an onus as to the historical facts, and materiality is reached by inference from the evidence. The plurality’s statement in this case remains accurate but incomplete without that guidance.

What happened?

The appellant, a citizen of India, arrived in Australia in 2006 on a student visa and in 2014 applied for a protection visa ([5]-[6]). He claimed to fear that his uncle would kill him in connection with a dispute between his uncle and his father over land in Punjab ([6]). A delegate refused the visa and he applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal for review ([7]).

The Secretary gave the Tribunal the documents the Secretary considered relevant, with a letter notifying the Tribunal under s 438(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) that s 438(1)(b) applied to information in specified documents, because Victoria Police had shared it with the Department “for investigative purposes only” ([8]). One document was a Court Outcomes Report of convictions in the Dandenong Magistrates’ Court in September 2011, which included an offence described as “state false name”, accepted to be an offence of dishonesty ([9]). The Tribunal did not tell the appellant of the notification or of the information ([10]).

The Tribunal reopened an earlier decision and, in November 2014, again affirmed the delegate’s decision ([11]-[12]). Its reasons accepted that there had been a dispute over the land and that the appellant had been kidnapped and held until his father paid for his release, but did not accept that he faced continuing threats, and they made no reference to the notification ([13]-[14]). The Federal Circuit Court dismissed his application for judicial review ([15]). On his appeal to the Federal Court, Mortimer J, sitting alone, dismissed it. There was no dispute that the failure to disclose the notification breached an implied condition of procedural fairness; the parties were at issue only about whether the breach was material to the decision ([17]-[18]). Her Honour held that the appellant had not established that it was ([19]-[20]).

What did the Court decide?

The appeal was dismissed with costs ([82], [153], [210]). There were three sets of reasons: Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ at [1]-[82], Gordon and Steward JJ at [83]-[153], and Edelman J at [154]-[210].

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Plurality (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ). Their Honours treated the principle in Hossain as a working hypothesis of statutory interpretation: a statute conferring decision-making authority is “ordinarily to be interpreted as incorporating a threshold of materiality in the event of non-compliance” ([31]-[32]). The word “ordinarily” matters, because some conditions, such as freedom from actual or apprehended bias and the requirement that the decision lie within the bounds of reasonableness, “of their nature, incorporate an element of materiality” and need no additional threshold ([33]). Materiality involves “a realistic possibility that the decision in fact made could have been different had the breach of the condition not occurred” ([2]), and their Honours would not revisit SZMTA ([3]).

The question is answered in two steps. How the decision was in fact made is a historical fact, found on the balance of probabilities by inference from the whole of the evidence. Whether the decision could have been different is then a matter of “reasonable conjecture within the parameters set by the historical facts” so found ([38]). The plaintiff’s burden is not to prove that a different decision would have been made, but

“to prove on the balance of probabilities the historical facts necessary to enable the court to be satisfied of the realistic possibility that a different decision could have been made had there been compliance with that condition” ([39]),

and that onus “lies unwaveringly on the plaintiff” ([60]).

Application, plurality. Two categories of undisclosed notification case were identified. Where the information might help the applicant, non-disclosure cannot have mattered if the Tribunal did take it into account; where it might harm the applicant, as here, non-disclosure cannot have mattered if the Tribunal did not take it into account, so proof that it did is a necessary but not sufficient step ([64]-[65]). The plaintiff faces “no presumptive impediment”: the passage in SZMTA about what may be inferred from the regular administration of the Act was not a presumption ([67]-[68]).

Here there was “simply no basis in the evidence to find on the balance of probabilities” that the Tribunal took the report into account ([74]). A separate question can remain where information is so “highly prejudicial” that a fair-minded lay observer might apprehend that the Tribunal did not bring an impartial mind to the review, but that was not argued ([72], [81]).

Gordon and Steward JJ. Their Honours restated the principles differently. Non-compliance results in excess of authority unless compliance “could not have made a difference to the decision” ([84]). In their two steps the applicant must first identify an error and show that it could realistically have resulted in a different decision, which “sets a low bar” and is not “an evidentiary onus” ([85]); the respondent must then “establish that that error was immaterial” ([86]). On the facts they held that the Minister had done so, because the Tribunal’s rejection of the continuing-threat claim did not result from any adverse finding about the appellant’s honesty ([151]-[152]).

Edelman J. His Honour considered the approach of Gordon and Steward JJ the better one to the onus of proof in this case ([155]), but thought the difference might have little practical effect ([156]-[158]), and agreed that the appeal fail because the Tribunal had not taken the report into account ([200], [205], [209]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ

Read judgment: [31]–[32] (PDF p 12) (opens in a new tab), [38]–[39] (PDF p 15) (opens in a new tab), [60] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab)

The four-Justice majority adopted the ordinary materiality threshold and distinguished proof of historical facts from reasonable conjecture about a different outcome. Their rejection of the proposed shift of onus supplied the rule used to dismiss the challenge: the appellant had not proved that the Tribunal took the adverse information into account. These passages form part of that ground of decision.

Obiter · Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ

Read judgment: [33] (PDF p 13) (opens in a new tab)

The examples of bias and legal unreasonableness explain limits to the ordinary materiality threshold. Neither condition was the basis of the challenge decided here, so these examples were unnecessary to the ground on which the appeal was dismissed.

Separate reasoning · Gordon and Steward JJ

Read judgment: [84]–[86] (PDF p 31) (opens in a new tab), [152] (PDF p 56) (opens in a new tab)

Their Honours concurred in dismissal but rejected the majority allocation of onus. They required the applicant to identify a potentially consequential error at a low threshold, then required the respondent to establish immateriality. They held that the Minister had done so; agreement in the result did not adopt the majority reasoning on onus.

Separate reasoning · Edelman J

Read judgment: [155] (PDF p 57) (opens in a new tab), [209] (PDF p 81) (opens in a new tab)

Edelman J concurred in dismissal while preferring Gordon and Steward JJ on the onus in this statutory context. His conclusion that the Tribunal did not consider the report sustained the result despite that disagreement with the majority.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ

Read judgment: [65] (PDF p 25) (opens in a new tab), [67]–[68] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab), [74] (PDF p 28) (opens in a new tab), [80] (PDF p 30) (opens in a new tab)

For this adverse-information challenge, proof that the Tribunal actually took the information into account was a necessary factual step. The majority rejected a presumption against the applicant and assessed the whole evidence, but found no basis to infer use of any notified information. This reasoning answered the grounds of appeal and sustained dismissal.

Obiter · Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ

Read judgment: [71]–[72] (PDF p 27) (opens in a new tab), [81] (PDF p 30) (opens in a new tab)

The discussion identifies a distinct possible apprehended-bias challenge where highly prejudicial information may have operated subconsciously. The appellant did not advance that challenge, and the majority also considered these offences insufficiently prejudicial to support it. The discussion preserves a possible route in another case; it was not the ground for disposing of the pleaded non-disclosure challenge.

Separate reasoning · Gordon and Steward JJ

Read judgment: [149]–[152] (PDF p 55) (opens in a new tab)

Concurring in dismissal on their different allocation of onus, their Honours examined the Tribunal’s acceptance of the historical narrative and its reasons for rejecting continuing threats. They concluded that the Minister established immateriality, rather than disposing of the appeal because the applicant failed to prove materiality.

Separate reasoning · Edelman J

Read judgment: [205] (PDF p 79) (opens in a new tab), [209] (PDF p 81) (opens in a new tab)

Edelman J concurred in dismissal by drawing an affirmative inference from the circumstances that the report had no effect on the Tribunal’s reasons. That conclusion also defeated the broader argument about all offences, notwithstanding his disagreement with the majority on who bore the onus.

Why does this case matter?

An admitted breach of procedural fairness did not decide this appeal, and that is the point many students miss: they treat the breach as the end of the analysis and write that the decision is invalid. The case shows what the argument turns on once the breach is conceded.

It is also a case in which a student can quote the right words and attribute them wrongly. The Court did not speak with one voice, and a sentence that reads as “the High Court said” may belong only to some of the Justices. A later decision of the whole Court has also dealt with the ground the Justices divided on.

Exam and application relevance

Identify the condition that was breached and ask whether it is one of the kinds the plurality singled out at [33]. Then apply the plurality’s statement of the test and of the applicant’s onus ([38]-[39], [60]), citing the other reasons only for what they say in their own terms. For the present statement of the onus, apply LPDT ([8]-[16]).

Where the facts involve undisclosed adverse information, the plurality’s two categories at [64]-[65] and its discussion of inference at [66]-[68] and [74] are the closest guidance.

Check your understanding

1. What was the breach of procedural fairness, and why was it not in dispute before Mortimer J ([17])?

2. Which Justices wrote the plurality reasons, and at what paragraphs do they state the plaintiff’s onus ([39], [60])?

3. In the plurality’s account, what must the plaintiff prove on the balance of probabilities, and what need the plaintiff not prove ([39])?

4. How did Gordon and Steward JJ describe the applicant’s first step at [85], and who did they say must show immateriality at [86]?

5. What did Edelman J say at [155] about the approach of Gordon and Steward JJ, and what result did he reach ([209]-[210])?

6. Why did the plurality say that information covered by the notification could not have made a difference if the Tribunal had not in fact taken it into account ([65])?