Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW)

High Court of Australia · 2010

Constitutional LawChapter Iii And State Courts

Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531

A privative clause said the Industrial Court’s decisions were final. The High Court asked what would be left of a Supreme Court if Parliament could say that.

What happened?

Mr Kirk and his company were convicted of offences under the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 (NSW). The charges never identified what measures he could have taken and did not take, so the statutory defence of reasonable practicability had nothing to answer. The Industrial Court’s decisions were protected by a privative clause.

What did the Court decide?

The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. In their place it ordered that the Industrial Court’s orders of 9 August 2004 and 24 January 2005, and the Full Bench’s orders of 15 November 2006 and 8 May 2007, be quashed, and that WorkCover pay the appellants’ costs ([109]). Its reason was that an order in the nature of certiorari “should have been granted for jurisdictional error of the Industrial Court” ([108]).

Heydon J wrote separately. He said he agreed with “the substance of the reasoning” of the majority but dissented from the orders it proposed, which he would have extended: he would have dismissed the applications in the Industrial Court and ordered the respondent to pay the appellants’ costs of the proceedings below as well ([113], [125]-[134]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

A state privative clause cannot exclude the Supreme Court’s supervisory jurisdiction to correct jurisdictional error; that jurisdiction is a defining characteristic of a state Supreme Court and is entrenched by Chapter III.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ

Read judgment: [98] (PDF p 53) (opens in a new tab), [99]–[100] (PDF p 54) (opens in a new tab), [105] (PDF p 56) (opens in a new tab), [108] (PDF p 57) (opens in a new tab)

The joint reasons treated supervision for jurisdictional error as a defining characteristic of State Supreme Courts protected by Chapter III. This was necessary to the stated ground of decision: at [105] the constitutional limit required s 179 to be construed as preserving certiorari for jurisdictional error, enabling the quashing of the Industrial Court’s orders at [108]. Paragraph [100] confines the protection to jurisdictional error and distinguishes legislation excluding relief for non-jurisdictional error of law on the face of the record; the reasoning does not invalidate every privative clause.

Why does this case matter?

Because of it, arguments in this area have moved off the page of the statute. The characterisation of an error now carries the weight that the wording of a clause used to, which is why “was this error jurisdictional?” is where these cases are actually won and lost, and why so much effort goes into a question that sounds like a technicality.

The facts show how unglamorous the underlying complaint can be. The charges never said what Mr Kirk should have done differently, so the statutory defence had nothing to answer: a concrete defect in the prosecution’s own case, and the kind of thing worth looking for before reaching for anything grander.

Exam and application relevance

Construe the clause first; that step does not disappear, and this case did it. Work out what powers the decision-maker had and what the clause purports to protect. Then identify the statutory limits on the decision-maker’s power and connect the alleged error to those limits, and explain why the defect is more than an ordinary error made while exercising jurisdiction. Finally, say which court is being asked to intervene, and what follows for that court from the answer you have given.

Check your understanding

A statute says a tribunal’s decisions are “final and conclusive and not subject to review in any court”. What must you establish before that clause can be put to one side?